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Healthy economic  growth  is crucial to the well-being  of poor
people,  who  derive  income  mainly  from their  labor.  Alleviating
poverty should begin with reducing biases against the rural
sector  and  the  urban  informal  sector-  not  reversing  the  bias,  but
aiming  for neutrality.  Public action  should  foster  the conditions
for pro-poor  growth,  and should  provide  a safety  net for those
who cannot  benefit from such growth  or who do so only with
exposure  to unacceptable  risks.
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This paper  - a product  of the Poverty  and Human  Resources  Division,  Policy  Research  Department-
is part of a larger effort in the deparumcnt  to review and disseminate  research findings on poverty  in
developing  countries,  and  the implications  forpolic  y.  Copies  ofthe paper  are  available  free  from  the World
Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Patricia  Cook,  room  S  1  3-064,  extension
33902 (April 1993, 120  pages).
In this analysis  of public  policy  to reduce  fighting  poverty.  There have been a number  of
poverty,  Lipton and Ravallion  point  out, among  advances  in household  data and analytic  capa-
other things,  that typically  the highest  incidence  bilities  for poverty  analysis  over the last ten
and severity  of poverty  are still found in rural  years. We are in a better position  than ever to
areas,  especially  if ill-watered.  For many  of the  devise  well-informed  policies.
rural  poor, the only inmediate route out of
poverty  is by migration  to towns,  to face a higher  Lipton  and Ravallion  identify  two important
expected  income,  although  often a more  uncer-  roles for public action. One is to foster the
tain one. This may or may not reduce  aggregate  conditions  for pro-poor  growth,  particularly  by
poverty.  We ca- be more  confident,  they  say,  providing  wide access  to the necessary  physical
that growth  in agricultural  output  - fueled  by  and human  assets, including  public infrastruc-
investment  in human and physical  infrastructure  ture. The other is to help those who  cannot
- is pro-poor,  though  not because the poor own  participate  fully in the benefits  of such growth,
much  land.  or who  do so with continued  exposure  to unac-
ceptable  risks.
The policies pursued  by most developing
countries  up to the mid-1980s  - and by many  Here there is an important  role for aiming
still  - have becn biased  against the rural  sector  interventions  by various means  to improve  the
in various ways.  The same is true  - although  distribution  of the benefits  of public spending  on
different  policies  are involved  - of the other  social  services  and safety  nets in developing
major sectoral  concentration  of poor, namely,  the  countries.  Those means range  from the selection
urban informal  sector.  There are clear prospects  of key categories  of public spending  (such as
for reducing  poverty  by removing  these  biases.  primary  education  and basic health care)  to more
Looking  ahead (far ahead,  in some  cases), it is  finely  targeted  transfers (including  nutrition  and
less clear how much further  gain  to the poor can  health interventions)  based on poverty  indicators,
be expected  from introducing  a bias in the  or on some self-targeting  mechanism.  Though
opposite  direction.  Neutrality  should  be the aim.  disappointing  outcomes  abound,  many  countries
have demonstrated  what is possible  with timely
We need good data and measurement  to  and well-conceived  interventions.
identify  which public actions  are effective  in
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Chwpter  42 IHandbook  af  D  amIL  Econo  (Volwme  3), edited by Jere Behrman  and T.N.
Srbwvasan  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  forthcoming).1  lntoducdion
By common  usage, 'poverty'  exists when one or more persons fall short of a level of economic
welfare deemed to constitute  a reasonable  minimum, either in some absolute sense or by the standards
of a specific society. The literature on poverty in developing countries  has often taken a fairly narrow
definition  of 'economic welfare' to refer to a person's consumption  of goods and services. "Reasonable
minimum"  is then defined  by pre-determined  "basic  consumption  needs", especially  nutrition. Both these
steps are controversial.
This definition  of "economic  welfare' can be made more or less comprehensive  (in the goods and
services embraced),  but it is intrinsically  limited. It may reveal nothing about  the disutility  of work, the
length or  health of the life over which consumption is expected, risk and variability etc.  While
recognizing  the limitations  of the concept of "economic  welfare" as "command  over commodities",  we
will largely confine ourselves to that definition, in order to review the many important  issues treated in
the literature  that has evo ved around it. Even this naow  definition  poses  serious  problems, such as how
to aggregate  across commodities,  across persons within households,  and over time.  We will return to
some of these issues. However, it is not controversial  that inadequate  command  over commodities  is the
most important  dimension  of poverty, and a key determinant  of other aspects  of welfare, such as health,
longevity, and self-esm.  And it has been one of the most powerfiu motives  for public policy.
"Economics  is, in essence,  the study of poverty" [Hartwell  (1972:3)J.1  The structure, efficiency
and growth of production  affect -and are affected  by - the distribution  of consumption  between  poor and
non-poor, and among  the poor.  Poverty analysis  has three tasks: i) to define and describe 'poverty", ii)
to understand  its causes, and iii) to inform policy. Each task overlaps  with other branches  of economics,
but the second takes  one far into the economics  of (inter alia) human  resources, labor markets, trade, and
growth. We will often refer readers to other surveys of these topics.
In section 2 we sketch the history of economic  thought on poverty since the Mercantilists,
concenrating on relevance to current economic analysis and policy.  Section 3 then examines how
consumption  poverq is defined and measured. These two sections  - history and measurement  - lay the
foundations for the subsequent discussion, which moves from the "grand" (the dimensions  of global
poverty) to the "small" (the farm-household). In section 4 we provide a "snapshot"  of poverty in the
developing  world today, looking  first at the global  picture, and then turning to the village and household
levels.  Evidence from modern  household surveys has allowed us to examine  the interactions  between
demographic, nutritional, and labor-force characteristics  of poverty groups; in this process, modern
economics is  developing some  of  the  central insights of  the  classical economists, though with
measurement  and modeling  methods not available  to them.  New knowledge  about  poor households  has
1also greatly Informed  our unde.standing  of how the economy  and policy impinge on the poor, the topics
of sections 5 and 6.  In Section 5 we look at how a typical developing economy works - or, more
accurately,  how it has been modeled as working - from the point of view of the poor.  Here we look at
the classic development  issue of the effect of growth on poverty and inequality,  and (the recent classic)
adjustment  and the poor.  From this base, and the evidence  of section 4, we can then explore several
issues  that arise in governmental  attempts  to reduce poverty  through direct interventions. Secdion  6 takes
up these issues.  Our conclusions  in section 7 suggest some directions for future research.
2  The history of Ideas about the poor
2.1  -he  first transition
Most cultures  have sought  to explain  poverty, and to devise a moral approach  to it [Illiffe (1987)].
However, a transition in thought and policy about  poverty emerged in Europe around 1750-1850. This
transition can help us understand a similar transition since 1945 in the LDCs.  Before about 1750 in
Europe 2 - and before about 1945 in Asia, Africa and Latin America - poverty was, by and large,
trendless; subsequently,  its secular  reduction,  by economic  growth  and by public  action, became  a widely-
held expectation. Both transitions  had similar correlates: accelerated  investment  in human and physical
capital; faster technical  progress in food production and disease  limitation; some degree of demographic
transition;  diversification  out of food-growing  agriculture;  and some political empowerment  of the poor.
The 18th century transition from mercantilist  to classical  economic  analysis  of poverty is also paralteled
(in more sophisticated  and quantified form) in the economics of LDCs since 1945.  And both the
economics  and economies  of LDCs were linked  to Western  models  by emulation,  colonialism,  advice  with
strings, and world markets.
Today's underdeveloped  world  is heterogeneous,  and faces  different  problems  to those confronting
the initiators of modern economic growth.  Nevertheless, the insights of the founders of modern
economics, as they analyzed  the impact  on poverty of the first 'great transition", help us to understand
the second. In responding  to Smith (1776), Maithus (1798, 1824)  asked a key question: to what extent
is poverty a consequence  of the impact  of demographic  change  on real wages? While modern  economics
rejects Malthus's answers (mainly  because  he does not adequately  endogenize  either fertility or technical
progress), his and other "classical"  questions  have influenced  the modern economics  of poverty.
Before about 1750, there was little durable growth of wor.d product  per person.  Partly for this
reason, moves to reduce  poverty by peaceful  redistribution  - from the land reforms of the Gracchi [Tuma
(1965: 31-6)] to the proposals of radicals within Cromwell's army [C. Hill (1972)1  - proved politically
unviable. In such a world, poverty did not seem curable, either tdropSh economic  growth or deliberate
2public action.  'There were four approaches to poverty: acceptance, palliation, insurance, or theft.
Poverty might be accepted: 'embraced as a sacred vow [or] tolerated (or railed against) as an unhappy
fact of life'  [Hlimmelfarb  (1984:2-3)]. Poverty might be palliated, by private charity: normally by the
works of the devout, financed  by the alms-giving  of the better-off, which most religions saw as a pious
duty.  Poverty might be socially Insured  against: exceptionally  by the state (as with England's relatively
comprehensive  Poor Law of 1597); sometimes  by implicit informal  contract  among members  of a group
or tribe [compare Platteau (1988)]; but usually by a lord or chief, providing insurance to free or serf
laborers because  of his interest in maintaining  their military  or productive  power and loyalty in bad times
as well as good [compare Bardhan  and Rudra (1981)].
In the absence  of palliation  or insurance,  theft was an ethically  accepted cure for life-threatening
poverty.  A person 'in  imminent  danger [who] cannot be helped in any other way ... may legitimately
supply his own wants out of another's property" [Aquinas,  ed. Gilby (1975: 2a. 2ae.q. 66.a.7)1.  This
view dominated  jurisprudential and ethical theory from Aquinas through Pufendorf to Locke and his
successors. The safety, as well as the morality, of capital required its owners "to provide with shelter
and to refresh with food any and every man, but only when a poor man's misfortune  calls for our alms
and our property supplies means for charity" [Locke,  cited in Hont and Ignatieff (1983:37)1.
Tbis was normative  econcnics, recognizing  constraints,  but c  oncerned  with rights and duties, not
allocations  and utilities. Although  production  was secularly  static, prto-economics recognized:  a right
to assistance  in extreme deprivation,  and a corresponding  duty to work; a duty of the well-off  to provide
such assistance,  and a corresponding  right to the security  of property. Long before Smith, several major
problems with achieving these rights and duties were recognized. For example, legislators sought to
avoid  disincentives  to work for the able-bodied  poor (the 'sturdy beggars"  denied  relief in England's 1597
Poor Law). Also, means  such as tithing or poor-rates  were used to avoid  free-riding  by those rich people
who chose to leave the duty of charity to others [Olson (1982)].
Such problems  were manageable. However, any duty to succor the poor created  a deep problem
for the first attempt to construct a rigorous economics  of means and ends: Mercantilism. The end was
to maximize  a nation's export surplus. A strengthening  currency,  and hence import capacity, could  then
permit one country  to grow, but in a static global economy  this could  only be at the expense  of the rest
of the world.  The means to  maximize the export surplus was cheap, and therefore poor, labor.
Mandeville's epigram that "the surest wealth consists in  a multitude of laborious poor"  outraged
fellow-economists  [Home (1978: 68-9)], but followed  from his and their assumptions.
Into this dark world of necessarily  low real wages,  zero economic  progress  (at least for the poor),
and (for extremists such as Mandeville)  the belief that even basic education  would do the poor and the
3economy more harm than good, came twin beams of light.  First, from around 1740-1780  in England
and somewhat later elsewhere, technical progress in producing both food and manufactures rapidly
accelerat!d. Second, at the level of supportive  economic  theory, the light came from the Hume-Smith
view of a progressive economy. The gains from specialization,  rising demand for labor, and technical
progress (embodied in rising rates of capital accumulatioa),  taken together, would increase both the
money-wage  and the availability  of corn for it to buy.  Instead of low real wages to build up an export
surplus, countries  would  trade freely  at home  and abroad, would  experience  rising real wages, and would
balance  their foreign accounts.
The view that economic development  is feasible, that it can reduce poverty, and that such
reduction is the  main theme of  economics, is thus quite recent.  It  stems from  Smith's deeply
anti-Mercantilist  observation  that "no society  can surely be flourishing  and happy, of which the far greater
part of the members  are poor and miserable"  [Smith  (1776: bk.I, ch.8), (1884: 33)]. Torrens epitomized
classical  economists'  rejection of any "plan of financial  and commercial  improvenwent  ... unless it raises
the real wage rate" [1839: cited by Coats (1972: 160)].
It remained controversial  to what extent a route through free-market  growth to the reduction  of
poverty was feasible. Even for the first-comer (Britain 1740-1850),  there were two important  objections
at the time.  Malthus  (1798) argued  that not only free-market  growth, but also policies such as poor-laws
to underpin  or increase real wage-rates, would self-destruct  by inducing  earlier marriage and therefore
greater fertility, "..thus at once driving up the price of food while forcing down the price of labor"
[Himmelirb  (1984:129)] until the living standards of the burgeoning poor had  been reduced to
subsistence  level.  However, in the second (1803)  edition of his Esay,  Malthus conceded  that technical
progress might raise wage rates and reduce poverty, provided "moral restraint" - delayed marriage and
abstinence  - prevented excessive  fertility [Winch (1991: 42)].  By 1824, he was citing Swiss and other
data to show how higher incomes, lower mortality, and better education  could  reduce fertility. 3
Malthus  himself  destroyed  the arguments  for his earlier  radical  pessimism  about  policies  to reduce
poverty.  Ibis  pessimism (unlike Nassau Senior's view that a disincentive to  work would arise if
poor-relief were insufficiently  stigmatizing  and unpleasant)  played no part in the increasingly  restrictive
application of English poor relief after 1834 [O'Brien (1975:281-2), Williamson (1991)].  Nor did
Malthusian fears about the fertility consequences  deter European governments (notably  Bismarck's in
Germany)  from attempting  pro-poor policies [Ahmad  (1993)]. The fears became even more remote with
the spread of contraception  - opposed  by Malthus, but expected  and vigorously advocated  by the high
priest of mid-century  classical economics,  J.S. Mill [Himmelfarb  (1984: 115)]. This further de-linked
the reduction  of poverty  from any subsequent  increases  in population. All this anticipates  modem theory
4of the demographic  impact both of poverty and of its remedies.
The sewond  objection  to tho Smithian  view - that poverty  reduction was at once the aim of policy
and the outcome of growth in a now normally progressive  economy  - came from Ricardo. He came to
accept [Coats (1972:152-3)] that mechanization  .lducei  inter ali  by higher real wage-rates, could
permanently displace workers.  Yet he did not advoca.e stopping it, or doubt its contribution  to the
embodiment of technical progress, ultimately enhancing national and labor income.  Hence serious
economics, building on Ricardo's concerns, did not relate to the Luddite (or Ruskinian) view that
machinery was damaging, but to Marxist and Owenite advocacy of working-class action to own and
manage the machines,  and later to neoclassical  and underconsumptionist/Keynesian  accounts  of the paths
to full employment  whatever  the capital/labor  ratio.
Economics, from Adam Smith, generally  saw the accumu;ation  of physical capital (especially  if
it embodied technical progress) as reducing poverty.  What of 'human capital", both as a long-term
preventer of poverty and as a short-term  insurance  for the poor? Better health was seen by Smith  [(1776:
bk. I, ch. 8), (1884: 34)] as a consequence,  and subsequentiy  a cause,  of greater working capacity,  higher
wages, and improved  living standards. We do not know if the classical  economists  advocated  publicly
mediated  health provision.  Yet institutional  care in old age and chronic infirmity  was available to the
poorest in many  countries,  long before  the industrial  revolution. In England  even after 1834, workhouses
offered the infirm pauper a refuge 'more  agreeable than life outside" [Himmelfarb  (1984:164-5)].'
Bismarck's reforms of the 1880s  brought some security to the aged and infirm in Germany.
Public and/or subsidiz  A  "'mass"  basic education was strongly advocated by  the classical
economists,  partly because  it was expected  to reduce total fertility  rates [Himmelfarb  1984: 120-1]. But
human development  was the main argument [Smith  (1776: bk. V, ch. 1), (1884:327-8)]. The classical
economists  saw that education  could well enhance ,he labor-productivity  and hence living standards of
the poor.  But that outcome, and possible effects on growth, was viewed as a desirable but incidental
by-product. Recent work on the returns to education  in LDCs [Schultz  (1975), Welch (1970), Jamison
and Lau (1982)]  provides some support for the classical  insight  here: that the transition to a progressive
economy  is what permits ed.cation to provide substantial  income  benefits for the poor as a whole. 5
The demoistration by the classical  economists  that this transition could complement  rising real
wage-rates, and a healthier and better-educated  workforce, was accompanied  by a shift in moral and
political  philosophy. This took the view that, as capitalist  civil society  emerged, public institutions  should
accept  responsibility  not only for mass education,  but also for poverty  prevention ziid/or  reduction  [Wood
(1991: xix)].  For this shift, Hegel was partly responsible. Hegel (1821/1991:  paras. 238, 241) saw
competitive  political and economic  action, by individuals  and groups, to achieve  both private and public
5goals as characterizing  the emerging "civil society", which
...tears the individual  away from family ties [so  that] he has rights and claims in relation
to it, just as he had in relation  to his family. For th.  U,  the universal power [State]
takes over  the role of the family.  The contingent character of  alms-giving ...  is
supplemented  by public poorhouses,  hospitals, street lighting, etc.
Smith had argued that (i) the modem economy  requires division  of labor; (ii) this risks deskilling the
working poor; (iii) hence the State should provide means to educate  them.  Analogously,  Hegel argued
that (i) the modem progressive  economy  is associated  with a strongrr civil society; (i) this endangers  the
kinship links that had previously  protected  the poor; (iii) hence the State should  provide new safety-nets.
2.2  The  second  transition
The ethical and economic  thinkers  at the dawn of European industrialization  were taclding  many
of the issues of poverty theory and policy that are cent' d to development  economics today.  This is
because. in some respects, the European  transition that inspired  the analysis of Hegel, Smith and their
successors  - and the effect of the transition  on the poor - have close parallels in Africa, Asia and Latin
America today.  There too, civil society is gaining at the expense of familial society.  Progressive
(accumulating, specializing, innovating) economies are  replacing stationary economies.  There is
temporary, but apparently  alarming, population  acceleration. And, on the whole, States are becoming
less patrimonial, more dependent on consensual  legitimacy. The first transition (so central in Europe
after 1750)  also had delayed effects  on the economics  of poverty  and of anti-poverty  policy in developing
countries  since 1945. Three effects can be identified.
First, the Western transition drove the colonization  process.  To some extent, though less than
envisaged  by Marx (1853/1951:312-324),  that  process reproduced  European  progressive economies,  and
the associated changes in poverty problems, in the Third World.  Colonization  helped to form the
institutions,  power-structures  and intellectual  climates for LDCs' post-colonial  poverty policy.
Second, the first transition led to important  experiments  in anti-poverty  policy.  These ranged
from the 1834 Poor Laws and the Factory  Acts in Britain, via the more comprehensive  social insurance
pioneered in Bismarck's Germany in the 1880s, to  the US "war on poverty" in the 1960s.  These
experimens are relevant  to poor cowittries  today [Ahmad  (1993), Ahmad et al. (1991)].
Third, the transition in the Euiope of 1750-1850 - to a stronger civil society, to a progressive
economy, to "modem" demographics,  and to more consensual  States - was a precursor of the second
transition in LDCs during the past half-century. This is not to support the crude, self-satisfied  analogies
of modernization  theory and cultural evolutionism.' Yet there are approximate  similarities (alongside
big differences) in processes and power-structures  - and hence in changes in, and policies towards,
6poverty  -as between  the Europe  of Smith,  Hegel  and their successors,  and the post-colonial  Third World.
2.2.1  Awakenings
One should not confuse a belief in what were to become (with the benefit of hindsight) failed
theories and policies with a lack of poverty-orientation  in policy design.  It  is sometimes said that
economics  underlying  early development  policy in the 'ex-colonies" paid little regard to poverty.  This
is doubtful even as a judgement of the theorizing of western development  pioneers, whether in the
Clark-Kuznets  or in the Rodan-! :wis-Nurkse  schools. More seriously, the  judgement  slights the poverty
concerns  of ecenomists and politicians  in the "ex-colonies"  themselves  [Quibria  and Srinivasan  (1992)].
Eff¢yf  anti-poverty actions (even in some fast-growing ex-colonies) proved elusive in the early
post-colonial  period.  However, this was not a result of a lack of concern  for the poor in policymaking,
but of the structures  of power, technology,  factor-intensity,  and the 'soft state" [Myrdal  (1968:895-900)].
These structures often diverted, captured or frustrated  those who (whether  through markets or through
public action)  sought to enhance  the prospects of the poor.  This process led to "the diLaribution  of public
largesse  to the not-so-poor"  [Minhas (1972: 26)], as in the Indian case, which is instructive.
The Indian elite that took power in  1947 was trained in the school of Gandhi, but also of
Macaulay, J.S.  MDI and (much less) Marx.  It was certainly concerned with poverty.  Both Indian
nationalists  and establishment  intellectuals  had long focused  the debate on "Poverty and un-British  Rule
in India' [Naoroji  (1901)]. Mann's still classic  village  study of 1909  in Pimpla  Saudagar  [Tborner  (1968:
xxiii), Mann (1916/1968:  82-103), consciously  modelled  on Rowntree (1901)], like many others in the
next few decades, was centered  upon identifying  and counting  the poor and explaining  their poverty.
Thus not only Gandhian  (and earlier) traditions  of religious and social service enquiry, but also
socio-economic  research emphases, had long prepared India for poverty-oriented  policies.  As Nehru
(1946: 399-403) emphasized,  the National Planning  Committee  put higher priority on the reduction of
poverty and unemployment  than on economic  growth per se.  The trouble was not lack of concern for
the poor, but rather the specific policies  pursued.  After Independence,  the First Five-Year Plan [Govt.
of India (1953)]  explizitly  rejected  growth maximization,  in favor of anti-poverty  planning. So did some
other plans of the time, notably Sri Lanka's Ten Year Plan [Government  of Ceylon (1959)].  The
indigenous  traditions documented  by Iliffe (1987)  demonstrate  similar concerns  about poverty in Africa.
Many  of the anti-poverty  intentions  of early development  planning  were partly frustrated, as with
land reform (section  6.4).  Many plans (including  Sri Lanka's) were largely or wholly  shelved. In most
of Asia, and in some of Africa and Latin America, schemes  for land reform, mass education,  health,
'community  development' [Ensminger  (1957)J,  and rural credit directed  at the poor, burgeoned  from the
7moment of independer.-e. Many such schemes  were  il-considered  or ill-implemented;  most, perhaps,
wore not incentive-compatible.  But the post-independence  intIlectual climate of economics, in and out
of planning offices, was explicitly  sympathetic  to the pooi.
2.2.2  A divers1on:forced-drqft  Industrializadon
Yet the early industrialization  plans of the post-colonial  P:a largely failed the poor. They aimed
at capital-intensive,  somewhat  autarkic, growth.  They turned out to be over-hopeful  of the capacity  of
such industrialization  to raise the demand for lab.,  and so enrich the poor.  Anti-trade biases did not
help; the poor (more, as a rule, than the non-poor)  tend to earn their living by converting non-tradable
inputs, especially  labor. into tradable outputs (section  4.2).  Also, the poor tended to lose to the extent
that accelerated  industrialization  is financed  by extracting  a surp:us  from agriculture,  which provides  most
of their income, and produces their food (section  5.3).  Agriculturally  extractive  and/or trade-restrictive
paths to industialization not only slow growth  down; they reduce its benefits to the poor.
Some of these criticisms  were made at the time [e.g., Vakil and Brahmanand  (1956) on India's
Second Plan].  But, by and large, they appeared  to carry little weight with the theorists of industrializa-
tion via the 'big push", balanced  growth, and above  all labor transfer, such as Rosenstein-Rodan  (1943),
Nurkse (1963), and Lewis (1954, 1955)  respectively. These theorists  shared the classical  optimism  about
"triclde-down",  but not the classical worries about real wage trends.  Yet these worries should have
loomed large; population  growth since 1950  has been much  faster than during the first transition.
The impact of closed-economy  assumptions  on the poor was also little discussed in the 1960s.
Indian approaches  to industrialization  - Nehru, Mahalanobis  (1957), Pant - were heavily influenced  by
Preobrazhensky's  (1921) model  of the extraction  of a surplus  from agriculture  via the intersectoral  terms
of trade (the "price scissors") and by Fel'dman's model of the Lmpact  on growth of accelerated  savings
and investment [Domar (1957: 223-261)]. These we.;  essentially  closed-economy  models, and were
based on the then heavily protected  economy  of the USSR.
The costs to the poor of an industrializing  "big push" were unexpectedly  heavy.  Compared to
the predictions of the planning models, forced-draft industrialization  demanded less unskilled labor,
supplies of unskilled labor grew faster, and the supply ;.  food staples (typically  50-60 percent of poor
people's spending) grew more slowly.  This last problem arose partly because, as Hansen (1969) and
others showed, the marginal  agricultural  product Oost  when  unskilled  laborers  were attracted  to industry)
was far from zero.  Contrary to Lewis's (1954) model, when labor moved  from farms to factories (and
there was no "green revolution") capital moved as well, and food output per person declined.  Also,
industry proved unexpectedly  capital-intensive  as it grew.  Hence unskilled wage rates, but not food
8prices, were sluggish. The poor fared worse than expected,  and to little industrializing  effect.
2.2.3  Counterblasts  to planned  lndustrrallzatlon
The policy approach of the Second and Third Indian rlans,  and of many other (usually less
operational)  LDC planning documents  prior to the mid-1970s,  was in one key respect classical. Growth
was to be achieved via accelerated capital accumulation  and industrialization,  thereby bidding up the
demand for labor and th.e  capacity  to import; that was to be the main weapon against poverty. 7 Not at
all clasAical  were central planning  itself; anti-trade-biased  policies  on quotas, tariffs and exchange-rates;
and, above  all, neglect  of Smith's warning that food supply would  constrain  urban growth [Lipton  (1977:
94-95)]. These elements  combined  to discredit closed-economy,  forced-draft  industrialization.
Taiwan and South  Korea  were outstanding  exceptions  both in the success  of their industrializatians
and in their management  of poverty. Yet they  too had directive  planning  processes, "distorting' domestic
relative prices and foreign trade, and ,xtractive from agriculture. The key difference was that in these
countries current-account rural  etraction  was offset by capital-account rural  recirculatio . This
comprised  (i) public  investme:nt  in infrastructure  for agricultural  production  (especially  irrigation  and crop
research); (ii) public support to human capital formation (health and education);  (iii) support, including
subsidy, for rural non-farm enterprise. 8 Probably essential to the big, fast response of food output to
such stimuli  had been prior, radically  redistributive,  land reform. Although  imposed  from abroad, it led
to productive  and dynamic owner-farmed  smallholdings,  along late-classical  lines [Mill (1848-71/1965:
142-52, 342-36)]. There are a numbe; of similarities  to China's experience  [World  Bank (1992d)].
Some developing countries  made less full-blcoded  efforts at land redistributions, investment  in
education and  health,  and  irrigation and  agricultural research.  Such countries - often despite
anti-agricultural  and anti-employment  policies on exchange rates, protection and prices - avoided the
extremes of retarded industrial  growth (strangled  for want of wage-goods  and/or of human capital) and
of deepening  rural poverty as agricultural employment  and output failed to keep up with unexpectedly
high population growth.  However, these countries typically achieved only modest growth in real
income, 9 nX failed to convert this slow (but cumulatively  substantial)  growth into a detectable  decline
in poverty incidence,  despite poverty-orientated  "add-ons"  to the inadequate  macro-policies. 10
From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, counterblasts  to the failed consensus  around poverty
reduction by planned industrialization  came from a number  of sources.
*  Seers (1972), Usher (1963), Bauer (1965) and others (from diverse ideological  stances) denied
either that GNP was correctly measured by LDC statistics, or that, if it was, it could itself correctly
measure changes in welfare.  Seers questioned  that an economy  in which GNP per person, unemploy-
9ment, and inequality  were all increasing,  could be counted  as 'developing' at all.
*  The model in which the poor largely comprised  unemployed  or "underemployed"  persons - to
be  absorbed productively in  a  labor-intensive (and probably industrializing) process  of  planned
mod  -sector  growth  - also came  under attack. Theoretically,  prevailing  notions  of "underemployment"
- and indeed 'unemployment' [Myrdal  (1968: ch.21 and Apps. 6 aud 16)1  -were increasingly  recognized
to lack micro-economic  foundations:  the poorest must work.  Empirically, following  Hansen (1969), a
succession of studies confirmed that farm labor had non-zero (albeit seasonally  fluctuating) marginal
p) Auct; and that overt and prolonged urban unemployment  was largely confined to the educated and
better-off, in search of "a good job" and able to afford to wait for it.  The ILO reports on Colombia,
Kenya and Sri Lanka [ILO (1970), (1972), (1971)]  confirmed  that the urban and rural poor were more
sc  in "underemployed"  than overworked, especially as casual laborers and in the informal sector
(section  4).  From the rural end, it became clear that the poorest seldom  migrated  successfully  towards
durable, adequately  earning urban employment  [Connell  et al. (1976)].
*  The celebrated "Nairobi  speech" [McNamara  (1973)] signalled  a shift in donor priorities, away
from the heavy (and largely urban) infrastructural lending of the 1960s, toward rural development
designed  to benefit the "poorest  40 per cent" of populations,  seen then as mostly 'small farmers" rather
than as landless laborers.  "Urban bias" was increasingly  recognized  as bad for growth as well as for
poverty reduction, though rooted in political structures in much of the developing world [Mamalakis
(1970), Lipton (1968, 1977), Bates (1981)]. Apart from past disappointments,  two facts supported  the
hope that a  new, rural emphasis could accelerate growth a  reduce poverty.  First,  the  "green
revolution"  was seen, from the late 1960s,  as potentially  able to enrich even  very "small"  farmers [Lipton
with Longhurst  (1989: Ch.2)]. Second, there was increasing  evidence  that farm size was inversely  related
to both employment  and annual output  per hectare [e.g. Berry and Cline (1979), Binswanger  et al, this
volume]. Thus an emphasis  on small farms would  reconcile anti-poverty  and pro-growth  policies within
the rural sector. This process was to be supported,  in attacking  poverty, by investments  in rural health,
education,  roads etc.  However, there was no clear evidence  that a given ouday would have most impact
on poverty or growth if divided among several sectors, let alone if also managed as multi-sectoral
"integrated rural development projects". 11 These projects - at least while conceived as  localized
exercises in  central planning - also  overstretched the  administrative capabilities of  agencies and
governments." 2 As regards agricultural spending (and rural anti-poverty  emphasis)  itself, the donors'
new initiative  from the mid-1970s,  and much domestic  spending too, suffered from two weaknesses. It
depended  heavily  on the efficiency  -and genuine  poverty-orientation  -of bureaucratically  directed credit
labelled "For the Poor" (section  6.4.2).  And it carried no insurance  against  fungibility,  i.e. against  extra
10agro-rural aid being offset by reduced domestic  agro-rural investment  [Singer (1965)].
*  Policies to increase the earned incomes of the urban poor had been neglected in the swings of
intellectual  fashion. But one set of urban anti-poverty  policies did emerge  in the 1970s. The urban poor,
it was argued, lived largely in slums or near-slums. They would  thus be helped by a shift of investnent
away from publicly built, so-called "low-cost"  housing for middle-class  civil servants, towards loans for
private site-and-service  hut building (with provisio-.  of water and electricity),  and for slum upgrading.
*  The earlier emphasis  on forced-eraft industrialization  had been partly driven by the identity
between  the rate of growth and the product  of the savings  rate and the marginal  capital/output  ratio. This
identity was interpreted as explaining  growth i  terms of savings embodied in physical capital.  The
resulting neglect  of the social sectors led to a counterblast  in both thinking and policy. Berg (1973) and
others argued  that better nutrition could  be instrumental  in raising  the productivity  of the poor.  The role
of human-resource  development  in equitable growth was emphasized  by Adelman and Morris (1973).
Schultz (1981) summarized  his earlier evidence  for the importance  of investment  in human capital for
growth; others, in analyses  based on neo-classical  production  or earnings  functions,  had established  high
private  and social returns to education,  especially  primary [Psacharopoulos  (1981)].13
*  The tilt towards  poverty-orientation  in the mid-1970s  was informed  by a view of public objectives
summarized  in the words "redistribution  with growth" (RWG)  [Chenery  et al. (1974)1. RWG reflected
disillusionment  with the poverty-reducing  potential of triclde-down industrialization, S  with radical
redistribution  of income or land, in view of the interlocking  power and self-interest  of the rich and the
bureaucracy. It has become fashionable  to dismiss the poverty  emphases  of RWG, and of the 1970s  as
a whole, as unsophisticatedly  reliant on the notion that the State is a benevolent  "Platonic  guardian" of
the public interest, when in reality  the state is permeated  by rent-seeking  and pressures  to achieve  political
stability  by distributing  the fruits of growth to its friends.  However,  this is a caricature of RWG, which
was quite explicit  about such obstacles [Beil  (1974: 52-61)],  but argued  that some redistribution  towards
the poor could still be induced out of a growing GNP.  First, there were pro-poor islands - whether
idealistic  or self-interested  -within  the power-structure  of most countries. Second,  RWG envisaged  donor
support, foreshadowing  "poverty  conditionality"  [compare  World  Bank (199Ia) and World Bank (1975)].
The  severe slowdown of  growth after the  mid-1970s meant a  harsher climate for  both  aid and
redistribution. When PWG was written, however, this could  not be foreseen.
*  Data and analytic capabilities  responded  to the growing focus on poverty.  While the collection
of data on poor households  had been used to generate  social awareness  and motivate  policy since the 19th
century, nationally  representative  surveys  of household  living standards  are relatively  new.  From 1951,
India's National Sample  Survey had been tracking  household  expenditures. Using these and other data,
11Bardhan  (1970) and Dandekar  and Rath (1971)  were instrumental  in setting in motion  ongoing  monitoring
of poverty data in India [Kadekodi  and Murty (1992)].  Bell and Duloy (1974, chapter 12) helped to
advance reorientations  of statistical services, in order to track the performance  of particular countries,
groups, projects and policy interventions. A sutcession of experiments  with the prediction of policy
imnpacts  on the poor using Social  Accounting  Matrices [Pyatt  and Round (1980)]  and computable  general
equilibrium  models  [Dervis et al. (1982)]  offered  promise, particularly  in LDCs with relatively advanced
basic data.  A number of new initiatives  for gathering  data on poor households  was also initiated in the
1970s. The UN National Household  Capability  Programme  [UN (1989)]  helped put household  surveys
on a sounder and more consistent basis.  The World Bank began its efforts to  collect high-quality
household  data on a wide range of welfare indicators [Chander  et al. (1980), Glewwe (1990), Grootaert
and Kanbur (1990)]. The collection  of panel data, even for small samples [Walker and Ryan (1990)],
has proved of great value in illuminating  the dynamics of poverty.  These and other initiatives in
household-level  data collection  facilitated  both more  systematic  pov-erty  monitoring  and more sophisticated
- and progressively  more convincing  - econometric  analyses  of the determinants  of poverty and impacts
of policies asd projects; see Ravallion  (1992d), and Strauss/Thomas  and Deaton in this volume.
However, these data initiatives have not yet spanned more than a narrow range of countries.
Also, there has been concern that, in some data-poor settings, national statistical systems have been
diverted from other poverty-oriented  data needs, such as reliable smallholder  food production data.
Furthermore,  the development  in data and analytic  capabilities  has been slow  to permeate  policy analysis;
for example, despite well founded critiques from Sen (1976, 1981a) and others, uninformative  and
potentially  misleading  "head-cowunts"  of poverty have tended to dominate  policymakers'  attention.
2.2.4  "Basic  needs and "capabiities":  za  constructive  diversion
Almost all these components  of the counterblast  concentrated  on what McNamara  termed 'the
productivity  of the poor": income corresponding  to retained  value added. However, many poor people
earn no such income:  children and the sick are heavily over-represented  among  the poor; old people are
currently  under-represented,  bi- this is changing  in Asia and Latin America (section  4.2.3).  The "basic
needs" (BN) approach instead stresses "...  human needs in terms of health, food, education, water,
shelter, transport" [Streeten (1981:7), Richards  and Leonor (1982), Streeten et al. (1981)]. Two main
arguments  were advanced  for tracking  poverty reduction by observing -RN,  rather than incomes. First,
increases in real income, especially in rural or sparsely populated areas, may be unable to command
better health care, education,  safe drinking  water, sanitation,  police protection,  or other commodities  with
public-goods  or merit-goods character (and/or produced under economies  of scale or agglomeration).
12Second, households  vary greatly in their capacity  to convert  commodities  into well-being. For example,
there is notable 'positive deviance' in the capacity of some poor households to convert income into
adequate  nutrition [Zeitlin et al (1987)].
Closely  related to the BN approach  in motivation,  but entailing  a more fundamental  re-definition
of 'poverty'  and its reduction, is Sen's (1985, 1987)  subsequent "capabilities"  approach,  Its roots lie
in the rejection of the "welfarist"  paradigm in which individual  utility is taken to be the sole metric of
welfare, and the sole basis for social choice.'4 Here commodities  matter as one determinant  of people's
capabilities  to function (rather than as a source of "utility"). The strength of this view is its emphasis
on commodities  not as ends, but as means  to desired  activities. This explicitly  recognizes  the contingent
nature of benefits conferred by any claim over commodities:  what these do for well-being  depends on a
host of factors, including  the circumstances  -personal and environmental  -of an individual. In focusing
on commodities  and utilities (but not capabilities)  we may thus be looking in the wrong space.
Unfortunately, focusing on capabilities  is beset with its own problems.  We rarely observe
capabilities,  but rather certain "achievements".  The mapping  from the latter to the former is not unique,
but depends on factors such as preferences. For example,  to conclude  that a person was not capable  of
living a long life we must know more than just how long she lived; perhaps she preferred a short but
merry life. The role ascribed  to preferences  in BN and capabilities  approaches  is not entirely  convincing;
it is one thing to reject the strict welfarist  view that ogly utilities matter, and quite another  to claim that
utilities are not at least a part of the objective  [Ravallion  (1992c)]. For a great many choices,  people do
know what is best for themselves."  If so, one should be cautious  in forming  judgements  about poverty
which are inconsistent  with those choices.  The capabilities  approach has not established why higher
consumption  - especially  for the poor - should not remain an objective  of policy, even if it does nothing
for capabilities. There is also the unresolved  issue of how  one should aggregate  over capabilities  or basic
needs.  Single  BN measures, such as the "physical  quality of life index" or PQLI [Morris (1979)], are
arbitrary in what they include, and in the weights  attached  to the included items. 16
The early 1990s  have seen some ambitious  attempts  at operationalizing  the capabilities  approach,
by  measuring each nation's level of  "human development".  In the  1990s, the UNDP's  "Human
Development  Reports" sought in large part to  explore the impact of the economic vicissitudes and
adjustments  of the 1980s  on key measures  of "human  development". However, it is much  more difficult
to draw convincing  inferences  about  the effect of adjustment  policies, over a decade or less, on outcome
variables (such as health or literacy)  than on income  (section  5.4).  There are various reasons, including:
weak and out-of-date  numbers; long (and varying)  time-lags  between  macro-policies  and BN outcomes;
and reciprocal causation  (simultaneity). Even the effect of adjustment  on public spending  for health care,
13education, etc. is controversial. 17 And the aggregation  problem bites once again: the UNDP's attempt
(1990)  to finesse these problems  via a single  indicator  of 'human development' is subject  to insuperable
objections [Kanbur  (1990b), Anand (1991)].
The surviving lesson from these approaches is: recognize the limitations of a commodities-
centered  conceptualization  of well-being. It is agreed that command  over commodities  matters - at some
level - to well-being. Where these approaches  differ is in the view they take on mhy incomes matter.
On the most simplistic  commodities-centered  approach, aggregate  affluence  drives attainments  of BN, or
capabilities. This seems consistent with cross-country  comparisons;  there is a quite good correlation
(after appropriate  transformations  to reflect the non-linearities)  of a country's average real income with
the main indicators of BN satisfaction  in nutrition, health, education,  shelter, etc. [Preston (1975), Sen
(1981b), Isenman (1980)1.13  However, this correlation may well be spurious, in that it reflects other
omitted  variables correlated  with average  incomes, such as the incidence  of absolute  poverty, and access
to key social  services; on controlling  for these, incomes  may matter far less than is often thought. There
is evidence for that view: when health spending and the incidence of poverty are held constant in
cross-country  regressions, the formerly strong relationship  between a country's income-per-person  and
its health outcomes disappears [Anand and Ravallion (1993)1]9.  There is other evidence  that capacity
for both private and public spending is  required to achieve  BN in health.  The message  here is not
that affluence  is unimportant  to well-being,  but that we must be careful in identifying  the precise ways
in which affluence maters.  Ipso facto, this approach can also throw light on what can be done to
enhance  well-being  at low levels  of average income:  China, Costa Rica, Cuba and Sri Lanka show much
better levels (or improvements)  in BN than are predicted  by income per head (or its growth) -sometimes
even allowing  for other variables such as poverty measures [Sen (1981b), Dreze and Sen (1989)J.2
The pressures  tCat  emerged  [Cornia  et al. (1989)]  to give adjustment  a more human  face -spurred
by the BN approaches  - probably helped the poor.  In the early 1980s, it was almost impossible to
persuade  donors  to design adjustment  assistance  with a view to improving  its impact  on the poor.  By the
late-1980s, add-on programs to "compensate  the losers from adjustment"  were common, though often
focusing on the articulate and somewhat  poor, rather than the inarticulate and very poor.  Today it is
increasingly  recognized  that poverty mitigation  has to be designed  into adjustment  programs inidally -
not added as a tranquillizer  later on - if otherwise  desirable reforms in food pricing, foreign trade and
exchange, public expenditure  and employment  are not to harm the poor in the short term.
It would be flattering  to economists  if these pro-poor "adjustments  to adjustment"  had resulted
mainly from theory (such as Sen on capabilities)  and/or major advances in empirical methods and
measurement  (such  as the new household  surveys  and econometric  tools). These  did illuminate  the social
14dimensions  of adjustment.  But  a more  importa source  of pressure  to protect  the poor  during  adjustment
came  from  the less sophisticated  analyses  of the specialized  agencies,  UNICEF,  ILO,  and later UNDP.
Though  honest,  these  analyses  were  often  dubious.  Keynes  has  taught  us that  such  "essays  in persuasion"
can do more  to shift  a stubborn  policy  than better  theory  and evidence  - but also  that these  are needed
as well, if policies  are to be durably  improved.
2.2.5  States,  markets  and  poverny
In the 1980s  there were strong  reactions  against  state  involvement  in development  policies  and
processes. It was widely  seen as rent-creating,  price-distorting,  protectionist,  inherently  corrupt,  and
destructive  of enterprise  - and as preventing  the state, with its limited  resources,  from providing  the
privately  under-supplied  goods (roads, education,  health, etc.) that comprised  its potentially  useful
contribution  to development.  Much  state intervention  was also deemed  to harm the poor directly,  by
rning  the terms  of trade  against  poor producers  of tradables,  and  by creating  discretionary  access  to
inputs,  subsidies,  licenses  and  credit. These,  even  if labelled  'for the poor",  often  went  to the wealthy  -
partly  as rents, shared  between  powerful  bureaucrats  and their  private  clients. A smaller  state  would  -
it was claimed  - accelerate  growth  and help  the poor.
Some  aspects  of this "neo-liberal"  position  are better  developed  than  others. The policies  it led
to entailed  a partial removal  of distortions,  implying  ambiguous  effects  on efficiency  [Lipsey  and
Lancaster  (1956)].  Evidence  that  the new  (ess-distorted)  policy  set  would  do what  is promised  has often
been either lacking  or unconvincing.=  And, while the wasteful  rent-seeking  behavior  of elites  was
emphasized,  the power  structures  which  created  those  elites  were  typically  ignored.
The last  point  may  well  be the most  important.  Shifting  the boundaries  between  state  and  market
may  matter  little  to the poor while  the balance  of power  is unaltered. Suppose  that the poor  are rural,
dispersed  and weak,  but that "the  state" is induced  to desist  from turning  the terms  of trade against  the
rural  sector. On its own  this is likely  to help  the poor. But,  if the power-structure  is unaltered,  such  a
change  will presumably  be offset,  due  to the continuing  power  of non-poor  groups. Hence  the  state  will
be pressured  to make  concessions  to the non-poor,  e.g by increasing  the share  of public  investments  and
expenditures  in non-agricultural  activities. Perhaps  :his is why, alongside  the reduction  of domestic
terms-of-trade  distortions  against  agriculture,  the proportion  of government  spending  (in oil-importing
LDCs)  fell from  7.9 per cent in 1975  to 4.5 in 1988,  registering  a fall every  year  [Lipton  (1992:  232)].
The neo-liberal  critique  provided  a valuable  corrective  to past  statist  excesses  and  errors,  but  was
probably  "a reaction  too far" [Kilhick  (1991:1)),  requiring  correction  by a more  balanced  view of the
developmental  "comparative  advantage'  of states  and markets,  and  of how citizens  in civil society  can
15control abuses of each.
2.2.6  A new consensus?
In the mid-1980s, it was widely alleged that poverty reduction had lost salience for LDC
governments and donors.  Pressures for fiscal stabilization  and market liberalization would raise food
prices, reduce public expenditure and employment, and curtail poverty programs.  Even primary
education  and health were exposed to cuts and user charges. The poor would be the main losers, and
the most defenseless. The counter-arguments  were that non-adjustment  would  be worse. The 'poverty
programs" and social services had often missed the poor.  The poor would gain most, as governments
switched  towards  a more  efficient,  labor-intensive,  pro-rural, tradables-orientated,  and non-interventionist
policy set.  The pain from public-sector  cutbacks, food price rises, etc. would  prove a brief evil.
The evidence is mixed. There was mass poverty long before adjustment  - indeed, long before
the imbalances  and distortions  that adjustment  seeks to reduce.  So it is not likely that either adjustment
or its absence causes or cures most poverty. Neither theory nor evidence  are conclusive  on the impacts
of adjustment  on the  poor (section  5.4). They gained  where adjustment  was not needed, or worked. They
lost where adjustment  was needed but not tried, or was tried but failed.
Early claims, that relaxing trade and other distortions alQon  could greatly stimulate poverty-
reducing  growth, have given way to more sober assessments. The emerging  consensus  is that successful
adjustment,  while it can help reduce poverty, is harder than had once been thought. It requires a large
and not too slow aggregate  supply response. Markets may achieve  this best where states do mMre  - by
providing  infrastructural,  public, or merit goods - to enable the poor to be part of that response.
Where does this leave the poor?  The World Bank (1990, 1991a), UNDP (1990), the Asian
Development  Bank (1992), the IFAD (1992), and other agencies  have published  criteria for anti-poverty
lending or spending.  Several have been followed  up.  For example, the World Bank (1992a) has set
operational  guidelines  for supportive  analysis  and lending; implementation  is completed  or under way for
most countries to which the Bank lends.  These documents  help us evaluate the current consensus  on
poverty [Lipton and Maxwell  (1992)1.
Some common  principles  can be found in UNDP (1990)  and World Bank (1990). Central is the
latter's strategy of combining labor-intensive  growth with investment  in poor people's human capital.
ITe growth is to be based on 1.,ivate  production,  released  in part by the removal of state-imposed  market
distortions  that discriminate  against  agriculture  and exports. The human  capital is to be expanded  through
primary  education and  basic health  care,  largely provided (not necessarily produced) publicly.
Additionally  [but secondarily in World Bank (1990)1  there is a perceived need for well-targeted social
16safety nets, provided by the state, to guard the poor and vulnerable  against  food and other insecurities.
While there are differences  in emphasis,  there Is broad agreement  on these basic elements of a poverty
reduction strategy. But some unsettled questions  still disturb the waters of consensus:
*  If all distortions  are removed, but many of the poor can find work only by accepting a return
insufficient  to prevent poverty, are further incentive  or expansionary  measures  toward 'labor-intensive
growth" justified - or are the risks of inflation, new distortions,  or logrolling  too great?
*  What is the role of asset redistribution  in reducing poverty?  The consensus  is uneasy about
unearned rents, but also about unstable regimes of property rights, and is somewhat evasive on this
question (however, see the chapter by Binswanger et al,.  Asset redistribution  may be essential for a
reasonable rate of poverty reduction in some circumstances:  when intial inequality is so great that
distribution-neuLal  growth brings few gains to the poor; when poverty is so severe that growth and
redistribution  are both needed; or when rapid growth is for some reason unattainable.
*  Should  some safety  nets (guaranteeing  food or work)  always  be available,  -while  protection  against
extreme or localized hardships is provided on an ad hoc basis?  Under what circumstances  do private
insurance  markets, informal  insurance  arrangements,  or even  public investments  such as irrigation  which
help stabilize  incomes, provide more cost-effective  risk reduction for the poor than formal safety nets?
3  Although poverty often induces its victims to  degrade natural resources, so do some of its
remedies [Barbier (1988), Dasgupta and Maier (1990), Leach and Mearns (1991), Vosti and Reardon
(1992), Leonard (1989)1. Is there a trade-off, and if so, how should it be handled?
*  The "country  poverty strategies" [World  Bank (1992a)]  seek to reduce poverty mainly through
economy-wide  poliies.  Does this divert resources from, or does it stimulate, efforts to improve the
poverty impact of major public-sector  projects at each stage of the project cycle, from identification
through post-evaluation? Or are such efforts useless  because of fungibility  [Singer (1965)]?
*  What is the economics  of inteional  non-aid actions  to reduce poverty? If a given amount of
trade liberalization  or debt restructuring  is on offer, how (if at all) should it be allocated so as to favor
the poor?
The smoke has cleared in the state-market battle.  The extreme positions are deserted.  A
consenss  about some key issues of anti-poverty  policy has emerged. Yet this consensus  still contains
omissions and obscurities. Economic  analysis  and testing can help to improve  the position.
3  Measurement
Assumptions  made in measuring  poverty can matter to policy.  We give two examples:
I Will a development  strategy  which transfers income from the rural (agricultural)  sector to the
17urban (manufacturing)  sector increase  or decrease  poverty? The answer  depends in part on the economy's
poverty profile; is poverty incidence,  depth, and/or severity higher in rural than urban areas?  That is
actually  a difficult  question  to answer  convincingly,  and little of the policy discussion  (summarized  in the
previous section)  has been based on good evidence. And some common  methodologies  (discussed  further
below) could be quite deceptive  on the answer.
ii) Should a poverty reduction scheme aim to reach the poorest, even if no beneficiary gains
enough to escape poverty, or should it concentrate  on those closer to the poverty line?  The answer
depends on the poverty measure used. The most common  measure  found in practice -the percentage  of
the population  deemed  poor -would suggest  that one should only be concerned  about  getting people over
the poverty line.  Other measures will put little or no weight on this, and will instead indicate  the need
to raise the living standards of the poorest first.  The choice of measure inevitably makes a value
judgement, and can have considerable  bearing on policy choices.
3.1  LvIng sandards
A suitably comprehensive  r  -n  sure of current consumer  spending on all goods and services is
generally preferred to income as a measure of current living standards in LDCs.2'  There are two
reasons. First, current consumption  is often  taken to be a better indicator  than current income  of  urnt
standard  of living; it is assumed  that instantaneous  utility  depends  directly  on consumption,  not on income
per se.  Second, current consumption  may also be a good indicator  of longterm average well-being, as
it will reveal information  about incomes  at other dates, in the past and future.  This is because incomes
(including  those of the poor) often vary over time in fairly predictable  ways - particularly in agrarian
economies. In such  circumstances,  there are typically  consumption  smoothing  and insurance  opportunities
available to the poor, such as thrcugh saving and community-based  risk-sharing;  for recent surveys see
Alderman  and Paxson (1992), Deaton (1992), and Besley's chapter.
A number of tactors do, however, make current consumption  a noisy welfare indicator. First,
people will not in general prefer constant consumption  over the life-cycle (even with unrestricted
opporunities for smoothing). Two households  with different lifetime wealth - one "young", the other
"old  - may have the same coasumption at the survey date.  Second, different households may face
different constraints  on their consumption  smoothing. The chronic  poor tend to be more constrained  than
the non-poor  in their borrowing  options, so that not only lifetime  wealth but its distribution  over the life-
cycle affect lifetime welfare. Third, even if current consumption  varies less around long-term  well-being
than current income for a given household, it may not be the best ordinal indicator of who is poor in
terms of typical long-term living standards.  That also depends on how the various living standards
18indicators rank different  households;  one cross-sectional  indicator  may vary less around long-term  living
standards than another, but cause more re-ranking and, hence, perform less well in identifying  the
chronically  poor [Chaudhuri  and Ravallion  (1993)].
We rarely have data on the differences  in living standards  within  households. Usual practice is
to measure household  consumption  and assume  arbitrarily that it is divided equally  or according to some
concept  of need (discussed  further below). However, in reality  a change in total household  consumption
may affect the welfare  of different  household  members  in different ways, and even  in different  directions.
This has implications  for both measurement  and policy [Haddad  and Kanbur (1990, 1993)].2
Household  size and demographic  composition  vary, as do prices and access to publicly supplied
goods.  So the same total expenditure  might leave one household poor, and another comfortably  off.
Welfarist  approaches  to this problem  exist, based  on demand  analysis;  these include  'equivalence  scales",
*true cost-of-living  Indices", and "equivalent  income  measures".26  These methods assume  that demand
patterns reveal consumer  preferences  over market goods; the consumer  maximizes  utility, and a utility
function  is derived which is consistent  with observed demand behavior, relating consumption  to prices,
incomes, household size and demographic  composition.27  In all such behavioral welfare measures, the
problem arises that one cannot (in general) deduce preferences  over both market and non-market  goods
from preferences over market goods alone [Pollak (1991)]. Observed  behavior in the marketplace  may
thus be consistent with infinitely many reasonable  ways of making interpersonal  welfare comparisons;
it is a  big step to assume that a particular utility function which supports observed behavior as an
optimum is also the one which should  be used in measuring  well-being. 2 This is an important  problem
because some non-market goods will always determine well-being: children, many publicly provided
goods and services, and common  property resources-2
Identifying  assumptions  are essential. One should  look critically  at the assumptions  (implicit or
otherwise)  used in demand-based  welfare  measurement;  for example,  models  of unequal  bargaining  power
can yield quite different interpretations  of empirical  equivalence  scales to the more common  assumption
of equality  within  households,  with implications  for anti-poverty  policy [Ravallion  (1992d)]. What looks
like a difference in *consumption  needs" may well be due to discrimination  based on unequal power.
Consider household  size.  In developed  countries,  even poor people consume  commodities  with
economies of scale in consumption;  two can live less than twice as expensively as one [Lazear and
Michael (1980), Nelson (1988)1. In LDCs, such commodities  pay little part in the budgets of the poor -
their consumption bundle is dominated by goods such as food and clothing for which few scale
economies  exist. For this reason, the developing  country  literature on poverty  has tended  to use a 'flat'
equivalence  scale; the most common  practice is simply  to divide household consumption  or income  by
19household  size. As a first-order  approximation  this is defensible,  though  It almost  certainly  understates
the extent  of the scale economies  in consumption  even  for the poor.  However,  that is not the only
consideration.  Welfare  measurement  may  also  be influenced  by the purpose  for which  a measure  is used.
For example,  recognizing  the likelihood,  but un-observabflity,  of larger  intra-household  inequalities  in
larger  households,  a policy-maker  may  want  to put  higher  weight  on  household  size  than  implied  by scale
economies  in consumption  alone.
In view  of the above  difficulties  in choosing  between  various  indicators,  it is useful  to know  how
much  the choice  matters. A strand  of recent  research  has been  concerned  with  the comparison  of how
different  indicators  at the individual  or household  level identify  different  individuals  as poor.3  For
example,  surveys  of individuals  in a household  can  indicate  whether  an indicator  of "household  poverty",
derived  from  the more  common  oni-shot  household  survey,  cerrectly  identifies  poor  individuals.  Panel
surveys  can similarly  indicate  to what  extent  a one-shot  survey  reveals  chronic  poverty  [Chaudhuri  and
Ravallion  (1993)].  The  tools  of dominance  testing  (section  3.3)  also  offer  hope  of achieving  robust  partial
orderings  when  there are multiple  dimensions  of welfare  but the precise  welfare  function  is unknown
[Atkinson  and  Bourguignon  (1982,  1987)].
3.2  Povr  lines
There exist levels of consumption  of various  goods (food, shelter)  below which  survival  is
threatened.  It is not clear what  these levels  are for any individual. Furthermore,  in most societies  -
including  some  of the poorest  - the notion  of what constitutes  "poverty"  goes beyond  the attainment  of
the absolute  minimum  needed  for survival. Hence  views  differ  on the location  of poverty  lines.' 1
However,  for many  purposes,  what  matters  most  is not  the  precise  location  of some  poverty  line,
but  rather  the  poverty  comparison  that  is implied  across  dates,  sub-groups,  or policies.  A serious  concern
here is that the comparison  should  be consistent;  two individuals  deemed  to enjoy  the same  values  of
whatever  indicators  are being  used  to construct  the poverty  measure  should  not then  be deemed  to be at
different  levels  of poverty. Fow do existing  methods  perform?
The  most  common  approach  in defining  a poverty  line  is to estimate  the cost  of a bundle  of goods
deemed  to assure that basic consumption  needs are met.32 The difficulty  is in identifying  what
consttutes 'basic needs'.  For developing  countries,  the most important  component  of a basic needs
poverty  line  is generally  the food  expenditure  necessary  to attain  some  recommended  food  energy  intake.
Tnis is then  augmented  by a modest  allowance  for non-food.
The first problem  is setting  food  energy  requirements.  Ihese are usually  set by US standards,
and  are often  not  even  corrected  for lower  adult  size,  and  hence  energy  needs  to maintain  a healthy  body-
20weight. There is little direct evidence  on energy  requiremerts." The most widely  used 'official'
esdmates  [FAOIWHO/UNU  (198S)1,  give  energy  requirements  relative  to alternative  levels  of activity
and body  weight. Requirements  also vary across  individuals  and  over time for a given  individual.  An
assumption  must  be made  about  desirable  activity  levels,  and these  then  determine  energy  requirements
beyond  those  needed  to maintain  the human  body's  metabolic  rate  at rest. Activity  levels  are, however,
endogenus socio-economic  variables  rathet  than  exogenous  physiological  ones, and are jointly  chosen
(under  constraints)  together  with  income  and  diet [Osmani  (1987),  Payne  and Lipton  (1993)].
The second  problem  arises in making  an allowance  for non-food  consumption.  There is no
obvious  anchor  (analogous  to nutritional  requirements)  for setting  a relevant  bundle  of non-food  goods.
Also  comprehensive  and  comparable  non-food  prices  are rarely  collected.  One  way  round  the problem,
the "food  energy  method",  proceeds  by first fixing  a food energy  intake  cut-off  (in calories  per adult
equivalent),  and  then  finding  the consumption  expenditure  or income  level  at which  an adult  equivalent
typically  attains  that food energy  intake  [Osmani  (1982, ch 6), Greer  and Thorbecke  (1986 a,b,c),
Ravallion  (1992d)J. This can be estimated  from a graph or regression  of calorie  intake against
consumption  expenditures  or income. The method  automatically  includes  an allowance  for non-food
consumption.  It also has the appeal  that  it yields  a poverty  line  which  is consistent  with  local  tastes,  as
well as prices. A variation  on this method  is first to find the minimum  cost of a food  bundle  which
achieves  the stipulated  energy  intake  level,  and  then  divide  this  by the share  of food  in total  expenditure
of some  group  of households  deemed  likely  to be poor. This  is the 'food share  method".
If one is comparing  living standards  in terms of consumption  then comparisons  of absolute
poverty  across  regions,  sectors  or dates  can  be misleading  unless  the poverty  line  has constant  purchasing
power  (based  on a cost-of-living  index  appropriate  to the poor3).  However,  the above  methods  are
quite  unlikely  to generate  poverty  lines  which  are constant  in terms  of real consumption  or Income. In
the case of the food energy  method,  the relationship  between  food energy  intake  and consumption  or
income  is not  going  to be the  same  across  regions,  sectors  or dates,  but will  shift  according  to differences
in affluence,  tastes,  activity  levels,  relative  prices,  and  publicly  provided  goods. There  is nothing  in the
food  energy  method  to guarantee  that  these  differences  are ones  which  would  be considered  relevant  to
poverty  comparisons.  For example,  poverty  lines  constructed  by the food energy  method  will tend  to
be higher  in richer  regions  or sectors,  where  households  choose  to buy  more  expensive  calories  (such  as
by consuming  "luxury"  foods). It is even  possible  for the difference  in poverty  lines to exceed  the
difference  in real consumption  or income,  so that the poverty  gap appears  to be higher for richer
households  [Ravallion  (1992d)J.  In the  food  share  method,  differences  arise  simply  because  of differences
in average  real consumption  or income  across  groups  or dates;  those  with  a higher  mean  will  tend  to have
21a lower  food  share  which  will thus  lead  one to use a higher  poverty  line. The differences  can even  be
large enough  to cause a rank reversal  in measured  poverty  levels across sectors  or regions  of an
economy.'3 This can be worrying  when there is mobility  across  the groups  being considered  in the
poverty  profile,  such  as migration  from  rural  to urban  areas.
There  are  refinements  to these  methods  which  offer  hope  of making  more  consistent  comparisons.
These aim to purge the measured  poverty  lines for each sub-group  or date of the implicit  positive
correlation  with  mean  living  standards  [tavallion  (1992d),  Bidani  and  Ravallion  (1992d)1.  For example,
in the food-share  method,  one can use a model  of the Engel  curve to estimate  the food share  of a
household  in each  region  at a given  food  purchasing  power  of total  income  or expenditures.  The most
important  point,  however,  is that (recognizing  that a certain  amount  of arbitrariness  is unavoidable  in
defining  any  poverty  line  in practice)  one  should  be careful  about  how  the  choices  made  affect  the  poverty
comparisons,  for these  are generally  what  matter  most to the policy  implications  [Ravallion  (1992d)].
A sound  practice  is to consider  a second,  lower  poverty  line. Lipton  (1983b,  1988)  argues  for focusing
on the "ultra-poor",  identified  as that sub-set  of the poor who are at serious  nutritional  risk.3  An
extension  of this approach  is to consider  a (potentially)  wide  range  of poverty  lines;  this  is the main  idea
underlying  the "dominance  approach"  discussed  further  in the following  section.
3.3  Poverty measures
Suppose  now  that a measure  of  .ndividual  well-being  has been  chosen,  and estimated  for each
person  in a sample,  and  that the poverty  line is known. How do we aggregate  this information  into a
measure  of poverty  for each  of the distributions  being  compared?
3.3.1  Alternadve  measures
There is a large  literature  on poverty  measurement,  and a number  of good  surveys;  for useful
surveys  see Foster (1984)  and Atkinson  (1987). Our aim here is to introduce  the main issues  with
bearing  on policy  analysis,  using  a few  illustrative  measures.
Let y denote  the living  standard  indicator,  which  has density  function  Jty), and a cumulative
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distribution  function  (CDF)  F(y) = fi(x)dx.  The  poverty  line  is denoted  z.  All  values  of y and z are
0
associated  with  a measure  of poverty  p(,z),  and  this  function  is non-increasing  in y and  non-decreasing
in z.  An important  class  of measures  have  the property  that p(y,z)  is homogeneous  of degree  zero  in
y and z i.e., they are "invariant  to scale".'
22Following Atkinson (1987) we consider the class of additive poverty measures; the value of
aggregate  poverty is then given  by:
to=  f(y*)dy  (1)
0
Additive measures satisfy sub-group consistency, as defined by Foster and Shorrocks (1991).  This
requires that when poverty increases  in any sub-group  of the population  (such as rural areas) without a
decrease in poverty elsewhere, then sggregate poverty must also increase.  Sub-group inconsistent
measures may mislead policy analysis; a well #argeted  poverty reduction scheme - in which poverty is
reduced in a target region, say - may not then show up in a reduction in national  poverty.'$
The widely used bead-countinde (H) is simply the proportion of the population for whom
consumption  (or another suitable measure of living standard)  y is less than the poverty line; H  - Ft),
obtained  by setting p(y,z) =  1 in equation (1).  1 is easily  understood  and communicated,  but for some
purposes (including  analyses  of the impacts  on the poor of specific policies) it has a serious drawback.
Suppose  that a poor person  suddenly  becomes  very much  poorer. What will  happen  to measured  poverty?
Nothing. H is totally insensitive  to differences  in the depth of poverty.
The Wp M gap index PG is obtained  by setting  p(y,z) = 1  -y/z (the proportionate  poverty  gap).
This indicates  the average depth of poverty, in that it depends on the distances  of the poor below the
poverty line.  PG indicators the potential for eliminating  poverty by targeting transfers to the poor
(whether  that potential can be realized or not in practice will be taken up in section 6).3  The widely
used income La  ratiQ  is I= 1 -pPIz  =PG/H, where iP  is the mean consumption  or income of the poor;
this measures  the average  proportionate  shortfall  below the poverty  line.  However, it can be a deceptive
measure. If a poor person with a standard  of living above ,p? escapes  poverty  then the income  gap ratio
will E_,  yet no-one is worse off, and one of the poor is actually  better off.  PG is a better measure.
One drawback  of PG and I is that they neglect  income inequality  among the poor; they may not
convincingly  capture differences  in the severity  of poverty. For example, consider  two distributions  of
consumption  for four persons; the A distribution  is (1,2,3,4) and the B is (2,2,2,4).  For a poverty line
z=3,  A and B have the same value of PG=.25  (=[(3-1)/3 + (3-2)131/4  fo, A).  However, the poorest
person in A has only half the consumption  of the poorest in B.  The poverty gap will be unaffected  by
a transfer from a poor person to someone  who is less poor [Sen (1976) (1981a)1.
The Foster-G.eer-Thorbecke  (FGT) (1984) measure P2 has p(y,z) =  (1  -y/z) 2 (the squared
23proportionate  poverty gap).  This reflects inequality  amongst  the poor. In the above example  of A and
B distributions,  P2 is [(2/3)2  + (1/3)1/4 =  0.14 for A and 0.08 for B, indicating  the greater severity of
poverty in A.  The general class of POT measures P.  is obtained when p(y,z)  (I -y/z)  (a 20). (The
head-count  index  has a=0,  while  PG has a=l.)  Other distribution-sensitivemeasures  includethe Watts
(1968)measure,  p(y,z) = log(z4y),  andthatproposedbyClarketal.  (1981),p(y,z) = (1-(yz)F)/P  (Bs1).
Poverty measures are typically calculated from sample surveys, and so they have sampling
distributions. Like any estimate of a population  proportion  from a random sample, H has the standard
error V[H.(1-H)/n] in a sample of size n.  Kakwani (1993) has derived the standard errors of other
common  poverty measures; for example,  the standard error of the P. measure is V((P2.-P 2)/n).  ThUS
one can test whether (for examplej  a measured  increase in poverty is statistically  significant.
A long-standing  poorly resolved  issue in poverty  measurement  is whether  there is a jump in well-
being as one crosses the poverty line.  The answer alters the effects of risk on expected poverty
[Ravallion  (1988)], and the properties of optimal poverty reduction policies [Bourguignon  and Fields
(1990), Ravallion (1991b)1. For measures such as P2 (and others in the FGT class for a>  1), the
individual poverty  measure  vanishes  smoothly  at  the  poverty  line,  i.e.,  in  equation  (1)
pz-z)  5  p,(z,)  = 0.  This  does not hold for al distribution-sensitiveadditively  separable  measures;  e.g.,
for the Watts measure.  Nor does it hold for non-additive  measures,  such as the Sen (1976) index.
Should  poverty  measures  embody  such  kinks? There clearly  are thresholds  in food energy  intakes
below which health - and survival - is threatened.  However, the poverty lines found in practice are
typically well above such thresholds (sectiop 3.2).  Also, the uncertainty about the location of such
thresholds, and their inter-personal  variability, can make it hazardous for some purposes to rely on
poverty measures  which are nft smooth at the poverty line [Ravallion  (1992d)1.
Does the choice of measures  affect the policy choices? If all persons  gain (ose) then clearly  not;
poverty cannot increase (fall).  Otherwise,  the differences  between  these measures can be pronounced.
Consider, for example, two policies.  Policy A entails a small redistribution  from people around the
mode, which is also where the poverty line happens to be located, IQ  the poorest households.0  EPoiy
P.  entails the opposite  change -the poorest lose while  those at the mode  gain. A moment's reflection  will
confirm that the head-count index  H will indicate  policy B; HA> H. since H depends solely on which
direction  people cross the poverty line.  However, P2 will indicate  the opposite  ranking, P2 < P2s,  since
it will respond  more to the gains or losses  amongst  the poorest  than amongst  the not-so-poor. The choice
here concerns  both value-judgements  about interpersonal  comparions,  and the empirical question  of how
closely poverty lines coincide  with points at which there are discrete  jumps in welfare.
243.3.2  DecomposItons  ,,  ,
Additive  poverty measures,  such as the FGT class and all measures  which can be represented in
the form of equation (1), can greatly facilitate  the construction  of '=  my  profiles", which are simply
decompositions  of an aggregate  poverty measure, showing how poverty varies across sub-groups of
society, such as region of residence  or sector  of employment. A consistent  poverty  profile can be useful
in assessing  how the sectoral or regional  pattern  of economic  change  is likely  to affect aggregate  poverty.
For example, if the poverty profile shows that there is significantly  higher poverty incidence  in region
A than B, then a transfer in equal amount to all residents of A financed by a lump-sum tax on each
resident of B holding their populations  constant will reduce the aggregate  poverty gap index [Kanbur
(1987, 1990),  Besley  and Kanbur  (1988, 1993)]. The  poverty indicator  for allocating  additively  absorbed
transfers (whereby  eah  income,  within a given sub-group,  changes  by the same  amount)  to minimize  the
aggregate  value of the FGT measure  P, is P,,Ij.  To see why, consider  regions A and B with population
shares n, (i=A,B) each resident of which receives a transfer xi (i=A,B),  and nAxA+nBxB  is fixed. The
aggregate  value of P. is given by
P,  =APA  + nNP.  (2)
where
I-xe
Pat  f1(1-(y+x)Iz)'f/y)dy  (3)
for i=A,B.  Consider the marginal  impact  of an increase  in xA  (at the expense  of B).  On differentiating
equation (2) one finds that (for a 2 1):
dP,  - [P.,  - P.UwA.nA,fAJz  (4)
Poverty will fall if (and only if) region A has the higher value of the a-1 poverty index.  Taking this
argument  further, it is also instructive  to characterize  the poverty minimizing  allocation  of a given budget
across sub-groups. For example, consider again the additively  absorbed transfer between two groups
which minimis  the aggregate  value of P2. With unrestricted  powers of redistribution  between groups,
P2 will be minimized  when P, is equalized  across groups.4' 1
Similarly, the povery indicator for allocating multiplicatively  absorbed transfers (whereby all
incomes increase by the same proporion) is (P,, I 1 - P,,/p4 [Kanbur (1987)1.  42  Since multiplicatively
absorbed  transfers leave the Lorenz  curve unchanged,  this result also implies  that the elasticity  of P. with
25respect to the population mean holding the Lorenz curve constant is given by a(l  - Pci/P.)  for a2!:1
[Kakwani  (1990a)J. In the case of the head-count  index (a=O), that elasticity is (minus one times) the
elasticity  of the cumulative  distribution  function  of living standards  when evaluated  at the poverty line.43
Changes in poverty measures can also be decomposed.  It is co interest to ask: how much of a
change in poverty is due to changes  in distribution,  as distinct  from growh in average living standards?
The usual inequality  measures, such as the Gini index, can be misleading  in this context.  One cannot
conclude that a change in any measure  of inequality  will change, in the same direction, any measure of
poverty (e.g., H d  if people just above the poverty line lose income to the poorest).  Even when it
does, the change in the inequality measure can be a poor guide to the quantitative  impact on poverty.
A number of recent papers have looked at this problem."  Datt and Ravallion (1992a) discuss the
relative  merits of alternative  approaches,  and propose  a simple  decomposition  for any change in measured
poverty which allows one to quantify  the relative importance  of growth versus redistribution.
When analyzing  the sources of reductions in poverty, we can also make use of another simple
decomposition  formula, also exploiting  the additivity  property  of measures  such as those in the FGT class,
as discussed  above. The idea here is to throw light on the relative importance  of changes  xiithJi sectors
versus changes  betwn  them, such as due to inter-sectoral  population  or work-force  shifts [Ravallion  and
Huppi (1991)].  The rapid rate of urbanization  typical of many developing  countries can make such a
decomposition  insightful,  though it tells us little about the underlying  causes of the changes  observed.
3.3.3  Assessing  robusness
At a number of points in the discussion  so far we have seen that there is pervasive uncertainty
in poverty  measurement. There are likely to be errors in our living-standards  data, unknown  differences
in needs between  households  at similar consumption  levels, uncertainty  and arbitrariness  about both the
poverty line and precise poverty measure.  Given these problems, how robust are  our poverty
comparisons? Would they alter if we made alternative  assumptions? A recent strand of research in
poverty analysis  has shown how we can answer such questions, drawing on and developing  results from
the theory of stochastic  dominance. 45
Suppose  we do not know  the poverty line z, but we can be sure that it does not exceed  z.  Nor
do we know the precise poverty measure, though we do know that it is additive, as in equation (1).16
Then it can be shown that poverty cannot  have risen between  two dates if the CDF for the latter date lies
nowhere above that for the former date, up to z"  [Atkinson  (1987)]. And poverty must have fallen if
the new F(z) is everywhere  below the old one.  This holds no matter what the poverty line or precise
poverty  measure. If the CDFs cross each other (and they may  i=tersect  more  than once), then the ranking
26is ambiguous.  Then we know that some poverty lines and some poverty measures will rank the
distributions  differently  to others.  We need more information. One can restrict the range of poverty
lines, or one can impose  more structure on the poverty measure. For example, if one restricts attention
to additive measures which do reflect the depth of poverty such as PG and P2 (but excluding  H) then
poverty cannot have risen if the area under the new CDF is nowhere greater than that under the old
one.'7 If this test is inconclusive,  one can further restrict the range of admissible  poverty measures;  see
Atkinson  (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks  (1988).
Such tests can also allow robust poveny  comparisons in  the presence of  certain sorts of
measurement  errors in the welfare indicator.  Suppose  that different households fall into poverty at
different, but unknown, levels of real consumption  per adult equivalent. This may happen because  of
inter-individual variation in  dietary energy requirements; or  because of  errors  in  measuring the
demographic composition of households, or differences in the prices they face.  Provided that the
distribution of measurement  errors is the same for the two (or more) situations  being compared and is
independent  of the distribution  of living standards,  non-intersecting  CDFs imply  an unambiguous  poverty
ranking. This holds no matter what the underlying  distribution  of the measurement  errors.4 8
In  summary: recent  practice has  started  to  move away  from  preoccupations with  the
cardinalization  of poverty, toward a search  for consistent  and robust  poverty comparisons  of distributions,
whether viewed as a single variable or many variables for which only quite weak properties of their
aggregaton are known. A number  of principles  for guiding  such comparisons  can now be laid out: The
poverty assessment  should aim to treat identical  levels of living identically. It should respect at least a
weak version of the Pareto piznciple,  in that a distribution  in which no one has a lower standard  of living
could not have more poverty.  It should also give higher weight to gains at lower levels of living.  It
should  not demand  identification  of a precise 'poverty line", but rather a range of admissible  lines; it may
well be that the qualitative  comparison  is unaffected  by choice within  that range.
4  Dimensions and causes
This section will try to provide a "snapshot"  of poverty in the developing world from recent
available data.  We will begin with a broad regional  overview, and move on to a summary  of what we
kmow  about the characteristics  of the poor.
4.1  A global snapshot
International comparisons  of poverty statistics are plagued with both conceptual and practical
problems. It is not clear what meaning  can be attached  to comparisons  across countries  in which the real
27value of the poverty line varies. But then whose  poverty line should  be used? Poverty lines appropriate
to the poorest countries, such as India, have been a popular choice in past work [Ahluwalia,  Carter and
Chenery (1979), Kakwani (1980a), World  Bank (1980a, 1990), Ravallion  et al. (1991)]. There are also
comparability  problems  across the underlying  household  surveys (Deaton  in this volume), though survey
methodologies  have now become somewhat  standardized. An equally worrying problem is converting
currencies, for which official exchange  rates can be a poor guide in making  poverty comparisons  across
countries.  The International Comparisons  Project of the U.N.  has helped here, by facilitating the
construction  of Purchasing  Power Parity (PPP)  exchange  rates [Kravis  et al. (1975), Summers  and Heston
(1988) (1991)].  Though these are not ideal for international  poverty comparisons  (not being anchored
to poor people's consumptions),  they appear to be the best available method  for setting internationally
comparable poverty lines, and have been used for this purpose by Ahluwalia et al. (1979), Kakwani
(1980a), World Bank (1980a, 1990), and Ravallion  et al. (1991).
Recent estimates  following  this methodology  indicate  that about  one-fifth  of the population  of the
developing  world - about 600 million people - in the mid-1980s  had a real consumption  level less than
India's poverty line of $23 per month  in 1985  US prices (adjusted  for cost-of-living  differences  between
countries).19  At a more generous poverty line of $31 per month - one dollar per day - the head-count
index of poverty increases to about one in three, or about one billion people.  Tbere are no strictly
comparable  earlier estimates,  but the proportion  of people poor has probably fallen since the mid-1970s,
while the absolute number of poor has probably increased.'  However, these aggregates  hide great
regional diversity; for example, while the proportion who are consumption-poor  has declined in much
of Asia, quite sharply in some countries, it has probably increased in Sub-Saharan  Africa and Latin
America during the 1980s  [World  Bank (1990, 1992b), Chen ?t al. (1993)].
Though the number  who are poor by Indian standards is large, the aggregate  poverty  gap in the
developing  world is actually  quite small. The aggregate  poverty  gap of the poorest fifth of the population
of the developing  world is about one percent of total consumption  by the developing  world in 1985; for
the poorest  third, the corresponding  figure  is about  three percent [Ravallion  et al., (1991)]. This suggests
that only modest  aid to LDCs would  be needed  to eliminate  poverty, though this assumes  perfect targeting
without disincentive  effects; that would be very difficult  in real life (section  6.2).
Properties of the static consumption  distribution  in the developing  world can help us understand
how poverty is  affected by  growth and redistribution.  First,  the aggregate CDF of  persons by
consumption  per person is quite elastic to changes in the poverty line or mean, 5"  reflecting a high
density of observations  around commonly  assumed poverty lines.  This suggests  that poverty will fall
quite rapidly with distributionally  neutral growth in mean consumption. Comparison  of the proportions
28of the aggregate  population  of developing  countries  deemed  to be poor at $23 and $31 per month Implies
an arc elasticity of the head-count  Index with respect to the mean consumption  of about two, holding
constant all relative inequalities  (as Indicated  by the aggregate Lorenz curve).  At the average rate of
population growth in the developing  countries, the total number of poor will decline as long as future
growth and  distributional shifts are equivalent to  a  distributionally neutral growth rate  in  mean
consumption  of about one percent per year [Ravallion  et al. (1991)].  The steepness  of the CDF also
implies that aggregate  estimates  of the number  of poor will be sensitive  to the choice  of the poverty  line.
Second, aggregate  prospects  for poverty  alleviation  through  future growth  are sensitive  to changes
in relative inequalities. Suppose  that the Lorenz curve shifts by a constant proportion  of the difference
between each income  group's actual  share of total consumption  and equal-shares  allocation.Y2  One then
finds that poverty would respond very elastically to shifts in the Gini index of  inequality for the
developing  world as a whole; for the $23 poverty line, PG for the developing world would respond to
the Gini index with an elasticity of over 13 [Ravallion et al. (1990)].  Thus, while poverty in the
developing  world would fa1l  fairly rapidly with distributionally  neutral growth, it would take only small
deviations fr&ii neutrality to wipe out those gains.  Consider a one percent rate of increase in mean
consumption  from 1985  until 2000. It would  take only a 0.25% per year increase in the aggregate  Gini
index to eliminate  the total effect of such growth on the poverty gap index of the developing  world.
As for trends over time, the World  Bank (1990, Table 3.2) compares  H, roughly from the mid-
1960s  to the mid-1980s,  using a constant  real poverty  line over time, in each of 11 developing  countries
(none  of them in SSA). In every case  the incidence  of poverty  fell over this period, and numbers  of poor
feil in most cases.  Estimates  of how poverty measures  have evolved  in the late 1980s  are given in Chen
at al. (1993).  The methodology  is consistent  across time, and the poverty line is fixed (in terms of
purchasing  power parity)  across  time and countries. The estimates  used available  household  consumption
data sets from nationally representative  surveys. The results show negligible change in the aggregate
poverty measures  between 1985  and 1990. The head-count  index (percentage  of persons  consuming  less
than $1 per day) has fallen slightly, from 34% to 33%, but this cannot be considered  significant.
Poverty measures  have fallen in the 1980s  in both South and East Asia, but have risen in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC), though the extent of worsening  varies by poverty  measure and poverty line, and there
have been improvements  in some countries [Chen et al. (1993)]. SSA has now levelled with SA in the
incidence  of absolute  poverty  at poverty lines  around $1 per day. SSA is now the region  with the greatest
depth of poverty, as measured by PG.'  Only in East Asia is there good evidence of falling poverty,
and progress has been impressive. From the point  of view of the poor, the low growth rates experienced
29since the late 1970s - and currently being forecast - in most of SSA are particularly worrying [World
Bank (1990), Walton (1990)1. The proportion  of SSA's population  who are poor by Indian standards  is
now at roughly the same level as in India, and SSA's growth prospects are lower.'
4.2  Demographic  characteristcs  of the  poor
Much of our current empirical  knowledge  about  specific  characteristics  of the poor is in the form
of bivariate correlations;  we know far less about  the joint interrelationships  with other characteristics  of
poverty, and attempts  to infer causality  are clouded  in problems  of simultaneity.-" While we shalll try
to cast some light on these issues, better data and testing are needed.
4.2.1  Poverty  andfamily  size
National  samples  and micro-studies  typically  confirm  that larger household  size is associated  with
greater incidence  of poverty, as measured by household consumption  or income per person [Birdsall
(1979: 132), Meesook  (1979), Musgrove  (1980), Visaria (1980: 47-9), Lipton (1983a), House (1989),
World Bank (1991b,d), van de  Walle and Ravallion (1992)].  In most cases, household size and
consumption  or income  per person are inversely  related over the whole range.m
Children are more likely to be poor than adults [Birdsall  (1980: 39), Musgrove (1980), Lipton
(1983a)J.  Usually this is not because households  underfeed children [Schofield  (1979)], but because
child/adult  ratios are larger in poor households. Higher infant  and child mortality  (leading  to even higher
replacement  fertility) is caused  by undernutrition;  and high child/adult  ratios cause  income  poverty. Also,
heavy female burdens and child poverty  often go hand in hand.
Poor households  are thus larger and younger;  their members  - particularly  the youngest  - are less
likely to live as long as the non-poor. Most mortality  differences  between rich and poor in LDCs arise
in the first five years of life.  In Asia and Africa, infant and child mortality  increase steeply  with poverty
[Lipton (1983a: 15-18)]. Often, poverty is linked  to high child death-rates  partly because it proxies the
impact  of low maternal  education  [Hull and Hull (1976: 8,15), Caldwell  (1979),  Hill (1981: 35), Ruzicka
(1982: Table 9), Roth and Kurup (1989)J;5 of inadequate  housing or water supply [ibid., Mitra (1978:
210)]; of farm labor or insecure tenancy [ibid.: 21; Natrajan, n.d.:12]; or above all of rural residence
[ibi .:  7; Hill (1981: 35), Mitra (1978: 223), Ruzicka (1982: tables 5-6), Irfan (1989)].  However,
poverty is causally related to this whole group of other correlates  of high mortality [Flegg (1982)]. So
the fact that poverty 'proxies" the other correlates  need not devalue its bivariate link to mortality.
Mortality  is probably  a non-linear  function  of income. Under certain  restrictions  on the properties
of the household production furction for health and the distribution  of personal constitutions  one can
30derive a relationship between survival chance and consumption  which is concave above some point
[Ravallion  (1987a, ch.2)].  At high levels of income,  4utrition  and health care, further reductions in
already low death rates are not easily atainable, nor strovgly linked to further income gains.  There is
supportive  evidence  for a concave  relationship  between  survival chances  and incomes. In cross-country
comparisons, Preston (1975) finds that the income-slope  of mortality is greater at the low end of the
income  range, though  low income  may be proxying  for other variables  such as low education,  poor health
services  etc [Ahmed  (1992), Heston (1992), Srinivasan  (1992),  Anand and Ravallion  (1993)]. Farah and
Preston (1982) for the urban Sudan, and Irfan (1989) for Pakistan, show a strong link of poverty to
mortality rates for the poorest few deciles. Clear discontinuities  are shown in death-rates  between the
landless and others; for Binar, India [Rodgers et al. (1989)1  and Pakistan [Irfan (1989)1;  and between
those of low status and others [Mukhopadhyay  (1989) for caste in West Bengal in 19834].
On its own, high mortality  in poor households  makes  them smaller. Higher morality among  poor
households  might, however, be associated with their larger sizes if it (or anything  else) induced them to
raise fertility - relative to non-poor households  - by a larger proportion. There  is a problem in testing
this; a positive cross-section  link between fertility and poverty need not show that high fertility is a
feature  of already-poor  households. The association  might arise mainly  because  households  become poor
after, and perhaps partly because  of, producing  children. Only a large, and (because  life events  are rare)
long-term, set of panel-data  can resolve this issue convincingly."
There is some evidence  that child deaths do stimulate  excess replacement  births, especially  in
rural areas [Schultz  T.P. (1981: 137-40)]. This is due pardy to lifetime earnings  patterns due to lower
education, especially  female [Birdsall  (1980: 52)].  Over-replacement  is thus probably correlated with
poverty, and with the associated 'felt need' to insure against  high risk of further infant and child death.
In Guatemala  [Pebley et al. (1979)], desired family size was positively correlated with previous child
deaths, holding several other variables - but not poverty - constant. However, if poor people's higher
mortality  is actually  to increase  their household  size, then the fertility  response  must involve  enough  over-
replacement  to outweigh  the  positive effect of sibling  crowding  on death risks. This is a substantial  effect
for the poor; in India the mortality  of infants  born within one year of a previous birth was twice as high
as that of children born tvwo  or more years after a birth [Bennett  (1991: 9.62); and cf. Ghosh (1987)].
One should  look to ove:  all fertility (not only replacement)  to explain  why  poorer households  tend
to be larger despite  higher morLlity. Many data sets reveal an inverted-U  relationship  [Birdsall  (1974:
5-7), (1980: 53-6), Hull and Hull (1976: 9), Schultz  (1981: 177)]. As income  and its correlates  (farming
status, housing type, education, etc.) increase from zero to a very low level, perhaps near the 'ultra-
poverty line", total fertility rate (CMR)  and its components  (especially  age-specific  fertility) initially also
31increase slightly: extra income from very low levels is associated, via better nutrition, with earlier
menarche [Huffman  et al. (1987), Bhalla and Srivastava  (1976)1  and more generally  with higher fecund-
ability [Frisch (1978, 1980, 1982), Easterlin and Crimmins  (1985)1;  the ultra-poor are somewhat  more
exposed  to marital  disruption  and interruption  than the moderately  poor (Hull and Hull (1976)1;  and rising
child wage-rates  accompany  increased  fertility [Schultz  (1981: 50-1)]. Fertility decreases  as the level of
living rises above ultra-poverty: women's time becomes  valuable, and it becomes increasingly  feasible
to delay family income by educating  one or two children, instead of using income from the wage labor
of several [Becker and Lewis (1974), World Bank (1984), Birdsall (1988)].  The entire inverse-U
relationship  has been demonstrated  for Pakistan  in 1979  [Irfan (1989)]; for urban Juba, Sudan, in the mid-
1980s  [House (1989)]; and (to the extent that husband's education  proxies income) for rural Bangladesh
in 1968-70  [Stoeckel  et al. (1980)] and Indonesia  in the early 1970s  (Hull and Hull (1977)].
This is an asymmet-.c inverted-U. Fertility indicators rise initially, reach a peak - though still
at a low standard  of living - then fall steadily  to far below their initial level as income  continues  to rise.
Thus fertility differences  do explain part of the size-poverty  link.
Although poverty is often positively associated to  fertility over most of the range,'m  so is
landholding  [Mueller and Short (1983), Stoeckel  and Chowdhury  (1980)]. Schutjer  and Stokes (1982),
using data from Thailand  and Egypt, show that operational  (but not owned)  farm size is positively  linked
to fertility [Mitra (1978: 209-10) confirms  this for India].  It may be because family labor economizes
transactions-costs  in own-account  farming; or because  [Chayanov  (1966), Nakamura  (1986)]  extra hands
and mouths in a family raise the marginal disutility  to it of incomeless  leisure relative to that of total
family drudgery. Cain (1984)  and Cain  and Mozumder  (1981)  questionthese explanations,  relying  rather
upon differential  frequencies  of spouse  separation  and upon local tenurial  and institutional  conditions  [see,
however, Good et al. (1980), Stokes and Chowdhury  (1980)]. There is, however, little question  about
the reality of the correlations,  whatever their causal structure.
The association  between  high fertility  and poverty  has prompted  wide advocacy  of family  planning
programs as an instrument  of ant-poverty  policy [World  Bank (1984)]. Yet, given the circumstances  and
risks in developing  countries, it is feasible, common,  and often rational  for poor couples  to choose  earlier
marriage, and higher marital fertility, than rich couples [ibid., Cassen (1978), Schultz (1981)].°  Some
scholars even deny that higher fertility normally slows down the growth of real income per person, or
raises the rate of resource depletiond'  [National  Academy  of Sciences (1985), Simon (19xx)]. The case
for publicly subsidized  family planning may then rest heavily on its prospects for helping the poor by
redistributing  income from profit and land rent towards wages. If the typical poor couple, by producing
many children  because this is individually  optimal,  raises labour supply and food demand, the real wage
32rate for poor people is reduced [Malthus (1798)].  Thus there is a pecuaniary external diseconomy
[Scitovsky  (19xx)]  to the poor ioiztW  from their high fertility.  Family planning may then merits state
subsidy.  However, to take this further is beyond our scope, requking a deep understanding of the
determinants  of fertility [Easterlin  and Crimmins  (1985), Cleland and Wilson  (1987), Bongaarts  (1992)].
4.2.2  Gender  and  poverty
Is there widespread "feminization  of poverty"?  In some parts of Asia and elsewhere, young
females  are often exposed to excess poverty-induced  nutritional  and health risk within  households,' and
this appears to be one factor explaining  the 'missing millions" of women [Dreze and Sen (1989)].
However, females are not generally over-represented  in consumption-poor  households;  nor are female-
headed households  more likely to be poor.  Evidence against widespread feminization  of income or
consumption  poverty appears in Visaria (1977, 1980) for Asia; Dreze (1990) on India; H. Standing
(1985)  on Calcutta;  Svedberg  (1991)  for Africa;  Haddad (1991)  and Lloyd and Brandon  (1991)  on Ghana;
and earlier sources cited in Lipton (1983a: 48-53).  Lack of data on intra-household  distribution often
clouds inferences  from such studies, but, even if it were true that consumption-poverty  incidence is on
average no greater amongst  women, they are severe  victims of poverty in other respects.
First, women  work longer than  men to achieve  the same  level of living. The burden of both parts
of the "double  day" - market labor and domestic labor - is more severe for poor women.  Female age-
specific participation  rates increase sharply as income falls towards severe poverty; yet so do the ratios
of children to adult women [Visaria  (1977, 1980), Lipton (1983a: 43-4)].Y  There is evidence  that, as
women  participate  more in market work under pressure of poverty, their domestic labor is not substant-
ially reassigned  to men [K. Bardhan (1985), G. Standing  (1985)1."
Second, women  face lower chances  of independent  escape  from poverty, in part because  women's
large share of domestic  commitments  prevents  them from seizing  new and profitable  work opportunities
as readily as men [Haddad  (1991)  for Ghana,  Birdsall  and Behrman  (1991)  for urban Brazil]. Many  LDC
job markets  appear to be segregated  into 'progressive": poverty-escaping,  and usually  male; and "static":
poverty-confirming  and usually fe,male.65  Even more important  than the domestic burden, in explaining
this poverty  trap, may be cultural discrimination  against  females in both education  and job assignments.
In Taiwan, in some ways a model of "growth  with equity", a 1978-80  survey showed that 25% of sons,
but only 4% of daughters,  had been apprenticed;  and that, in the poorest 80 per cent of families, as the
number of sisters rose from 0 to 4, the mean schooling per  brother rose from 6.8 to  11.4 years,
indicating that girls are sacrificing  prospects of independent  escape from poverty to pay for brothers'
prospects  via education  [Greenhalgh  (1985)]. In Ghana, much  lower female literacy and numeracy  after
33age 15 greatly reduce female access to good jobs [Haddad (1991)].  In Bangladesh, non-formal and
technical/vocational  training - far from correcting the big gender disparities in schooling - generally
makes gQ  provision  for female  enrolment  [Safilios-Rothschild  (1991)]. In rural India in 1981, the gender
gap in adult literacy was higher among the far poorer scheduled  castes (22  %-6%) and scheduled tribes
(28%-8%), than among the population  as a whole (40%-18%)  [Bennett  (1991)].
Third, in some cultures widows face effective  barriers against employment  or ren  .iJage, and
are treated as second-class  citizens within the home, leading  to high risks of poverty.  One of the few
systematic  studies pDreze  (1990)] shows that nuclear, widow-headed  households  in India are by far the
poorest (even  average expenditure  per person is 70% below the overall average). The younger  the oldest
male in such households,  the deeper their poverty. Age-specific  mortality  for rural North  Indian widows
is also higher than for otherwise comparable  wives [Chen and Dreze (1992)].
Thus an important  way in which poverty is feminized  is that male-dominated  societies make the
escape from poverty harder for women.  This suggests  that poverty is more likely to be chronic for
women, and transient for men; individual,  panel data are needed to test this, though such data are rare.
4.2.3  Poverty  and  old age
Poverty is juvenizing and may be feminizing;  is it greying? The over-65s comprised  3.8% of
South  Asians in 1980, but are projected  at 4.8% in 2000 and 8.2% in 2025; in other developing  regions
the expansion  is as rapid, except in Africa where even by 2025 the proportion is projected  at only 3.9%
[Deaton  and Paxson (1991: 2)1. In the Ivory Coast, average income within rural and urban areas is no
lower for the elderly, but they are worse off on a national basis because of rural concentratation. In
Thailand, older Thais do not have lower average income [ibid.: 22-7].  That does not tell us whether
proportions in poverty are higher for the old.  This was not so in Nigeria and India in the 1970s [Gaiha
and Kazmi (1982: 56), P. Hill (1982: 187-8)1. Given their greater dependence  on the uncertain support
of others, we hypothesize  that inequality  among  the old is greater than among  those of prime age. If so,
similar average incomes in these two groups would probably mean higher poverty among the elderly.
With the ageing of many LDC populations,  these issues merit further research.
4.3  Labor  and  poverty
4.3.1  Pardckaon  and  employmewnt
As a rule, poor households  depend  heavily on labor income. Its quantum  depends on their age-
structure; their age- and sex-specific  participation  rates (ASPRs);  their prospect of employment  (or self-
employment)  when they  participate;  and their wage-rates  (or net daily  rewards on own account)  when  they
34are employed.  The age-structure of  poor households implies high dependency ratios. 67 Even if
reflecting privately optimal couple fertility decisions, this  is a  horrendous drag  on  their overall
participation  in work. The drag appears  to increase with early development  and associated  urbanization.
The rich-poor  gap in the dependency  ratio is greater in cities than in villages, and in more than in less
developed countries  and regions [Lipton (1983a)].
It is to be expected  that the poor will seek high ASPRs. Assuming  leisure to be a normal good,
poor people will work more, ceteris paribus.  Second, with fewer assets (and often lower wage rates)
the poor wi1l  have to work longer to reach any given income.  Third, poor people's high dependency
ratios increase  the marginal  household  utility  of income-per-worker  relative  to leisure [Chayanov  (1966)].
Among men aged 14-60, ASPRs - except in the agricultural slack season - are seldom much
below 95 per cent for any income group [Visaria (1980: 76-7); Lipton (1983:7,16)1. Therefore, if the
poor are to raise ASPRs significantly,  it must be mainly among  the under-14s,  the over-60s, or women.
All we can say with confidence  about child ASPRs is that they are understated  by large official  surveys;
child lator is much  more prevalent  among  the poor [Lipton  (1983: 17-18)]. Many studies  [Lipton (1983:
16-17)]  confirm that women's ASPRs increase, but only modestly, with falling household income per
person.  However, the poorest 5-15% of households  typically show female ASPRs no more than the
moderately  poor.  Also, female ASPRs decline, given mean income, with rising household ratios of
under-fives  to women and older children [Dasgu,'ta  (1977: 153)1.0  Most seriously, urbanization  - even
for the poor - appears drastically  to cut female  ASPRs [Lipton (1983: 23-5), Visaria (1981: 13), World
Bank (1989)].  Since urban proportions of populations (including  poor populations)  are rising, as are
urban female/male ratios - especially for poorer adults [Lipton (1983a: 51)] - we need to know the
reasons and remedies for poor urban women's low ASPRs.
Unemployment,  as a usual status  over a long period, is in  come-elastic  [Udall  and Sinclair  (1982)]
- a "luxury  bad".  However, the time-rate of unemployment  (TRU) -the proportion  of time in workforce
spent in job search - is an inferior bad.  It is generally higher among workers from poor households,
often sharply so among the poorest, especially  in towns.  The linkage is stronger for the assetless  and
landless, than for those who can fall back on asset-based  self-employment  [Sundaram  and Tendulkar
(1988)]. Also, unemployment  is concentrated  among  the assetless  and in areas, age-groups,  etc. that are
likely to over-represent  the poor [Lipton  (1983: 42-54)1.6
4.4.2  Wages
Given the heavy  dependence  of the poor on unskilled  labor, one would  expect the real wage rate
for such 'abor to be an important  determinant  of poverty. The evidence  on the co-movement  of rural
35poverty  Incidence  and  real agricultural  wage  rates  is mixed;  poverty  has often  fallen  without  rising  real
wage rates for unskilled  labor.^  However,  the lesson  from these experiences  is not that poverty
incidence  is unaffected  by the real wage  rate for unskilled  labor, ceteris  paribus,  but rather that  other
variables  can also matter  greatly  to the outcome  for the poor. Skilling,  sectoral  shifts,  increased  cereal
yields even on handkerchief-sized  farms, rising employment,  and remittance  incomes,  have been
important  in explaining  falling  rural poverty  in most  poor Asian  countries."'  And  it is critical  whether
or not a real wage  rate increase  comes  at the cost  of higher  unemployment;  it cannot  be presumed  that
an exogenously  imposed  wage  increase  will  be pro-poor.  Certainly  Kerala's  persistent  (and  genuine)  25%
unemployment  rate - thrice  the Indian  rural average  - alongside  a uniquely  enforced  statutory  minimum
farm wage,  does not suggest  that the latter is very helpful.2 Only  for India  are there adequate  time
series  data  to test the strength  of the empirical  link between  real  agricultural  wage  rate and  rural  poverty
incidence  controlling  for at least  some  of these  other  determinants;  on doing  so there  is evidence  that
higher real wages  have resulted  in lower  poverty  incidence  [van  de Walle  (1985)]. Household  cross-
sectional  data  for West  Bengal  suggest  the same  conclusion  [Bardhan  (1984,  ch.  14].
There  is controversy  about  wage-iscrimination,  and  the issues  are far  from  settled. Task-specific
earnings  differentials  between  genders,  castes  or ethnic  groups  reflect (at least in part) differences  in
productivity  (due  to education  and  experience)  or in work  period  [Lipton  (1983:  69-72,  834), Ashenfelter
and  Oaxaca  (1991),  Birdsall  and  Sabot  (1991)1.  However,  such  earnings  differentials  testify  to inferior
access to better-paid  skills and productive  tasks; these often themselves  arise from prior forms of
discrimination.  This  is  harmfil,  not  least  because,  where  it most  reduces  women's  earning  opportnities,
there appears  to be greater neglect  of (and death-rates  among)  little girls [Rosenzweig  and Schultz
(1982)1.  Though  wa  discrimination  has been  observed  in a few  careful  studies  [Bardhan  and Rudra
(1981),  Lluch  and Mazumdar  (1981)],  acs  discrimination  may  well  be the more  serious  problem.
4.4  Nmriton and  poverty
4.4.1  The ncome  elasticity  of nurent intakes
The  link  between  poverty  and  nutrition  has  been  looked  at mainly  in terms  of dietary  food  eneigy
deficiency,  relative  to requirements.  Energy  deficiency  can be measured  directly,  by recording  energy
intakes  relative  to supposed  requirements  (section  3.2), or via its anthropometric  correlates:  upper  arm
circumference,  and  body  mass  index  (BMI:  kg/m) in adults,  and  height-for-age  (or, as an acute  indicator,
weight-for-age)  in children. Except  where  roots  and tubers  are main  staples,  protein  deficiency  is rare
in the absence  of energy  deficiency.  However,  micronutrient  deficiencies  are widespread,  often  occur
without  energy  deficiency,  and may  or may  not be closely  linked  to poverty."
36Tne poverty-nutrition  link is conditioned  by other variables (behavioral  and/or biological), and
involves sinr.taneity.  From household  resources, the lncnk  runs to expenditures (conditional  on prices
and tastes); thence to calories; to intra-family  distribution;  and to the level, variability, and adaptability
of the adequacy of individual  intake for normal 'requirements" of resting metabolic rate (RMR: body
requirements  to function at rest), work, growth, etc.  This last linkage is mediated by health-affected
capacity  to ingest, absorb, and use energy. 7'  Even given all this, energy absorbed (given requirements,
health, etc.) Is related in highly  variable  ways to health-nutrition  outcomes  such as survival, physical  and
mental  performance, and wellness. Each link can be modelled  as "health-seeking  behavior' [Alderman
(1993)]. Furthermore, some of these linkages are likely to have feedtL k effects; nutritional  outcomes
may affect (in turn) productivity  and hence household  resources [Strauss  (1986), Deolalikar (1988)].
While the income-elasticity  of food expenditure  in poor populations is often close to unity
[Bhanoji  Rao (1981),  Lipton (1983b),  Edirisinghe  and Poleman  (1983), Pitt (1983)], several  papers report
low income- or expenditure-elasticities  of either calorie intake or anthropometry  [Bouis and Haddad
(1992)]. The ICRISAT  nutrition  observations  for South  Indian  villages, used by Behrman  and Deolalikar
(1987), Bhargava (1991) and others, cannot be properly  matched  with the times of the consumption  and
income  observations. That is not true of other studies, such as Behrman  and Wolfe  (1984)  on Nicaragua,
and Bouis and Haddad's Philippines  data (which suggest an income-elasticity  of food energy intake of
0.05), and the Ivorian data of Thomas  et al. (1992: 27) showing  that most child anthropometry  did not
respond to extra income (though adult BMI, and urban child height, did).  Not all careful studies have
confirmed  the very low CIEs found in the above  data sets; see, for example,  most of IFPRI's six studies
on the impact  of commercialization  on nutrition [Kennedy  and von Braun (1986)].
To believe that very poor, hungry and underfed  people raise caloric adeac  - as distinct from
energy intakea - by only 1 per cent or so when income rises 10-20 per cent does seem contrary to
common sense. There is evidence  for several possibilities,  not mutually  exclusive:
o  Food energy intakes  were not inadequate  at the mean (where the elasticity  is typically  measured)
to begin with, so that income  rises could  be devoted  to food quality  improvement,  as Behrman,  Bouis  and
others emphasize. Mean adult weights in most tropical rural places -- and hence approximate  energy
requirements - typically lie 15-30% below reference weights used in estimating energy requirements
[Lipton (1983b: 14-20), (1989a: 12)].
O  There are strong non-linearities  in the calorie-income  function [Ravallion  (1990e), Holleman
(1991), Garcia (1991: 118),  Thomas (1990)]. For example,  in Java the CIE rises from 0.15 at the mean
to 0.33 at half a standard deviation  below the mean [Ravallion  (1990e)l.
o  Income gains may have more impact on nutritional adequacy than on calorie intake per se,
37because the poor are clustered around a critical threshold  of caloric adequacy [Ravallion  (1990e)J.
o  In unhealthy  environments,  the use of income gains solely to obtain extra calories may do little
for nutritional or health status.  A health-seeking  person should then spend extra income on health
improvements  (e.g.,  sanitation  or even leisure) rather than nutrition.  Similarly, low levels of public
inputs, complementary  with incomes  in their impact  on such outcomes [Taylor  et al. (1978), Thomas et
al. (1992: 25), Anand and Ravallion  (1993)]  may entail that extra income is wasted on nutrition.
o  Food energy adequacy  may thus be much more elastic to income than is energy quantum. For
Java in the early 1980s, a low CEE  (0.15 at the mean) still implied  an income elasticity  of the incidence
of undernutrition - relative to fixed caloric requirements  - close to unity [Ravallion  (1990e)].  To the
extent that income  rises are achieved  in a way that reduces  (increases)  fool energy  requirements  this will
boost (diminish)  the income  effect on undernutrition  [Lipton  (1989a: 11)].
o  The value of the CIE is contingent. Female-headed  households  show a higher CIE than equally
poor male-headed  ones [Garcia (1991: Table 5), for the Philippines],  perhaps due to smaller household
size [Greer and Thorbecke  (1986: 86), for Kenya]. The effect appears  to be stronger in poor households,
in Kenya and Malawi (Kennedy  and Peters (1992)]. Who receives the income gain may also matter.
Extra incomes  going to household  members (men)  with relatively  low marginal  propensities  to purchase
food implies a lower response  of food energy intake [Kennedy  ar1 Peters (1992)].
4.4.2  Adaptation
A low CIE may indicate  effective  -though seldom  costless - adaptation. In some environments,
poverty is  associated with  smaller stature, harder  work,  and  therefore worse  health;  in  other
environments,  moderately  small  persons  select work requiring  body translation  (rather  than heavy  lifting),
in which they have a comparative  advantage  over people who are taller or with higher BMI.  Some
doubtful  use has been made of an excellent  Norwegian  study by Waaler (1984), showing  sharp rises in
mortality  if BMI  falls below levels  as high as 20-23; but this appears  to be synergistic  with smoking, and
in any event, it need not apply  in warm LDCs [Payne and Lipton (1993)]. In India, agricultural  laborers
with BMI as low as 16 appear healthy and hard-working [Shetty (1984)].  In a study of 199 men in
Bangladesh,  risk of illness rose sharply when BMI fell, but only below 17 [Pryer (1990)].
The discussion  of adaptation  to dietary energy stress has emphasized  two biological  paths: child
growth reduction and adult downward adaptation of RMR/kg.  The latter is considerab!e in semi-
starvation [Keys  et al. (1950)], but in response  to milder stress may reduce RMR/kg only a little (by 2-
5%, rather than 8-10%). Most important,  such biological  adaptation  (i) happens only if victims choose
to  maintain 'voluntary'  (work or  leisure) energy expenditure when intake falls, or  intake when
38expenditure  rises, yet do not fully compensate  by weight loss; (ii) is an unknown  quantity for children,
the most seriously affected by  a given proportionate energy shortfall; (iii) is  much smaller than
interpersonal  variation in RMRAkg;  given income, persons with lower RMR/kg select lower calorie
intakes  per day.'
Much more important  is the question  of child  growth faltering,  and of possible consequent  higher
mortality  or lower mental  or physical  performance. For extreme  states -the anthropometries  of the 5-7 /O
of LDC populations  classified  as severely undernourished  - there is no disagreement:  these people are at
substantial  risk of increased  infant and child mo-tality,  and of physical  (and perhaps mental)  impairment
in adulthood.7 What about the effects  of "mild  to moderate' anthropometric  shortfalls? It is important,
because correcting such shortfalls - by inducing extra food acquisition among households that now
"choose' a low calorie-income  elasticity  - is not obviously sensible: if children grow up mildly stunted
without  serious harm, they survive into lower adult energy  needs, and hence (given continued  poverty)
smaller risks of wasting, which is usually far more dangerous  than stunting.
Pelletier (1991) claims that a  continuous positive relationship exists between sub-standard
anthropometry  and child  mortality. However,  his graphs show a greatly weakened  or absent  relationship
once weight-for-age  is at or above  65-70% of the US (NCHS) median, height-for-age  85-90%, or mid-
upper arm circum-ference  105-115  mm [ibid.: 12-14]. A large bulk of evidence,  and some supporting
(immunological)  theory, now shows clear turning-points,  well below NCHS medians, above which few
or no health impacts for stunting can be demonstrated. Further, we can find no evidence  for claims
[ibid.: xii] that 25-50% of "child  deaths are statistically  attributable  to anthropometric  deficits" and that
"33-80 per cent of these deaths are associated  with mild-to-moderate  PEM".  Even if it is correct, most
non-genetic  "anthropometric  shortfalls", and much PEM, are due to infection,  and may not be readily -
if at all - prevented by pumping in calories Oet alone income), rather than, say, by sanitation, clean
water, and good primary health care [Payne and Lipton (1993), Lipton (1983b)].
In adults, much the most important  adaptations  of poor people to energy stress are weight loss
and work adjustment. This ranges from rescheduling arduous tasks towards periods of greater food
availability, to inmproving  ergonomic  efficiency at the cost of discomfort or inconvenience. Little has
been done to study, to assist via price and technology  policy, or to lower the costs of, these and other
behavioral or  biological adaptations.  Excessive concentration on the intellectually fascinating but
quantitatively  unimportant  issue  of intrapersonal  RMR  adaptation,  and on the important  but oversimplified
issue of child growth faltering, has blinded students of poverty to the many, but currently constrained,
adaptations  to food energy shortage  by poor people, and their communities  and institutions.
394.5  Icome  wraby  l\ J
Income variability has been a common concern in attempts to reduce poverty through direct
intervention  (section  6.3).  This reflects a belief that intertemporal  consumption  smoothing  possibilities
are limited, or costly, for the poor.  While informal  credit and insurance  arrangements  are common, they
do not  appear to  provide anything like perfect income insurance.'  Even if  surrogates for  state-
contingent  commodity  markets  exist  in these settings,  they may  perform inadequately  for the poor, or may
involve  high cost  to longer-term  poverty  reduction  (e.g., if savings  are shifted  from productive  investment
to grain storage).  Then programs to reduce poverty may be more cost-effective  If they steer some
resources into reducing income  downturns  (section  6.3).
Of the peak-to-trough  quarterly  fluctuations  in ASPRs  in India in 1977-8,  changes  among  workers
whose main activity is 'casual labor" - a group that overlaps strongly with the poor - accounted  for
almost 70% for rural men, and about 100% for rural women. Where the time rate of unemployment  is
high on average, further seasonal rises produce "discouraged  worker effects", so that periods with a
higher TRU also feature a lower ASPR, especially among women. Nigerian and Indian village data
confirm that seasonal variability in gainfiul  worktime is greatest for the poorest [Lipton 1983: 34-6].
Moreover, the Javanese  village in which the poorest workers were most driven to raise the proportion
of workforce participation  spent in job search [Hart (1980)] may well typify places where casual labor
is a major source of income for the poor.  In villages of West Bengal where uncertainty is greatest,
employers  provide a search-free work fallback  for poor locals in slack times, thereby ensuring fealty
during peaks [Bardhan  and Rudra (1981)1;  this transfers instability  (and search costs)  to poor non-locals.
Domestic  tasks and catle care do expand  in slack  seasons  [Hopper  (1955)]. Yet unirrigated,  rural
places with litde non-farm  employment  continue  to suffer great fluctuations  in labor use.  Hired labor,
especially  casual, shows much  greater seasonal  -and, more seriously because less predictably, annual -
variability  in employment  [Lipton  (1983: 54-9)]. Since  rural poverty is associated  with casual labor and
with residence in places with litte non-farm  employment  [e.g. Singh (1980: p. 110 and table 13)], the
impact  of agricultural  fluctuations  on not very mobile  poor people appears  large. Poor urban populations
are also characterized  by surprisingly high dependence  on (unstable)  aidcultural work [Visaria (1977:
Table 34) for Maharashtra,  India].
Unemployment  and ASPRs  tend to fluctuate  inversely,  and so the harmfil effects  on labor income
are covariant.  This is serious because the variability of both employment  and ASPRs increases with
poverty, as does dependence  on labor income, lack of reserves, and non-creditworthiness.  Matters  would
improve if falls in ASPRs in slack seasons, or bad years, were large enough (compared with falls in
demand for employees) to bid Xi  wage-rates, given elasticities and plasticities of labor supply and
40demand. Unfortunately,  evidence  [Bardhan  (1982a), Ravatlion  (1987a Ch.5)] confirms  common  sense:
in bad times many poor people must work for whatever they can get, so that (because ASPRs fall
proportionately  far less than demand  for labor) wage-rates  fall too.  Since  this often happens when food
is dearest and disease is most rampant, we can see the importance  to the poor of safety nets in bad times.
Nutritional and other impacts of  agricultural fluctuations on the rural poor have received
substantial recent attention.'  Since poor people have low average monthly income, they face higher
disutility  - and perhaps significant  extra risks to infant  life -not only from a $1 income  fall, but probably
even from a  1% fall; evidence from several countries indicates  that poor households - compelled  to
maximize productivity in order to  survive as units - are likelier to discriminate against vulnerable
members in seasons of energy stress than at other times [Sahn (1989: 6)]. Worse, bad outcomes go
together. The second half of the wet season frequently brings heavier work, dearer food, and more
infections  [Schofield  (1974, 1979)].  Times and places of low employment,  wage-rates  and participation,
tend to overlap strongly, especially  for the poorest [Lipton (1983: 33-7, 56-60, 845)].  Also, the rural
poor are more dependent than the non-poor on casual labor (which is much likelier to be laid off when
the harvest is bad). Hence the rural poor seam likelier to lose income, in bad seasons  or years, than the
rural non-poor.
4.6  Secora 1 and  locational  characterLsics
It is common  to postulate a "dualistic"  structure  to a developing  country, typically based on the
distinction  between *urban"  and *rural"  sectors. Provided  that LDCs comprise  clearly  distinct rural and
urban populations,  this distinction  is useful in poverty  analysis  if levels (or types) of poverty clearly  differ
between them, or if poverty is clearly  related to rural-urban  interactions,  or imbalances.
LDC settlement paerns  usually concentrate the large majority of people into clearly rural or
urban places. Around 1980 'intermediate"  localities  - with 5,000-20,000  persons - comprised  only small
proportions of population in most LDCs."  Unless such places have exceptionally  severe poverty - a
topic deserving research - this fiufills a  necessary condition for the good sense of a  "rural-urban'
approach to poverty and to anti-poverty  strategies. The contrast is usually sharp. Typically  the rural
places (<5,000) are sparsely settled, and employment  is agricultural;  the towns (>20,000) are densely
settled, and employment  is 85-95 percent non-agricultural.@
Poverty comparisons  between urban and rural areas pose a number of problems. This is partly
because "urban' means different things."  National "poverty  lines' also vary greatly, though this is less
worrying for comparisons  of rural-to-urban  poverty incidence  ratios (RUPIRs) than of absolute levels.
Cost-of-living  adjustments  pose a more worrying problem, as spatial cost-of-living  indices are far less
41common  than inter-temporal  indices, such as the CPI. And urban poverty lines are sometimes  set at a
higher real level than rural poverty lines (section  3.2).
We have no wholly satisfactory method of dealing with these problems, but data based on
consumption  or income per person, allowing  for rural-urban  price differences, from thirteen LDCs for
the 1980s, suggest the following  RUPIRs:1 Kenya 6.0;  Cote d'Ivoire 4.6; Gh3na 2.2; Indonesia 3.7;
Malaysia 2.5; Thailand 1.7; Philippines 1.4; Parama, Peru, Venezuela,  each 1.4; Guatemala, Mexico,
India each 1.3 [World Bank (1990: 31)1.3  Similar differences were found in the (fewer) studies that
estimate higher-order poverty measures (such as PG and P);  see Ravallion and Huppi (1991) for
Indonesia,  Boateng et al. (1991) for Ghana, Datt and Ravallion  (1992b,d) for India, World Bank (1992)
for China, and van de Walle and Ravallion  (1992) for Morocco.
What about  the trends? It has been suggested  that the very high African  RUPIRs may  have fallen
substantially  in the 1980s,  due to increasing  urban poverty and reduced  policy biases against agricultural
prices. However,  there is little evidence  of this.  It does not seem very plausible,  because even in Africa
most of the rural poor are net food buyers.  In India, there is some evidence  of a declining RUPIR,
though this is sensitive  to the choice of price deflators  for the 1980s [Ravallion  and Subbarao (1992)].
Do RUPIRs understate  or overstate  the rural-urban  differences  in poverty? They allow only for
price-deflated  private income per person.  The capacity of poor people to convert such income into
well-being  is probably lower in rural areas than in towns, due to worse rural public services, notably
health care and sanitation. While the physical  quality of life index (PQLI)  has its limitations  (section  2),
it is telling that India's urban PQLI in 1971  was 61, as against a rural PQLI of 35 [Morris and McAlpin
(1982: 62)].  Infant mortality in rural India in the 1980s was 105, as against 57 in urban areas [World
Bank (1990: 31); for Africa, see A. Hill (1981: 35)]JY This, together with comparable gaps in adult
literacy rates, suggests that urban/rural ratios between poverty measures based only upon private real
consumption  or income are considerably  lower than the urban/rural ratios (if such could be obtained)
between poverty measured in terms of inadequate "welfare"  or  "capabilities". The health gaps are in
sharp contrast to  the development process in  nineteenth-century  Britain, where urban death-rates
substantially  exceeded  rural rates [Williamson  (1991: 127)].
Rural poverty is marked by its common conuection  to  agriculture and land, whereas urban
poverty is more heterogeneous  in how incomes are generated.  A comparative study of seven Asian
developing  countries  in the late 1980s  showed  that the rural poor depended  more on agriculture  than the
rural non-poor [Quibria and Srinivasan (1991)]; this has also been observed in West Africa [A. Hill
(1981); Reardon et al (1992)]. It remains important  that one-third of rural income, and one-quarter of
employment,  typically  derive from non-farm  activities  [Chuta  and Liedholm  (1981)],  but their prosperity
42depends substantially on forward and backward production linkages - and even more [Hazell and
Haggblade (1993), Hazell and Ramasamy  (1991)]  on consumption  linkages  - from farmers.  Especially
in view of agriculture's high labor-intensity  and relevance to  local food availability and price,  an
anti-rural  poverty strategy for production activities  should be based substantially  on agriculture.
No such even moderately  homogeneous  base for anti-poverty  policy is usually  available  in towns,
with their normally much more diverse pattern of activities  and problems. It is possible to focus rural
anti-poverty  policy on improving the amount, productivity, stability, and distribution of farm inputs,
employment,  and output, and their social and physical infrastructures. This is why - despite the urban
bias of public spending and personnel allocation in most LDCs - there is a much clearer and more
production-orientated  menu of anti-poverty  policies for rural areas than for towns." 5
The urban informal  sector (UIS)  has traditionally  been perceived  as a residual  category, made up
of those who have not obtained  employment  in the "formal' urban sector, and their fortunes are linked
to those of both the rural sector and the urban formal sector through migration and remittances.  In
contrast to the urban formal sector, the stylized view of the UIS is of a sub-sector with easy entry, little
unionization,  no legal minimrum  wages, weak safety standards at work, low physical  capital inputs, low
reurns to labor, and mainly small (often  family-based)  enterprise units, typically  producing  non-traded
goods, disproportionately  consumed  by the poor. However, views of the UIS have changed in the light
of new data.  There is now greater recognition  of its diversity, associated with the heterogeneity  of its
products, and the wide range of skills required.  Large income inequalities  are often found within the
UIS, with some UIS workers eraning far more than some formal sector workers [e.g., Telles (1993)].
In explaining  poverty  in the UIS, current  thinking  puts greater emphasis  on individual  characteristics  such
as human capital  endowments  than on the "structural"  features  of the economy  arising  out of Todaro-type
migration  equilibrium  with a fixed urban sector wage. Poverty in the rural sector tends to be explained
more by low access to physical assets (particularly land), farm technology, non-farm employment
opportumities,  and health care and schooling,  than by labor-market  distortions  as in the urban sector.
Since the early 1970s, the UIS has increasingly  been viewed as a sub-sector with substantial
growth  potential  in its own right, rather than as a temporary  holding  area for the "reserve  army" -though
that potential is often seen as greatly hampered by market failures (particularly  credit), and excessive
governmental  regWlations  and biases in favor of the formal sector, such as in the availability  of credit.
An early and influential  exposition  of this view was ILO (1972), expanded  upon in (inter alia) ILO (1985)
and de Soto (1989). This has also led to some  optimistic  assessments  of the prospects  for reducing urban
poverty by the deliberate promotion of the UIS, e.g,  through credit subsidies and protection from
competition;  this has been an important  element  of industrial  policy in India.
43While  there  are likely  gains  to the poor  (as both  producers  and  consuimers  of the services  of the
UIS) from removing  existing  policy  biases  against  the UIS,' the anti-poverty  case  for a pro-UIS  bias
in policy  is more  contentious.  Despite  the stereotype,  small-scale  urban  manufacturing  enterprises  may
not significantly  more labor-intensive  or technically  efficient  than larger enterprises  in LDCs [Little
(1987),  Little,  Mazumdar  and  Page  (1987)X.  The structure  of protection  across  industries  is now  thought
to be a far more  important  deteminant  of aggregate  labor  demand  [World  Bank  (1990  Ch.4)].
The emphasis  on housing  in urban  anti-poverty  policy  might  suggest  that  slum-dwelling  provides
a homogeneous  environment,  and  hence  an arena  for cure,  for most urban  poverty  risk - as agriculture
does  In the case  of rural  poverty  risk. However,  the ranking  of fifteen  Indian  States  by the proportion
of urban  people  living  in slums  in 1981  [Malhotra  (1988:  20)l is mildly  negatively  correlated  with their
correct  ranking  by Incidence  of urban  poverty  in 1983  [Minhas  et al. (1991: 1676)1.J Many  of the
urban  poor are unaffected  by slums,  and  many  of the rural  poor live  in quasi-slums.
The rural-urban  dichotomy  has perhaps  diverted  some attention  from even sharper regional
disparities  in poverty  levels. Large disparities  in rural poverty  incidence  have  been  documented  for a
numner  of countries;  for example,  in Indonesia  in 1990  the RUPIR  is estimated  to be 2.2, while  the ratio
of the highest  poverty  incidence  in rural  areas  of any  province  to the lowest  is 4.3 [Bidani  and  Ravallion
(1992)J. The regional  variations  in the incidence  of rural poverty  are often strongly  associated  with
rainfall  and dependence  on rainfed  agriculture  [Bardhan  (1984),  Webb et al (1991),  Lipton (1992)1.
Regional  factor  mobility  has plainly  not equalized  poverty  risk.
5  Growth, inequaliy and poverty
5.1  Growth  and  poverty, with  Inequaliy  constant
The relationship  between  growth  and  poverty  can  be complex.  Let us first  make  the simplifying
assumption  that  all incomes  grow  at the same  rate. How  will  poverty  respond?  Consider  the propertie
of the class  of poverty  measures  given  by equation  (1), which  can  also be written  in the form:"
p  . P(71p,  ])  (S)
where P  is the measure  of poverty, z  is the poverty  line,  i  is the mean of the distribution  of
consumption  or income,  and x  is a vector  of parameters  fully  describing  the Lorenz  curve of that
distribution."  For every  well-behaved  poverty  measure,  the function  P is monotonic  decreasing  in z,Jt,
holding  X constant. A growth  path  of the mean  which  maintains  the same Lorenz  curve implies  a
reduction  in absolute  poverty.90  But  how  rapidly  will  poverty  fall?
44Consider the P. class.  The elasticity  of H (a60)  with respect to the mean holdWing  the Lorenz
curve constant is -f(z)z/H,  the elasticity  of the CDF at z.  For a  2  1, the corresponding  elasticity  of the
P. index w.r.t to the mean is a(l-P,/P,)  (section  3.3). -Table 1 estimates  the elasticity  of some poverty
measures  w.r.t. the mean for various countries. Absolute  elasticities  of PG are in the range 1.54,  and
they tend to be higher for the P2 index. Thus a 2% annual rate of growth in consumption  per person at
aU  consumption  levels will result in a 3-8 percent rate of decline  in the poverty indices.
Table 1: Elastidtes  of poverty messures to mean consumption or Income
Elasticfty  of  poverty  meaure  w.r.t.
Country/year  distributiontlly  rutral  growth in  the man
Poverty gap  Foster-Greer-
index  Thorbeeke  P 2
Batlnh  1988/89  -2.9  -3.5
Neal  1984/85  -2.7  -3.2
India 1987-8a  -3.0  -3.8
Indons  -i  1987  -4.1  -4.8
Coto  d'Ivofre  1985  -2.0  -2.2
Morocco  1990  -2.9  -4.0
Brazfl  1986  -1.5  -1.8
oiurces:  Bangtldesh:  Rava  lion  (1990a)  (tp-dated  usfng  date  from Bnltadesh
Bureau of  Statistfes);  Nepal:  Caleulations  for  this  paper from VorLd Bank
data;  Indfa:  Datt  and RavaliUon (199Ma,e) (up-dated);  Indonesia:  Ravallfon
and  Nuppi  (1991);  Cote  dfIvoire:  Kakwanl  (1990);  Brazil:  Datt  and  Ravallion
(19928).  All  calculations  are  based  on  tocal  poverty  lfnes.
The  impact of changes in the Lorenz curve on poverty is less clear.  Inequality can change
without any absolute  gains or losses to the poor, and hence no change in povery.  The ambiguity  goes
deeper for H (and an exposition  also illustrates  some useful properties of the Lorenz curve, as defined
above)." t Inequality  increases if there is an unambiguous  outward shift in the Lorenz curve, i.e., the
change  in distribution  satisfies  the Pigou-Dalton  criterion  [Atkinson  (1970, 1975)]. By the properties of
the Lorenz curve, H as the value of p  at which the SIM  of the Lorenz curve equals z/p  [Gastwlrth
(1971), Kakwani  (1980a)J. An outward shift in L(pj)  does not imply a lower slope at any given value
of p, nor, therefore, a higher value of H for given z/p.  However, for higher-order  P,, measures  (a>  1)
a clearer relationship  between  inequality  and poverty  emerges; unambiguous  outward shifts in the Lorenz
curve at a given mean must reduce poverty.
455.2  Growth  and  inequality
Now relax the assumption  that growth is distributionally  neutral.  During the 1970s  and 1980s,
it was widely  believed  that growth in low-income  countries  would be inequitable. A foundation  for this
view was provided by Kuznets (1955, 1963), and has come to be known as the "Inverted U Hypothe-
sis'".  This claims that a process of growth through modern (urban) sector enlargement  in a dualistic
developing country will initially result in an increase in inequality, but, beyond some level of mean
income, inequality will begin to fall.  This assumes  that growth proceeds under a "Kuznets process".
Specifically, the economy  is conceived  of as comprising  a low-mean,  low-inequality  rural sector and a
high-mean, high-inequality  urban sector, and the migration  of workers from the former to the latter is
assumed to be 'representative": a representative 'slice'  of the rural distribution is transforined into a
representative  slice of the urban distribution, while  preserving  distributions  within each sector.
What does such a process imply about  the relationship  between  growth and inequality? Assume
that everyone is initially  in the rural sector. When the first (representative)  sub-group  of the rural sector
moves into the urban sector under the Kuznets process inequality  will appear that was not there before,
namely that between a typical urban resident and a typical rural resident.  Inequality will increase.
Consider  the last sub-group  to leave the rural sector; the same  inequality  will now disappear. Extending
this reasoning,  an inverted  U can be derived linking  certain indices  of inequality  and the population  share
of the urban sector can be derived [Robinson  (1976), Anand  and Kanbur (1984, 1993), Kakwani  (1988)].
What will happen  to aggregate  poverty? For all additive  poverty  measures [equation  (1)], if the
sub-group  poverty index is initially higher in the rural sector then aggregate  poverty must fall under the
Kuznets  process."  To see why, note that the aggregate  cumulative  distribution  function is given by
F(z) = n,F,(z) + nF,(z)  (6)
where n, (i=u,r)  and Fi (i=u,r)  are the population  shares and distribution functions  for the urban and
rural sectors respectively  (where n +n,= 1).  Under the Kuznets process, the distribution  functions F 1
(i=u,r)  are independent  of the population  shares.  Thus
WF(z)/In 8 = F,(z) - F,(z) < 0  (7)
for all z.  Consider the sequence  of CDFs resulting  from successive  increments  in n..  From (7), each
CDF will lie entirely below the previous one; all poverty measures and poverty lines will show an
unambiguous  decline in poverty (section  3.3.3).
However, the poverty levels of the two sectors do not converge (the vertical distance between
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of representative  migration. That assumption  simplifies  the analytics, but it is not appealing. Relaxing
it can alter the conclusion  that modern-sector  enlargement  is pro-poor. For example, Anand  and Kanbur
(1985) show that in Todaro's (1969) model (in which migration is a response to the expected income
differential between sectors), aggregate poverty could increase with migration to the urban sector.'
This is because (under the Todaro model) some new migrants will fail to find formal work in the urban
sector, and will end up worse off than they would have been in the rural sector (though this is stIll an
equiibrium, since expected incomes are equalized).  Depending  on the parameter values, economic
growth through urban sector enlargement  may increase  or decrease aggregate  poverty.
The way one models the migration decision could matter greatly to the results.  The Todaro
model of migration is quite restrictive.  A broader set of motives is now seen to underlie migration
behavior than expected  wage differentials;  individual  migration  is also increasingly  seen as an outcome
of family decision-making,  particularly  in response  to uninsured risks [Stark (1991)]. It is not yet clear
what this new migration  literature implies for the effects of modern-sector  enlargement  on poverty.
In another strand of research  on migration,  a distinction  has been drawn between two groups of
migrants:  the moderately  'rich'  going to towns  to seek education  and known  jobs, and the relatively  poor
who tend to go first to other rural areas  or small towns, and then chain-migrate  towards uncertain  urban
jobs [Connell  et al. (1976)]. Such data suggest that the "mainstream"  urbanization  process may thus be
neutral, or even adverse, in its impacts  on aggregate  poverty.
Urbanization  is not the only way growth can occur. Following  Fields (1980)  one can distinguish
three sources of growth: "modern  sector enlargement", "modern sector enrichment"  and "rural sector
enrichment".  The latter is unambiguously  pro-poor in these models (at least while the rural sector
remains the poorer sector), while  the effect on aggregate  poverty of modern- sector enrichment  - rising
mean income in the formal urban sector, without any change in rural sector incomes - is unlikely to be
pro-poor; there will  be no change  in aggregate  poverty  under Fields's (1980) assumptions  (in which there
is no urban sector poverty), though under the weaker  assumptions  of the Anand-Kanbur  model (in which
there is a poor urban informal sector) there will an unambiguous  increase in aggregate  poverty.
Empirical investigations  (typically  on cross-country  data) have explored  these issues. The early
compilation of  country-level data on inequality and growth did suggest an inverted U relationship
[Adelman and Morris (1973), Paukert (1973), Ahluwalia (1976), Tsaldoglou (1986)].  However, the
robustness  of these results (such as to the choice of inequality index)  has been questioned  [Anand and
Kanbur (1993)].  Other studies have not supported the view that inequality will increase in the early
stages of development;  from the (imited) time-series  evidence, it appears  to be just as likely to decrease
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support for the inverted U [Lecaillon  et al (1983)1  suggests  that the impact  on poverty is small, since the
changes  in distribution  amongst  the 'poorest'  95% of persons were negligible. The current consensus
is that several factors influence  the effects of growth on inequality, notably the initial distribution of
physical and human assets, the way the growth process influences  the returns to those assets, and the
effectiveness  of governmental  redistributive  policies [Frank and Webb (1977)].
However, even when growth has been associated  with rising inequality, it appears  that poverty
has usually fallen [Fields (1989), Wor'd Bank (1990, Chapter 3)].  The comparability  over time and
across countries of some of the poverty measures  used in such comparisons  is questionable. One recent
study has looked at the experience  of 16 countries  for which distributional  data were available for two
points in time during the 1980s  from nationally  representative  household  surveys [Chen et al. (1993)].
Poverty measures  were estimated  using the same  real poverty line at each date, with constant  purchasing
power exchange rates to assure that the poverty lines have similar real value across countries, and the
estimation  methods  adjusted  for some of the comparability  problems,  and allowed  for measurement  errors
in the underlying  household surveys.'  About 60% of the variance  in the rate of reduction of the head-
count index of poverty could be attributed to differences in the rate of growth in mean household
consumption  per capita;  changes  in relative inequalities,  and differences  in initial conditions  (determining
how responsive  poverty is to growth and/or redistribution),  accounted  for almost all of the rest of the
variance in rates of progress in reducing  poverty. The regression of rates of poverty reduction against
rates of growth in mean household  consumption  implied  an elastictiy  of -2, though this was also found
to vary considerably  between countries, reflecting  differences  in initial conditions  [Chen et al. (1993)1.
However, short-run  elasticty  with respect  to growth in national  income  is probably somewhat  lower than
this figure, due to consumption  smoothing.
The above  strand of the literature  has concerned  how growth affects  inequality  (as one of the links
from growth to poverty). The reverse causation  - from initial inequalities  to growth - has received less
attention. Initial inequalities  in the ownership  of human and physical  assets will influence  initial  market
outcomes  Ed  the efficiency  of those outcomes  [Hoff  (1992)]. Thus one would expect that the extent and
type of economic  growth would also depend on initial inequalities, though a unified theory is not yet
available. This link has arisen in a number  of models. A classic argument  assumes  that savings  functions
are non-linear, in which  case aggregate  savings  will  depend  on the distribution  of income. If the marginal
propensity to save rises with income and the growth rate is determined  by the aggregate rate of saving
(though these are stronger assumptions  than may appear at first glance) then there will be a trade-off
between  equality  and growth. However,  the link  between  inequality  and savings  rates is weak [Gersovitz
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efficiency  gains from redistribution  [Geanakoplos  and Polemarchakis  (1986), Hoff (1992)1. Equalizing
redistributions  of wealth can increase aggregate  output in a competitive  economy under the efficiency
wage hypothesis rDasgupta and Ray (1987)].  Under certain restrictions on preferences, the initial
composition  of demand (itself influenced  by the initial  distribution  of assets) will also influence  the type
of growth observed [Murphy et al (1989), Eswaran and Kotwal (1991), Falkinger (1992)], with the
prediction that high initial inequality  can impede the prospects for a pro-poor growth process.  The
political economy  of conflicts over distribution can also lead to a similar prediction, and there is some
supportive evidence in  country experience since the mid-1960s; countries with more equal initial
distributions  appear to have grown faster [Persson and Tabellini  (1991)].9 However, there is still much
we do not know about the link between initial conditions  and growth, let alone the policy implications.
5.3  The  sectoral  paern  of growth
Some observers have read the recent evidence,  that economic  growth is rarely associated with
sufficiently  adverse changes  in relative inequalities  to prevent  a decline  in absolute  poverty, as suggesting
that the role of government  in reducing  poverty can safely be confined  to promoting  growth. That does
not follow. Even though past growth has often helped reduce  poverty, some growth processes may do
so more effectively  than others.  One potential role of government  is then to foster a pattern of growth
conducive  to poverty alleviation.
The sectoral and regional pattern of investment  - and hence of the resulting income gains - has
often been identified  as an important  policy instrument. It is now widely  believed  that many LDCs could
grow faster, as  well as more equitably, by  shifting investments towards rural, labor-intensive or
'backward  activities  (section  2).  However, such a shift need not indefinitely  increase  mean income VA
reduce poverty, because rates of return (as conventionally  calculated)  to investments  across sectors or
regions need not remain positively  correlated with the relevant  poverty indicators.
How much impact  on aggregate  poverty is possible by altering  the sectoral pattern of economic
growth?  The answer depends in part on the growth performance  of existing allocations  of investment.
If past policies have been biased against growth in regions or sectors where it would have a high return
and it would benefit the poor, then suitable policy reforms may allow bgt  higher impacts on current
poverty, and higher rates of growth and, hence, poverty alleviation in the future.  There is strong
evidence that this  is so in a  number of  developing countries, notably those which have followed
excessively capital-intensive, pro-urban development strategies through  a  variety  of  pricing and
expenditure  policies [Lipton (1977), Krueger et al. (1988), World Bank (1990, 1991c)].
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Agricultural  growth, especially  growth and stabilization  of food staples production, is likely to benefit
poor people. First, most of the poor - including  the iural poor - are net food buyers. Smooth and ample
local food supplies, even in open economies,  carry special  advantages  for them, especially  'f international
or national  transport costs per ton of food staples  are high.  Second, while poor people's entitlements  to
food (rather than local availability  per se) determine  their nutritional  levels [Sen (1981a)], poor people's
rural exchange entitlements  depend largely on earnings  from growing food.
The empirical  debate on the effect  of agricultural  growth on rural poverty continues. 7 Counter-
examples to the proposition  that agricultural growth is necessarily  pro-poor do exist.'  These indicate
that there are some important  contingent  factors  that mediate  between  some forms of growth and poverty
reduction [Prahladachar  (1983)  emphasizes  appropriate  rural institutions]. It is also unclear to what extent
agro-technical progress and  the nature of  rural institutions can be  viewed as  exogenous in  this
relationship.'  This has implications  for the type of policies that are needed to promote agricultural
growth, though it need not dull the motivation  for a pro-rural emphasis  in anti-poverty  strategies.  The
balance of evidence  is that, globally [Binswanger  and von Braun (1993)]  and in important  specific cases
such as India [Mellor and Desai (1985), van de Walle (1985)], times and places of relatively high
(growing)  farm output, especially  food output, per acre and per worker, have also featured  relatively  low
(alling) rural poverty."°  High-yielding  cereal varieties  have clearly benefited  the poor, by restraining
food prices, providing  rural work, and raising incomes  of small farms; but doubts remain about impacts
on regions and countries  unable to adopt  HYVs, and on the stability  of incomes  and output [Lipton  with
Longhurst (1989)1.  Tractorization  and other labor-displacing  sources of agricultural cost reduction,
especially  if subsidized,  are likely to harm the poor, on balance.  The impact of irrigation on poverty
depends on the technical features  of the type of systcm used [Narain  and Roy (1980)].
In many  LDCs the policy environment  has, however, been  decidedly  biased  against  the rural farm
sector.  Three sources of such a bias can be identified: i) the direct effect of sector-specific  pricing
policies, appearing as a wedge between domestic producer prices and border prices for agricultural
outputs; ii) the direct effect of non-price, sector-specific,  policies, such as public spending on roads,
schools,  services, research etc; and iii) the indirect  effect on the farm sector of economy-wide  distortions
operating through exchange rate and external trade policies.  The latter bias is more subtle, though it
should be evident in the real exchange  rate (the price of tradables -typically including  most agricultural
outputs - relative to non-tradables)  but policies  to protect the manufacturing  sector will also depress the
relative  price of farm outputs. Krueger et al (1988)  look at price biases [(i) and (iii), though not (ii)] for
18 developing  countries  in the period 1975-84  and find that the indirect effect is stronger than the direct
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particularly through the allocation  of public spending  on physical  and social infrastructure.
However, once the possibilities  for policy reforms eliminating  these biases have been exploited
(and their reform has been the aim of adjustment  lending  since the early 1980s;  see section  5.4), further
targeting of the pattern of growth will probably entail some loss of growth potential.  One can still be
readily willing to  pay that cost if such targeting has sufficient impact on poverty, relative to the
alternative  policies. This is a relatively  unexplored  area.  To better assess the case for a reverse bias in
favor of rural areas or labor-intensive  products, one needs to know more about both its growth costs and
the poverty alleviation  benefits.  This information  is not easily obtained.  But let us make a couple of
assumptions  which will load the case in favor of sectoral targeting, so we can at least get some idea of
the poenial  benefits.  The case for such targeting is questionable  if factor mobility is perfect across
sectors or regions.  Let us assume that factors are immobile, and that the growth cost of targeting is
negligible. How then is poverty affected  by redistributing  aggregate  incomes  across regions or sectors?
For India, Datt and Ravallion  (1991a) consider  the effects on poverty of transfers among states,
and between  rural and urban areas. Effects on pre-transfer  incomes  and price effects  are ignored. They
find that the oualitat  effect of  reducing regional/sectoral disparities in average living standards
generally favors the poor.  However, the quantitativ gains are small. For example,  the elimination  of
regional disparities in the means across 20 states of India, with each state divided into urban and rural
areas, while holding ia?a-regional inequalities constant, would yield only a  small reduction in the
proportion  of persons below the poverty line, from an initial 33% to 32%.  Regional/sectoral  targeting
may thus be quite a blunt instrument for aggregate  poverty alleviation,  although when administrative
capabilities  allow finer geographical targeting the gains will increase.'l  Growth costs of shifting
resources  out of more profitable  locations  -once the gains from eliminating  existing  distortions  have been
exhausted  - are likely to reduce the gains to the poor.
Such experiments  are at best suggestive;  provided  its growth cost is not too large, regional and
sectoral targeting  can reduce poverty. But the above  estimates  of the benefits under ideal conditions  do
make one rather sanguine about  the prospects for a really significant  reduction in aggregate  poverty by
this means, beyond the likely gains from removing  policy biases against  the rural sector.
Cross-sectoral  links have played little role in the literature surveyed above. These can arise in
a number  of ways, including  migration  across regions, and remittances. The key question  for the present
discussion is: to what extent do sectorally  specific anti-poverty  policies spill over to the poor in other
sectors? Ravallion (1990d) looks at both intra- and inter- sectoral effects of anti-hunger policies in a
dualistic developing economy, with linkages  arising through a migration equilibrium  ',ndition;  in this
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remittance behavior have suggested the opposite conclusion; policy interventions induce behavioral
responses which dampen the net gains [Cox and Jimenez (1992)].
5.4  Macroeconomic  adjustment  and poverty
For most LDCs, the 1980s  saw macroeconomic  instability,  with rapidly  rising servicing  costs on
foreign debt, external terms-of-trade  shocks, and rising fiscal and external imbalances entailing an
unsustainable  excess of aggregate  demand  over supply."'° An "adjustment  program" is a set of policies
to restore macroeconomic  balance.  The program combines fiscal contraction - cutting government
spending and/or raising taxes - with supply-side  measures  aimed at reducing inefficiency  (cutting, for
example, trade distortions  or wasteful  parastatal  organizations,  or removing trade distortions).
Unless there is a rapid supply-side  response,  or the cuts are solely in government investment  [a
strategy followed  by some adjusting  countries; see World  Bank (1990, Ch.7)%,  somebody's consumption
must fall. Lack of adjustment  may thus be an attractive  short-term  option, though there must eventually
be a (potentially  hard) landing. The ultimate case for an adjustment  program  depends on showing  that
the present social value of the future sequence  of consumptions  is higher with adjustment  than without.
How will adjustment (relative to not adjusting) affect the poor?  To what extent are those impacts
contingent  on the initial conditions  of an economy  and the details of policy reform?
5.4.1  Theory
The main  model  underlying  discussions  of the effects  of adjustment  on real incomes  identifies  two
categories of goods: taded  and non-traded.  Only for the latter do domestic demand and supply
conditions affect price.'°  Adjustment  will reduce domestic demand for both traded and non-traded
goods. Producers of traded goods  can sell to foreigners  instead, but producers of non-traded  goods will
initially suffer unemployment  and reduced incomes. To restore full employment,  the price of the non-
traded goods must fall, relative to the traded goods - a real devaluation. This stimulates  a switch in
domestic demand  from traded to non-traded  goods, and the opposite  switch in domestic  production.
How will this process affect the incomes  of the poor? Assume  that the poor are net suppliers of
labor, and fairly mobile across  sectors. From what we know  about  the characteristics  of the poor in most
developing  countries, these assumptions  are believable (section  4.2) though there are exceptions, which
we comment  on below.  Then, from the Stolper-Samuelson  theorem, the real wage of labor will rise
during the adjustment  if (and only if) the traded goods sector is more labor-intensive  than the non-traded
goods sector.'  Most policy discussions  assume this (because LDCs' comparative advantage  lies in
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price shifts associated  with adjustment.
That prediction  must be qualified. If domestic  prices (both  outputs and inputs) are flexible, and
labor is mobile, then the process will be rapid.  However, in reality, some prices adjust sluggishly  and
there are impediments  to labor mobility;  structural adjustment  is very unlikely to remove all distortions.
Some sectors  of the economy,  with flexible  prices, will  fare differently  during adjustment  to other sectors,
where significant  unemployment  may  persist. Then we must  ask: are the poor concentrated  in the sectors
with relatively  flexible  prices.  A common  and plausible  characterization  of developing  countries is that
the rural sector tends to have flexible  prices, while the modem sector has more rigid prices.  Given that
poverty tends to be concentrated  more in the rural sector, this suggests that the positive impacts of
adjustment  via wages and employment  may be felt quite quickly in the rural sector. 105
However, it is not just this response  that matters, but how much the poor must pay for the goods
they consume. If they do not consume  traded goods, then the welfare  outcome is clear: command  over
non-traded  goods must rise.  More generally, the direction  of the change in welfare for a worker will
depend on the magnitude  of the real-wage response relative to the share of income devoted to traded
goods.
A key category of goods for the poor is food staples. The common  presumption  is that (except
for most roots and tubers) these goods  are tradable. Then staple food prices rise during adjustment. In
most countries,  however, the poor are quite heterogeneous  with respect to their trading position in food
markets (section 4.2).10  Some will gain and some will lose, and the assessment may then depend
crucially  on interpersonal  comparisons  of welfare amongst  the poor (section 3.3).
Also, food staples sometimes behave more like non-traded goods in the short term, because
government food storage policies buffer domestic food prices from fluctuations  in world prices, or
because internal market integration  is impeded by inadequate  rural infrastructure  [World Bank (1990,
ch.7)1. Short-term  welfare impacts may thus be in opposite  direction  to long-term impacts.
The welfare impacts  of adjustment  will also depend  on how public expenditures  are cut.  If the
poor initially benefit little from public spending, then they will lose little from the cuts.  That, however,
is often not plausible. Though often poorly targeted, public expenditure  in most developing  countries
does yield  potentially  important  gains to the poor. Unless  adjustment  is to be associated  with a short-term
increase in poverty, public expenditure  cuts will have to spare such programs.  Several countries have
combined aggregate budget contraction with rising shares (and occasionally  rising absolute levels) of
public spending in the social sectors, including  targeted transfers.""  Elsewhere, 'golden handshakes'
to  retrenched workers figure prominently in compensatory  packages, even though such workers are
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However, the role of policy here goes well beyond compensating  the poor for direct losses from
adjustment. Complementarities  often exist between  the composition  of public spending and the benefits
to the poor of structural adjustment. The supply response  of farmers to higher prices of traded goods
will typically depend on the quality of supportive  infrastructure  (both physical infrastructure, such as
roads, and information),  and there are compelling  arguments  for believing  that such infrastructure  would
generally be under-provided  without  public provisioning." 09 Yet the fiscal "crunch" of adjustment  often
tempts governments  to cut exactly these infrastructural  sectors.
For these reasons, we should  be wary of simple theoretical  arguments  about  the welfare impacts
of adjustment. They can offer a useful guide  to thinking, but evidence  will typically  be needed  to resolve
the issues; it is difficult to obtain.  Fortunately, great strides have been made since the early 1980s  in
collecting  the sort of household  level data that can inform  these  questions  for developing  countries. Also,
adjustment  lending  to LDCs now commonly  includes  resources for collecting  such data, and monitoring
welfare impacts. 110 Few of the issues can be resolved  1WIx  by such data; both theory and casual
eampiricism  will remain essential. However,  household  surveys  have often helped to resolve ambiguities
about impacts of policy reform on the poor.
S.4.2  Evidence
Much of the impact of adjustment on the poor is mediated through its impact on economic
growth. Some household-level  evidence  on the evolution  of poverty indicators  during adjustment  is now
available." 1 '  One of the few clear pattens  is that the head-count index tends to move with mean
consumption  or income of households;  poverty increases  during recession, and it falls during recovery,
e.g.,  in Latin America [Morley (1992a,b)) and East Asia [Ravallion  and Huppi (1991), Demery and
Demery (1991)1. For an analysis  across 16 countries in the 1980s  see Chen et al. (1993).
Such observations  do not, however, tell us the impact  of adjusting relative to what would have
happened under the counterfactual  of not adjusting.  One careful study of Peru's decision to avoid
stabilization  during the 1980s  found sharply worsening  living standards of the poor [Glewwe  and Hall
(1992)1. Yet we do not know  how different the outcome  would  have been under a stabilization  program.
To the extent  that the change  in mean income  is typically  the main correlate  of changes  in poverty
measures, a key question is: did adjustment  raise or lower the rate of growth? The answer depends on
the speed of supply-side  adjustment. That depends on initial conditions  in the economy, notably the
flexibility  of price adjustment  and the state of physical  and social infrastructure. Normally, adjustment
is associated  with initially  slower  growth, and hence  presumably  with more poverty in the short term than
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Distributional  shifts can have an Important  impact. In Brazil,  distributional  shifts  during  the
1980s  significantly  worsened  the  effects  of falling  growth  on poverty  [Datt  and  Ravallion  (1992a)].  Yet
a slight  improvement  in distributionhelped  the  poor  in Indonesia  [Ravallion  and  Huppi  (1991)J.  Dorosh
and Sahn (1993)  find that the distributional  effects  of real devaluations  will tend to be pro-poor  in a
number  of African  countries,  since  the rural  poor  tend  to be net producers  of tradable  goods.
The distributional  impacts  of adjustment  depend  heavily  oi the economy's  initial  conditions,
particularly  its openness,  and the extent  of flexibility  in its output  and factor markets. For example,
Costa  Rica's large,  open, and  labor-intensive  traded  goods  sector  allowed  the poor to benefit  from  real
devaluation;  opposite  conc.tions  in Argentina  and  Venezuala  induced  distributional  shifts,  associated  with
adjustment,  far less  advantageous  to the poor [Morley  and Alvarez  (1992)]. The importance  of price
flexibility  is also  clear  from  the results  of  Bourguignon  et al (1991)  for Morocco,  who  contrast  the effects
of adjustment  under  a 'fix-price' closure  - fixed  prices in the modern  sector  and flexible  prices  in the
rural  sector  - with  a standard  Walrasian  closure. Impacts  on the poor  differ  greatly. With  the fix-price
closure,  quantity  adjustments  largely  determine  the distributional  implications.
The  policy  response,  particularly  in the  compsitin of public  expenditure  cuts,  can  greatly  affect
the poverty  outcomes  of adjustment. For example,  the careful  mix of public  spending  cuts during
adjustment  in  Indonesia,  and  the rapid  currency  devaluations,  helped  mitigate  the  short-term  consequences
for the poor of declining  growth  r[horbecke  (1991)].
Our  understanding  of  distributional  changes  during  adjustment  has been  illuminated  by combining
direct  observations,  based  largely  on household  level  surveys,  with  models  of alternative  policy  packages,
typically  in a general equilibrium  (GE) model [Demery  and Demery (1991), Thorbecke  (1991),
Bourguignon  et al. (1991  a,b)j. Each  mode  of analysis  has its strengths  and  weaknesses:  household-level
analysis  tells  us about  actual  impacts,  and  about  key  parameters;  the  aggregate  models  simulate  alternative
policies. To be computable,  the aggregate  models  must  sacrifice  realism,  and the assumptions  need  not
be innocuous.  For example,  it is commonly  assumed  that  distributional  effects  are  neutral  within  sectors;
the evolution  of sector mean  incomes  drives  the aggregate  distribution. However,  in one test of this
assumption  using  household  data  (for  Indonesia),  there was a great  deal of distributional  change  within
sectors  during  adjustment  [Huppi  and Ravallion  (1991)].
A class  of 'meso' level analyses  have also emerged. These  are less ambitious  than the GE
models,  but still isolate  the most  relevant  links  of policy  to welfare. For example,  one might  ask what
the distributional  effects  are of an increase  in food staples  prices allowing  wage  rates to adjust, but
assuming  that other input  and output  prices  are unchanged. 112 Compared  to a full-blown  GE model,
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tailored more closely to time series evidence  on the way prices move with each other and on detailed
household level parameters  estimated  from cross-sectional  surveys.
In these models, the link between  economy-wide  variables  and household  incomes  is through the
budget constraint and the supply functions for  goods and  labor.  Theoretically, this link is well
understood,  and supports  much  of the economic  analysis  behind  policy discussions  of the welfare impacts
of adjustment;  yet some important  issues  remain poorly understood. For example,  the popularity of the
Stolper-Samuelson  theorem in studying  the distributional  impact  of real devaluations  rests on its power
in identifying  effects  on current factor prices. However, this approach  does not sit comfortably  with the
abundant  recent evidence  from microeconomic  studies  and less formal anthropological  investigations  that
behavioral  responses intervene  between  price changes  and living standards (sections  4.2 and 6.3).
The  way household  living standards  are measured  is critical.  Most studies concur that the best
single indicator is not income, but consumption  (section 3.1).  This is the outcome of intertmporal
choices by individuals or households.  Yet policy discussions about how adjustment affects living
standards  often assume  that income  and price effects  impact immediately  on living standards. Under the
standard  formulation  of the consumer's choice  problem, consumption  responds to income changes  in so
far as they alter life-time  wealth;  the current impact  of a transient  income  change is slight. There remains
much that we do not know about the link between macroeconomic  conditions  and living standards.
6  Interventions
The desire to reduce  poverty has been used to justify various direct policy interventions  by LDC
go,,;  ernments. How well have the specific  forms of intervention  worked? This section  cannot survey the
full range of interventions. It seeks only to illustrate  the arguments  for and against them, and to give
detail on a few examples. We focus on the rural sector, recognizing  that - judged by a typical LDC's
poverty profile - rural poverty should  have higher priority (section  4.6). 113
6.1  Evaluaing  targeted  intervendons
Many of the problems  in evaluating  targeted  schemes  are common  to other policies;  for example,
it is often difficult to quantify the counterfactual  of what would have happened without intervention. 1 '
Here we comment  solely on some selected  issues  concerning  anti-poverty  policies in LDCs.
Most recent policy discussions  agree that anti-poverty  schemes  should aim for *cost-effective-
ness", either by maximizing  the gains to the poor for a given revenue cost, or by minimizing  the cost of
a given impact on poverty [World Bank (1990, ch. 6)1. An advantage  of this criterion is that one does
56not have  to spell out any trade-offs  between  one policy  objective,  say poverty reduction, and others. One
Is concerned  solely  with efficiency  in attaining  a given objective;  could one achieve  greater impact  at the
same cost? But there Is a potential hazard, particularly when efficiency  rankings of policies alter with
changes  in the revenue cost; the most efficient  policy for one outlay need not be the most efficient for
all, and then one must specify  the trade-off  between poverty and revenue to rank policies.
In formulating  objectives,  value-judgements  concerning  interpersonal  comparisons  amongst  the
poor can also affect the policy choice. Should a public employment  scheme aim for the widest possible
coverage amongst the poor, recognizing  that this may entail very low wage rates, or should it aim to
allow a smaller number  of participants  to escape  poverty, by setting  a higher  wage rate? The answer can
be shown to depend on the available budget, administrative  cost, the initial wage distribution, jd  the
policy maker's ethical aversion  to poverty-severity  [Ravallion  (1991b)].
A  popular policy recommendation for  more cost-effective interventions has  been  "better
targeting", meaning that more of the poor and/or fewer of the non-poor gain.  Household  survey data
have shown that benefits of  undifferentiated  transfers (such as general food subsidies) often go
disproportionatelyto  the non-poor  [e.g., Grosh (1991)].  However, this does not mean that targeting  will
have a greater impact on poverty. Participation  in a targeted scheme can be far more costly  than an un-
targeted scheme. If the costs of participation  (embodying  behavioral  responses)  and the administrative
costs are high enough, then better targeting  will diminish  cost-effectiveness  in reducing  poverty [Besley
and Kanbur (1993)]. Empirically,  the size of those costs  will depend  on the responses  of participants  and
others;  for  example, intra-household time  allocation responds to  new  "workfare" employment
opportunities  in rural India in ways which diminish  the foregone income [Datt and Ravallion  (1992b)J.
Targeting can also undermine political support and funding for anti-poverty policies.  For
example,  the switch  from universal food subsidies  to targeted food stamps in Sri Lanka in the late 1970s
was associated with a substantial  contraction  in real funding over subsequent  years; many of the poor
ended up with a larger share of a smaller cake, and absolutely  worse off [Besley  and Kanbur (1993)].
However, one should be wary of oversimplifying  the political economy  of targeting,  as the set of people
who will support an efficient  anti-poverty  scheme is often far larger than the set of direct beneficiaries;
for example, rural landlords and the urban rich have supported rural relief work schemes in India
[Echeverri-Gent  (1988), Ravallion  (1991a)].
Policy discussions  have also distinguished  a scheme's  ability  to avoid "type 1 errors" (incorrectly
classifying  a person as poor) versus "type  2 errors" (incorrectly  classifying  a person as not poor) [Cornia
and Stewart (1992)]. The values  one attaches  to these two errors in targeting are implicit  in the poverty
measure one uses;g' the concern with these errors arises because an appropriate measure of poverty
57did not fail as much  as it could  have.  The essential  message  from this strand  of the recent  targeting
literature  is that, while  we should  be concerned  with  avoiding  leakage  to the non-poor,  we should  also
aim  for a desirable  coverage  amongst  the poor. Poverty  measurement  should  reflect  both concerns.
There can be no presumption  that the most cost-effective  policy  has the lowest "errors of
targeting". Given  that  there  may  be significant  costs  of targeting,  the deliberate  introduction  of leakage
or imperfect  coverage  (allowing  a reduction  in those  costs)  may well  allow  a greater  total impact  on
poverty  for a given  budgetary  ouday. One  should  be wary  of assessments  of targeted  schemes  based  on
their ability  to "concentrate"  benefits  on (say)  the poorest  40% [e.g., Grosh  (1992)1.  This is only one
determinant  of a policy's  impact  on poverty.
6.2  Mediods  of targeting
Administrative  costs  and  related  constraints  on policy  instruments  are now  widely  appreciated  in
analytical  discussions  of targeted  policies. These  constraints  are particularly  relevant  in underdeveloped
rural economies. In rural sectors  and the urban informal  sector, negative  income  taxes are seldom
feasible. Sometimes  a means  test is imposed,  but without  the administrative  capability  to implement  it
convincingly.  And  even  with  that capability,  this type  of scheme  will entail  high marginal  tax rates  on
the poor. 116  Both  the problems  of observing  incomes  and  the incentive  effects  of means  testing  have
led  to a variety  of schemes  for "indicator  targeting"  whereby  transfers  are made  contingent  on correlates
of poverty,  such  as landholding,  caste,  or place  of residence  [Besley  and Kanbur  (1993)].
Regional  targeting  of transfers  has attractions.  Substantial  regional  disparities  in living  standards
are common  in developing  countries,  and backward  areas can often  be readily  identified. Place of
residence  may  thus  be a useful  indicator  of poverty. It can  be manipulated  by migration,  which  may  or
may  not  reduce  the impact  on poverty. Local  governments  provide  an administrative  apparatus.  This  has
already  been  exploited  in many  LDCs. For example,  the allocation  of central  government  disbursements
across  states in India has been determined,  in part, by regional  disparities  in poverty. Section  5.3
disused  such  interventions  in the context  of regional/sectoral  'growth targgeting";  the same  comments
apply  here: while  regional  targeting  of transfers  can  help reduce  poverty  in developing  countries  if the
growth  cost  is not too large, it may  be a relatively  blunt  policy  instrument  on its own.
In much  of Asia, and increasing!y  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the most  promising  single  additional
indicator  is probably  land-holding  class. Where  land  and  water  are  reasonably  adequate  and  reliable,  one
observes  a strong  negative  correlation  between  land-holding  and poverty,  especially  in much  of rural
South  Asia.  This has motivated  interest  in a variety  of forms of 'land-contingent  targeting",  such as
certain  land  reforms,  and  transfer  payments  to the  landless  (section  6.4.1). There  are inherent  limitations
58to such targeting; landholding  is an imperfect  correlate  of poverty. Simulations  confirm the advantages
of targeting poverty alleviation schemes in Bangladesh  toward households owning little or no land
[Ravallion  (1989a), Ravallion  and Sen (1992)], but also highlight the limitations. Even with complete
control over the distribution  of income across (but not within) 10 landholding  classes in Bangladesh,  the
maximum  reduction  in the aggregate  severity  of poverty which is attainable  this way is no more than one
could obtain by an untargeted lump-sum gain to all households  of about one tenth of mean income
[Ravallion  (1989a)1. Various factors  may enhance  the poverty alleviation  impact,  such as any effects  of
the in(. me or wealth gains on future productivity  of the poor." 17 Other factors will detract from that
impact.  For example, plausible restrictions on the government's redistributive  powers would further
diminish  the gains to the poor from such policies. There may be potential for combining  land-contingent
targeting with other types of targeting.  For example, there are poor even amongst households with
relatively large landholdings  in Bangladesh  [Ravallion  (1989a)1. If these households  can be identified
with reasonable  precision  by other indicators,  such as region  of residence, then  greater poverty  alleviation
would  be informationally  feasible in practice.
The prospects for reaching the poor also depend crucially on the institutional environment,
including  local administrative  capabilities,  the incentives  facing  local administrators,  their social  relations
with the poor, and the extent of empowerment  of the poor, through both governmental and non-
governmental  representation. Options for seemingly effective  administrative  targeting  at local level do
arise in some settings.  For example, since 1980, the Indian state of Kerala has provided a pension to
agricultural workers over 60 who have low self-reported incomes (including  that of unmarried adult
children).  An official local committee including representatives  of minority groups is in charge of
verification [Gulati (1990)1.  Future comparative  research could reveal how much the institutional
enviromnent  constricts  poverty  alleviation  possibilities;  when compared  to autocratic  structures  of power,
what are the gains from broad-based participatory forms of  local political organization in  which
representatives  and administrators  face incentives  consistent  with poverty alleviation,  and can an open
political environment  provide suitable checks  on their efforts? For example,  comparing  the experiences
of India and China, it appears that democracy and freedom of the press can facilitate public action to
prevent or relieve famines [Dreze and Sen (1989)].
Disappointment  with the prospects for poverty alleviation  using administratively  and politically
feasible forms of indicator targeting has re-kindled interest in self-targeting. This works by creating
incentives  which encourage  participation  only by the poor.  This is illustrated  by one of the oldest anti-
poverty schemes: relief work. 118 The argument is not that such work alleviates poverty by creating
assets (though all the better if it does), but that work requirements  can provide seemingly excellent
59incentives  for self-targeting;  the reservation  wage rate for unskilled  manual work is negatively  correlated
with poverty.  Some of the largest schemes  in South Asia have done well in screening  poor from non-
poor [Ravallion (1991)1119  at modest administrative  cost.  There may be lessons for achieving  better
targeting  of other public services. For example,  public  health services  can be better targeted to the poor
if waiting rooms provide only minimal comforts. Fair-price  outlets, free clinics, etc., can be located in
the poorest areas (thus combining  indicator  targeting  with self-targeting). Under certain conditions, the
rationing of food or health subsidies by queuing can also be self-targeting  [Alderman (1987)], as can
subsidizing  inferior  food staples. However,  none of these mechanisms  is perfect: the poor may  be unable
to afford the work loss in queuing;  the rich may  jump the queue, or send their servants to queue.
There are two main caveats about self-targeted schemes.  First, they screen participants by
imposing  a cost on them; good schemes  ensure that the cost is higher for the non-poor than the poor (so
that it is the poor who tend to participate),  but it may not be inconsequential  to the poor.  An important
cost is foregone income. We know little about its magnitude  for rural public works schemes, though it
is unlikely to be zero; the poor can rarely afford to be idle.  Estimates  for South Asia suggest  that the
net income transfer  may be only half of the direct gain in earnings [Ravallion  (1991)1. A recent estimate
using survey data for two Maharashtran  villages found that the foregone income from employment  on
public works schemes was quite low - around one quarter of gross wage earnings; most of the time
displaced was in domestic  labor, leisure and unemployment  [Datt and Ravallion  (1992b)].
Second, some sub-groups  of the poor are not willing to participate  in workfare schemes, often
because  they are physically  unable to do such work.  The non-poor  are screened out, but so are some of
the poor.  Fortunately there are some obvious, relatively non-manipulatable  and easily monitored,
characteristics  for identifying  such households,  such as physical  disability  and old age.  A combination
of self-selection  through relief work and indicator  targeting based on such characteristics  could provide
a fairly comprehensive  safety net for the poor [Dreze  and Sen (1989)1.
6.3  Transientpoverty
A distinction  is often made between  attempts to reduce transient poverty (experienced  for only
a short period of time) versus chronic poverty (experienced  over a long period).  Both sorts of poverty
are usually substantial in LDCs,'"  though their relative importance depends on how well existing
consumption  smoothing  and insurance  arrangements  work.  Individuals  - including, perhaps especially,
the risk-prone rural poor - act, and set up demand  for local institutions,  to defend themselves  from both
expected  and unexpected  fluctuations  in well-being  (section  4.5).  Hence  the need to crowd in, not crowd
out, private and community  adjustments to fluctuations (as to much else) is an important theme of
60anti-poverty  policy [Morris  (1974)]. However,  even  if optimal  individually,  most risk-avoiding  responses
are costly, and reduce the private prospects of escaping  poverty; for example, low-risk crops normally
produce low expected  incomes. Social  insurance  can exist without  markets  or governments,  but how well
does it work? Community-based  risk-sharing  arrangements  may well be less prone to moral hazard and
adverse selection  (in traditional  village settings  in which participants  are well known  to each other), but
they must still be implementable  without binding, legally enforceable contracts.  This fact constrains
performance  for the poor, particularly in spells of transient poverty, or when the threat of destitution
reduces the probability of continued participation in social insurance [Coate and Ravallion (1993),
Fafchamps  (1992), Besley's  chapter]. All this may  justify, even  on pure efficiency  criteria, public actions
to partly insure or subsidize  poor people's production  risks, or to reduce or insure their "background'
risks to health or food security.
What form should such actions take?  There are many examples of ineffective interventions.
Governments often try  to  stabilize foodgrain prices during a  famine by banning "hoarding'  and
"profiteering";  even when current storage  is excessive  (relative  to a rational expectation  of future price)
this policy can fall dismally, even making  matters worse.  A far better approach is to work directly on
current and future food availability, to undermine any destabilizing  speculation. Understanding  how
foodgrain  markets actually work - and how public action can enable them to work better - is often the
key to success  in famine relief [Ravallion  (1987)].
Compensating  the victims is another  approach  with mixed  results. Crop insurance  often succumbs
to problems  of moral hazard [Hazell  et al.(1986),  Walker et al.(1986)]. Also, it is not obvious  why this
form of fluctuation should be favored; some of its poor victims might have had good fortune in other
respects, while  farmworkers  - usually poorer, and (via unemployment)  worst affected  by yield decline -
are unprotected  by crop insurance. There are other options, such as social security  [Ahmad  et al (1991)],
including  rural public works and employment  guarantee  schemes  readily "switched  in' during bad times
[Ravallion  (1991a)]. All such approaches  face issues  of (i) cost containment,  (ii) avoidance  of perverse
incentives (including  moral hazard), (iii) ensuring coverage of the needy, while not discouraging the
emergence of insurance markets for the better-off, (iv) distributing scarce public resources fairly and
efficiently  among types of events for which compensation  might be important  to the poor.
Policy may also shift resources toward low-risk areas, or risk-reducing inputs.  Agricultural
research, irrigation, or roads may be diverted to rural areas with relatively low variability in poor
people's incomes: Punjab in India, Central Luzon in the Philippines,  Sonora in Mexico. This approach
aims, in part, to encourage migration away from riskier environments,  but mainly to place a larger
proportion of output and income in "safer" districts.  Yet such "betting  on the safe" may paradoxically
61increase  the variability  of gal  farm  output  and  income,  due  to the covariance  among  the districts  - often
climatically  similar - into which  the policy  has concentrated  a larger proportion  of farm output  and
income  [Hazell  (1982)].  Moreover,  unless  the poor  respond  with  substantial  migration  towards  the  areas
of low  fluctuations,  there may be a perverse  poverty  impact  from concentrating  resources  upon such
areas,  where  initial  poverty  is often  lower  [Rao  et al. (1988)]. A more  promising  approach  is often  to
shift  public  research,  extension,  or subsidies  towards  locally  risk-reducing  inputs  (e.g. irrigation  and  pest
management),  crop-mixes  (e.g. from  maize,  towards  more  drought-resistant  millets),  or forms  of work
provision.  For example,  the income  stabilization  benefits  of relief  work  schemes  have  probably  been  as
important  as the transfer  benefits;  there  is no more  important  example  than  the role these  schemes  have
played  in famine  relief  in South  Asia  [Dreze  (1990),  Dreze  and  Sen (1989),  Ravallion  (1991a)1.
6.4  Chronic  pmverty
Many  actions  affect  both  transient  and chronic  poverty. For example,  certain  traditional  coping
mechanisms  during a famine  - such as the sale of assets - can save lives but foster longer-term
impoverishment.  Direct  interventions,  such  as relief  work  schemes,  can  help  the poor, or near-poor,  to
avoid such costly forms  of adjustment  [Binswanger  and Rosenzweig  (1990),  Ravallion  (1991)]. An
effective  safety  net may  thus also help  reduce  chronic  poverty. Conversely,  one of the best defenses
against  transient  distress  is a long  period  of relative  prosperity.  For example,  vulnerability  to a famine
may  depend  greatly  on the prior history  of poverty  [Ravallion  (1987)].
Typically,  policies  aimed  at reducing  chronic  poverty  try to make  the poor more  productive.
Altered  choices  about  land,  human  capital,  and  credit  - inputs  usually  associated  with  extra  output  - can
raise  incomes  among  the poor.' 2' In each  case, the poor can gain  from seven  sorts  of event,  including
policy  interventions,  that  affect  inputs. The  first  three  rows  of Table  2 relate  to the impact  of events  that
improve  input  volumes;  the next  two, input  productivity;  and  the last  two, appropriate  prices.
The first way  in which  poor  people  may  gain  from  extra input  volumes  is by benefiting  from  a
rise  in resource  availability,  e.g.  through  a settlement  scheme  that  provides  each  person  (poor  or not)  with
the same  probability  of extra  land whatever  their initial  income  levels. Second,  at the other extreme,
poor  people's  resources  may  be increased  by pure  redistribution  from  the  non-poor,  e.g. by land  reform.
Third, input  volume  and  distribution  can together  shift in favor  of the poor, e.g. by targeting  land  in a
settlement  scheme,  or jobs in a public  works  program.
Fourth and fitth come events, including  policies,  that raise factor productivity,'m  without
necessarily  varying  the quantities  of other  inputs. These  are typically  concentrated  on one  factor,  such
as land, labor,  or irrigation  capital. Poor  producers  will  probably  share  in the benefits,  sometimes  even
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to poor  people  [Howes  (1985)1.l"
Sixth  and  seventh,  the poor  may  gain  as producers  (without  direct  changes  in volume,  distribution
or productivity  of any  factor  input)  from  changing  prices. Such  changes  can either  reduce  (or stabilize)
the prices  of inputs  boaght  mainly  by the poor,  or raise  (or stabilize)  the price  of marketed  outputs  that
are intensive  in their  use of poor  people's  preferred  inputs,  notably  labor.
Table  2 uses  this  framework  for classifying  events,  including  policy  interventions,  that  can alter
inputs into rural production  and thereby  reduce  poverty.  Each box exemplifies  one such type of
event/input  interaction  (including  some  non-farm  cases). Only  a few  boxes  are reviewed  below.
6.4.1  Land
"More  land' is often  what the rural poor say they  need most. Also, when asked  to farm in
land-preserving  ways  - e.g. to reduce  cattle  stocking  ratios  - they often  reply  (demonstrably  correctly)
that they  need  more land  before  they  can afford  to do so [Drinkwater  (1991:14.5)].  Indeed,  from the
Neolithic  Settlement  to about  1750,  the usual  response,  in most  rural  areas  suffering  from an increase  in
chronic  poverty,  was  to farm  new  lands,  often  nearby,  or to shorten  failows  [Boserup  (1965)1.
Spontaneous  land expansion,  without  significant  diminishing  returns (or increasing  marginal
break-in-costs)  per hectare,  has until  quite  recently  been  a significant  response  to poverty. For example,
millions  of farmers  resettled  voluntarily  in Ethiopia  in 1934-77,  in response  to environmental  problems,
evictions,  and other pressures  [Chole  and Mulat  (1988: 165)]. However,  such  processes  have  much
abated  under  pressure  of land  scarcity. They  remain  significant  in parts  of West  Africa  and Brazil,  but
even  there the areas  of new setlement  are experiencing  shorter  fallows,  increasingly  inadequate  land
regeneration,  and hence long-run  threats  of diminishing  returns. In such circumstances,  spontaneous
settlement  can seldom  do much  to cure  poverty  without  major  supportive  public  action.  12
The direct actions inducing  land expansion  for the poor are settlement  schemes  and land
redistribution.  How  much  can  these  reduce  rural  poverty?  The rural  poverty  profile  has bearing  on the
answer. The rural  poor  usually  do overlap  substantially  with  those  who  own  and/or  operate  litde or no
farmland. But  there  are exceptions.  Rural  teachers,  shopkeepers,  and artisans  are often  well-off  though
landless; in parts of West  Africa  rural non-farm  employment,  not occupancy  of farmland,  appears  to
predict  lower  risk of poverty  [P. Hill (1972),  Reardon  et al. (1992)]. Conversely,  households  that  own
and  operate  as much  as 34 ha. of bad land  can  be very  poor: in Western  India,  they are no likelier  to
escape  poverty  than  are  the landless  [Visaria  (1980),  Lipton  (1985)1.  In better  farming  areas,  lack  of land
63is a clear correlate  of poverty,  but it is an imperfect  one: this constrains  the prospects  for reducing
aggregate  rural  poverty  by land-based  redistributions  [Ravallion  (1989),  Ravallion  and Sen  (1989)].
Another  limitation  on land  redistribution  or settlement  - even  among  households  deriving  their
livelihoods  entirely  from farmland  - is that  land  inequality  is less than it seems. First, household  size
almost  everywhere  increases  with operated  land  area [Singh  (1990)). In a study  of the Indian  Punjab,
the Gini index  of operated  land  per household  was double  that  of land  per person  [Vulka  and Sharma
(1989)1.  Second,  in Asia [Bhalla  and Roy  (1988)],  smaller  holdings  tend  to be on higher-quality  land,
and to embody  more land improvement  (wells,  bunds)  per hectare,  than do larger holdings. Third,
tenancy  usually  enables  some  non-landowners  to farm; operated  land is almost  always  distributed  less
unequally  than  owned  land  [Singh  (1985)].
For  settlement  schemes (Table 2:1a) to  be effective against poverty, there are several
prerequisites.  Two  are normatly  met. There  must  be differences  among  agricultural  regions  in (potential)
marginal  productivity  of labor  (MPL). And  the scheme  must  be needed,  and  able,  to overcome  barriers,
or deterrents,  to poor people's  spontaneous  migration  towards  the regions  with  a higher  potential  MPL.
More problematic  are other prerequisites:  fiscal sustainablity;  low "crowding  out" of spontaneous
settlement;  motivation  to identify  potential  settlers,  genuinely  willing  to move  and  mostly  poor, yet able
to benefit  from  resettlement;  and absence  of severe  conflicts,  or environmental  degradation,  in the area
of settlement,  such  that  decreases  in poverty  among  the settlers  are unsustainable  or are outweighed  by
increases  among  indigenous  people. Oberai  (1988)  reviews  alternative  schemes.
Redistributive  land  reform  - see the chapter  by Binswanger  et al., and  Lipton  (1993)  - remains
an important  route  to "more  land  for the  poor". Its aims,  of advancing  the rural  poor  by increasing  their
land  rights  and  by defanging  multi-market  "rural  tyrants"  [Bell  (1990)1,  have  often  been  achieved,  though
seldom  sufficiently  to meet  initial  excessive  expectations.  And  there  have  been  failures  too. Several  have
involved  incentives  to shift  control  of land  away  from  the  poor. Restrictions  on tenancy,  without  effective
ownership  ceilings,  have harmed some  of the landless  poor, because  landlords  ha-ve  responded  oy
reducing  the supply  of land to rent, especially  by resuming  land for personal  cultivation. This has
prevented  the poor  from selling  services  as farm  managers  and entrepreneurs  via tenancy.5 State  and
collective  farming  usually  excludes  poor  non-members  (ex-employees),  relies  on economies  of scale  that
seldom  exist, and  creates  incentives  to individual  shirking  and to farm-level  capital-intensity.
These erroneous  measures  have often been redeemed  by, or converted  into, classic land
redistribution. In Taiwan and Korea, tenancy  restrictions  were redeemed  by effective  ceilings  on
holdings,  so that incentives  to ex-landlords  were not (as is usually  the case)  to evict  ex-tenants,  but to
sell, or accept  compensation  for, excess  lands. Across  Latin  America,  collective  and  State  farmers  have
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and collective  farming zs a "detour" on the road from unequal to equal private farming [Bell (1990)J.
Public policy for land settlement, and (much more) for land redistribution, has comprised a
major, and partly successful,  response  to the pressures  created by rural poverty and population  growth.
As the composition of the rural poor shifts increasingly from farmers to employees, however, the
employment  effects  of reforms will become  more critical. Fortunately,  above  all in the extremely  unequal
circumstances  of (say) Brazil, it is clear that smaller family holdings are not only more labor-intensive,
but more employee-intensive,  than large commercial  farms.  Moreover, this fact (itself due mainly to
costs involved  in search, screening and supervision  of large hired farm workforces)  probably  creat  an
"inverse relationship"  between farm size and annual output per hectare, as shown in the chapter by
Binswanger et al [also see Berry and Cline (1979), Tbiesenhusen  (1988), Lipton (1993)1. Thus land
redistribution  - unlike collectivization,  or in most cases tenancy reform - normally creates extra GNP,
out of which the losers can in part be compensated.
However, "more  land for the poor", whether  through settlement  or distribution,  has limits as an
anti-poverty  policy. First, in India [Dev et al. (1991)],  Zimbabwe, and elsewhere,  it is often second-rate
land, needing  supportive  expenditure  or infrastructure,  that reaches the poor (seldom  the poorest) in such
reforms.  Second, there are diminishing  returns to increasingly  "difficult"  reforms, both economic  (as
the poor acquire marginal  land) and political. Third, even if the poor do gain some land, old farmland
is being lost, possibly to net desertification,m  certainly to salinity and urbanization [Eckholm (1976)].
Fourth, poor rural populations  in many countries continue  to increase.  A major part of rural poverty
policy, therefore, depends  on higher productivity  of land already owned, rented or worked by the rural
poor. Fortunately, a growing  body of evidence  confirms  that biochemical  and hydraulic innovations  tend
to help the poor (though not generally  to reduce inequality)  by reducing  food prices, raising demand for
labor, and often stabilizing  farm-specific  output. The effects on poor farmers in nonadopting  regions and
countries, however, may be harmful [Lipton  with Longhurst (1989)].
6.4.2  Credk
In much of Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa, rural credit has been widely regarded as
the key to poverty reduction. In urban production,  inputs and outputs  usually flow fairly smoothly  over
the year.  In agriculture, especially  field-op  production, (i) input requirements  are concentrated  into P
few critical, climate-related  periods, especially  breaking  the soil and harvesting  the crop; (ii) output  flows
are also concentrated,  in rainfed  annual crops typically  into a month or two; (iii) input costs are incurred
months before outputs arrive.  Poor rural r! .,le,  with few own resources, appear to need credit to
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inputs well before farm incomes  become available.
But can this need be avoided? Seasons  and their risks are obvious; hence farm families  do adapt
through non-crop labor inputs [Hopper  (1955)], savings  and storage. Yet such adaptation  is costly, and
itself risky; credit might reduce those costs. Also, while  rural people may adapt labor supply to the rural
nonfarm  economy  so as to be contravariant  with farm  requirements,  the time-distribution  of farm-nonfarm
linkages means that some nonfarm  labor demand, especially  for processing  and transport, is covariant
with farm labor demand.  Hence consumption  smoothing (see Besley's chapter), input finance, and
investment  demand generate quite exceptional  demands  for tutu  credit, especially  among  the poor.
Is it normally supplied to the poor?  It is often alleged that this or that African society, for
example,  lacks  rural credit. However, almost  invariably  there exist  non-cash  substitutes,  and/or 'hidden"
informal cash-credit  mechanisms  such as "rotating  credit and savings  associations"  [Besley  et al. (1992)].
Moreover, many rural transactions, usually analyzed in the context of land and labor, also operate as
forms of credit. For example,  sharecropping,  as a 'loan'  of land for a rent that varies with output, helps
to address an otherwise  largely unprovided  farmer demand  for equity  loans; so does the lending  of cattle
by owners to managers in Botswana's  mafisa system. Many of the forms of social insurance  discussed
in section 6.3, too, are imperfect  substitutes  for credit markets.
To attack "wicked moneylenders" as a cause of rural poverty has long been the mode of
demagogy,  but seldom  of economics.  '2  Yet even those who recognize  the need for rural credit supply,
and hence for incentives  to provide  it, fear local moneylender  monopoly  and power, sometimes  operating
in "interlocking  markets" [Bell (1988)] - e.g. lenders who insist that needy borrowers  rent their land, or
work for them, if they wish to  borrow at all.  As general concerns, these fears are exaggerated.
Informal-sector  interest rates usually reflect costs of administering  small loans, together with risks of
de.'ault,  rather than substantial  monopoly  profit [Bottomley  (1964), Adams et al. (1984)].
Nevertheless,  there has been much concern that informal credit fails to reach the poor, and is
inadequate for  expanded farm output.  Partly due to  market responses to  that concern, partly to
government actions and subsidies, formal credit has displaced much informal (family, trade, curb,
moneylender)  credit in much of Asia and Latin America.
Yet formal credit too, it is often claimed, does not address the needs of the poor.  It is usually
restricted  to lending for productive  inputs, to creditworthy  persons; the rural poor are increasingly  often
landless, lacking in non-land  assets and hence collateral, and in need of loans mainly for consumption
smoothing. Further, small borrowers  offer formal lenders two serious disadvantages: high fixed costs
per unit of lending [Bottomley  (1963)1;  and problems  of adverse selection,  moral hazard, and above all
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met face-to-face  by local informal lenders than impersonally  by banks or other remote organizations.
Even when a means test is applied - aimed at directing  subsidized  credit to the poor - the outcome  often
falls far short of perfect targeting; for example,  a comparison  of the incidence  by consumption  group of
participation  in the (credit-based  and income  means-tested)  Integrated  Rural Development  Programme  in
Maharashtra,  India, reveals that the scheme  is a good  deal less well targeted  than that state's Employment
Guarantee  Scheme (which involves  neither credit nor a means test) [Kavallion  and Datt (1992)1.
Some of these problems can be overcome. Group-based  lending  schemes (such as the Grameen
Bank in rural Bangladesh)  have often achieved  excellent repayment  rates, though some assessments  of
the rates of return have been less encouraging  [Hossain  (1984)]. The default/loan  ratio of small farmers
in formal credit systems is usually lower than that of large ones [Lele (1974); Lipton (1981)].  The
speculation  [ibid.] that this is largely due to more intensive  screening of small farmers - and hence not
replicable if formal lending to such farmers grows substantially  - may be mistaken. In India, marginal
farmers (below 1 hectare) operated only 12.2 per cent of farmland in June 1985, yet received 33.0 per
cent of agricultural  credit from commercial  banks, the main source [Reserve  Bank of India (1989: 85)].
However, it is hard to maintain  hope that chronic poverty  can be reduced appreciably  by credit-
based interventions. Chronic  poverty is rarely due to 'market failure" in credit or other markets, but to
one of more of the following:  low real total factor  productivity,  low endowments-per-person  of non-labor
factors, and/or a distribution - of those factors and/or of the skills and resources to use them with high
TFP - which is unfavorable  to the poor.  If these conditions  prevail, even perfect responses  of all factors,
product, and credit markets to undistorted  incentives  will seldom  remove chronic poverty.
6.4.3  Public  services
To what extent can chronic poverty  be reduced  by policies concerning  the provision and pricing
of public services? Physical  and human infrastructure  is dealt with more fully in the chapter by Jimenez
in this volume; here we only flag some key issues  meriting  further research in the context of poverty.
There is evidence  on the productivity  effects of physical infrastructure  development,  suggesting
that investments  in rural infrastructure  can generate sizable income gains (both farm and non-farm) in
underdeveloped  rural economies  [Antle  (1983),  Binswanger  et al. (1989),  Jimenez chapter]. The benefits
to  the poor are rarely dealt with explicitly in  this literature (except in the context of the use of
infrastructure development  in relief work schemes; see sections 6.2  and 6.3).  However, given the
evidence  that agricultural  growth tends to reduce rural poverty (section  5.3), there is a compelling  case
that rural infrastructure  development is generally poverty reducing.  The causal links that have been
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on agricultural  output, and more indirect effects (particularly  of roads) in reducing impediments  to the
flow of information  and commodities.  There is also evidence  of positive  productivity  effects  from human
infrastructure development, particularly basic health and education; for reviews see Schultz (1988),
Behrman and Deolalikar (1988), and the chapters by Jimenez and Lau in this volume.  Nor are those
benefits confined  to the urban sector [Jamison  and Lau (1982)].
In al such assessments,  a recurrent issue is that infrastructure  is typically  a locally  provided  good.
Public decisions  are made about the location  of such investments,  which may be influenced  by income
level or  growth rate differences between regions.  Empirical assessments of  income gains from
infrastructure  development  may then be plagued  by a simultaneity  bias.  The (few) studies which have
dealt with this problem do confirm the existence  of sizable productivity  effects; see Binswanger  et al.
(1989) on physical infrastructure  in India, and Pitt et al (1992) on human infrastructure  in Indonesia.
None  of this implies  that the expansion  of public  investments  in local infrastructure  at the expense
of other public programs - including  infarstructure  in other regions - is unambiguously  pro-poor.  That
is a far more problematic. It depends crucially  on how well markets can provide those goods (almost
c-ainly  markets will under-provided  some components  of infrastructure,  but not all; see the Jimenez
chapter), and at what prices.  Infrastructure' is also a heterogeneous  category; some components  are
more pro-poor than others.  The outcomes for the poor can depend critically on  what type of
infrastructure  is developed.
Consider human infrastructure.  Undifferendated  subsidization  of human capital formation is
unlikely to be inherently  pro-poor. Income elasticities  of demand for education  and health care of unity
or  higher are plausible for LDCs.,'  However, a consensus  is emerging in favor of differentiated
expansion  in primary education  and basic health  care, as an instrument  for poverty  reduction [e.g., World
Bank (1990)]. This is seen as desirable in its own right, and as an important  complement  to achieving
the right conditions  (incentives  and infrastructure)  for promoting  a labor-intensive  growth path.>
A 'social services trickle-down"  argument is often made in favor of this type of intervention.
The argument rests on the assumption  that the non-poor are now satiated in their consumption  of these
social services in most LDCs, so that public spending  to these services would go disproportionately  to
the poor.'"  However, these services can differ gready in qualiy Oower  staff-student  ratios in schools,
better facilities in health care clinics), and the non-poor (even when they have themselves reached
universal  enrollments)  are very unlikely to be satiated  for improved  quality. The extra benefits  of greater
budgetary allocations  to these social  services may then go to the non-poor in the form of higher quality.
The same factors in a country's political economy which resulted in the bias against the poor will
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Another - and somewhat more persuasive - argument is based on the existing utilization of
categories of public spending on social services, as revealed by household surveys (an lncreasligly
important  use of such surveys).' 31 There have been a number of empirical studies of the incidence  of
subsidies.'"  These typically find that existing allocations  to primary education and basic health care
tend to be at least mildly  pro-poor, in that subsidies  per head received  by the poor account  for a relatively
higher proportion  of their income  or expenditure,  and (in some cases) are also absolutely  highei thm for
the non-poor. The explanation  appears to lie in a tendency for the rich to shift into the private market
for health and education,  and also for family  size to be higher for the poor (so that primary education  and
health care subsidies  act like a family  allowance  scheme). Allocations  to education  and health care above
primary level tend, however, to favor the non-poor.
Such studies are informative,  but they tell us little about  how the benefits of public expenditure
reforms - extra spending  on some categories  - will be distributed. What they do suggest is that targeting
of primary education  and health care will be pro-poor, provided  that average pre-intervention  incidence
reliably indicates  the incidence  of the benefits from selective expansion. However, that need not hold;
marginai  gains to the poor may be high for categories  of spending  which do not currently  have a pro-poor
average incidence. Tbis can be assessed  by directly  examining  how the incidence  of benefits of public
spending  on social services evolves  when budgetary  outlays alter.  Two such studies are Hammer et al
(1992)  for Malaysia  (comparing  1973  with 1984)  and van deWalle (1992)  for Indonesia  (comparing  1978
and 1987). Both countries  experienced  a sizable  expansion  in aggregate  budgetary  outlays on health and
education; in both cases, aggregate school enrollments  and public health care utilization expanded
considerably. The distribution  of the benefits of subsidies  to these services, already quite  pro-poor, did
not worsen; in the case of Malaysia,  it improved  somewhat. Thus the poor gained from the expansion
in social sector outlays.  More evidence  of this sort is needed, given the weight  attached  to this type of
intervention  in current policy discussions.
Similar comments  can be made about  physical infrastructure;  some components  (rural roads) are
almost certainly more pro-poor than others (urban highways).  However, the evidence is even more
contentious  than for human capital investments,  not least because  the measurement  of 'who benefits' is
more problematic; few surveys of household living standards surveys, for  example, assess road
utilization,  and (in any case) the pervasive  second-round  benefits would make such assessments  unduly
narrow.  Compelling  evidence  is likely to come via the more indirect route of first establishing  that a
particular growth process reduces poverty, and secondly establishing that a particular infrastructure
initiative  will promote such growth.  This is a feasible route, but needs further research.
697  Condusions
The idea that economic  development  is possible, and that it can reduce poverty, dates from the
eighteenth  century; there was little sign of it before Adam Smith. This idea came hand-in-hand  with a
significant shift in moral and political philosophy.  The emerging capitalist civil society was seen to
require  public institutions  which accepted  responsibility  for mass  education  and basic health care, and also
for protecting the vulnerable  in the market economy.
The early translations  of this idea  into the development  policies  of many  post-colonial  LDCs were
(with few exceptions)  failures. For the most part, the failure was in the translation,  not the idea. Smith's
vision of the 'progressive economy"  was mistranslated  into  overly  optimistic  plans for a capital-intensive
industrialization  path; that was how - it was believed - poverty would eventually  be eradicated. (There
was quite wide agreement  that eradicating  poverty was the goal).  And the role of the state in providing
social services  was seen more in terms of universities and hospitals  than primary schools and clinics.
The attempts at forced-draft planned industrialization  offered little for the poor.  Growth was
often retarded; even when not, it brought few gains to the poor.  Indeed, they were often  the hardest hit
by  anti-trade biases,  since (much more than the non-poor) they earned their  living by  turning
non-tradables  into tradables. And, to make matters worse, the forced-draft  industrialization  was financed
in large part by extracting a surplus from the main source of income to the poor: agriculture.  The
welfare of today's poor was sacrificed,  but not for tomorrow's poor.
The revolt against this  failed approach to  poverty reduction emerged in the  mid-1970s.
Disillusionment  with the potential of trickle-down industrialization  to reach the poor, md  with the
prospects  for radical redistribution  of income  or land, spurred a move away  from the policies  and projects
of the previous two decades.  "Urban  bias'  started to be seen as damaging to both growth and poverty
reduction.  Instead, efforts turned to rural development,  supported by agro-research  and investment  in
physical  and human  infrastructure  in rural areas. This accompanied  a smaller-scale  revolution  in thinking
about urban sector development  priorities.  Like their predecessors, some of the new plans proved too
optimistic, given the real constraints  on finance and organization. However, from the mid-1970s, this
new direction offered greater hope for the poor, and brought real benefits to them in many countries.
In this context, it remains surprising  that the early responses  to the macroeconomic  crises of the
1980s  paid so little explicit regard to the interests of the poor.  There were some reasons for believing
that adjustment  might well benefit the poor even in the short term.  The traded goods sector in LDCs
tends to be labor intensive, because that is usually their comparative advantage. Then the poor will
probably gain from the relative price shifts associated  with adjustment. However, that prediction  must
be qualified. The circumstances  in most developing  countries - the extent of price and wage flexibility,
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to which the poor consume  traded goods, the extent  to which they lose from cuts in public spending  - are
far more diverse  than is allowed  for in many  of the models  which guide policy-making. With the benefit
of hindsight, many of the arguments  that adjustment  - relative to non-adjustment  - had unambiguously
hurt the poor were implausible. But so were some of the high expectations  of supply-side  response to
adjustment,  and hence of a rapid transition to a more favorable growth path.
A more  balanced, and realistic, consensus  on how poverty  can  be most effectively  reduced  started
to emerge from the late 1980s,  though one with deep roots in the history of thought on poverty, going
back to Adam Smith. In this view, the main role of the state is to facilitate  provision  of privately  under-
supplied  goods (infrastructure,  but also social equity  itself)  in an otherwise  market driven  economy. With
neutral incentives,  growth in such an economy  is seen as being in the best interests  of the poor, who are
intensive suppliers of the main factor of production  likely to benefit, labor.  Growth in private-sector
economic  activity is a key part of this story, both as an instrument  for income  poverty reduction, and as
one of the means of financing public support where it is needed.  But it is only a part.  As much
emphasis  is given to successful  public action, in the areas where it is called for.
What issues endure? A comprehensive  list should include (in no particular order): the political
economy  of poverty reduction;  country-incentive  issues in pro-poor aid policies; the costs and benefits
to  the poor  of  asset redistribution; the extent to  which poverty considerations should influence
macroeconomic  and trade policies; fighting  chronic poverty  versus fighting vulnerability  to poverty; the
status of the so-called "special  poverty groups" (women, children, remote areas); environmental  effects
(positive and negative) of poverty and its reduction; the impacts of developed country polices on
distribution within  developing  countries.
However, one generic issue stands out: the need to better understand  how to make a success of
public action in fighting poverty.  The history of development  efforts - including some of the best
intentioned  - has clearly  dulled expectations  of what governments  can do effectively. Yet how confident
can we be in those expectations  while we remain as ignorant as we are about the benefits and costs of
much of what governments  and donors do?  Development  agencies still devote few resources to proper
evaluation. Granted, it is difficult  to properly  evaluate  any project or policy after it is introduced, given
that one is aiming to compare living standards "with" and "without' the project (which is quite distinct
from "before" and "after").  The besw  hope is to build in the evaluation methodology  - including the
survey instrument - right from the start, prior to intervention. This is rarely done.
Effective public action needs good data and measurment.  There are signs of  an emerging
consensus  on poverty measurement,  which might fruitfully guide future efforts at evaluation.  Recent
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many people do not reach some arbitrary poverty line - or even a single measure of poverty, no matter
how many axioms it satisfies. Instead, the aim is to form consistent  comparisons  of poverty, such as
between  different places or dates, or under alternative  policies. Recent literature has identified  a number
of principles to guide such comparisons. The more challenging  questions  in poverty measurement  now
lie right at the heart of the problem  of normative  economics  in general:  how do we measure  the "standard
of living"?  The welfarist approach - by which only information on individual utilities should be
considered  - infers preferences  from behavior  and makes  ethically  acceptable  inter-personal  comparisons
of utility functions which reproduce those preferences.  But the chances of convincingly  retrieving
individual  preferences  from observed behavior  remain slim, recognizing  that there are many non-market
determinants  of welfare  even in the most market-oriented  economy. The need for value  judgements  about
individual  utilities, and the search for convincing  and applicable  non-welfarist  approaches, will continue.
Recognizing  these  pervasive  uncertainties,  what do we know  about  the world's poor, to help guide
policy?  The proportion of people deemed poor, by local poverty lines, decreased in most LDCs (for
which we have data) between the mid-1960s an-d  the mid-1980s. However, there has been negligible
progress in the aggregate  since then, and by any reasonable standard, numbers of poor have almost
certainly  been increasing  since the mid-1980s. Around 1i,,  a little over one billion people were living
on less than one dollar per day.
More striking than this observation is the marked regional imbalance in the current rate of
progress in povety reduction. Poverty is probably  worsening  in Africa (though  data inadequacies  warn
against confidence),  and Latin America. But in Asia the poor are appear to be seeing some real gains,
and can reasonably  expect them to continue, albeit with ups and downs in some countries.
At micro level, some reasonably robust generalizations  about the poor are emerging from
houshold-survey  data.  By most measures, poor households  tend to be larger, due mainly to more
children. The children are less likely to reach average life expectancy,  but it is the higher replacement
fertility of the poor - which is perfectly rational - that makes up the difference. The working  members
of poor households  thus have more mouths  to feed, but they also face higher risks of unemployment,  and
of ilness preventing work.  Women are worse off, though this need not be evident in the incidence  of
current consumption  poverty, but rather in terms of the demands  on their time, and their opportunities
to escape  poverty.
The poorest depend  mainly on their labor; there is typically  little else that they can derive income
from.  They typicaly face varied, and uncertain, employment  prospects from one time of the year to
another.  Other risks pervade their lives, such as the threat of illness.  They do many things to help
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to longer-term  prospects for escaping  poverty.
In many respects relevant to policy, the poor are quite heterogeneous. The depth of current
poverty varies, as do the endowments  which might help in escaping poverty.  Net trading positions
(consumption  minus production)  in key markets - notably for food - also vary among  the poor, so some
gain while others lose from a given change in relative prices.  In much of South and South-East  Asia,
for example,  higher prices of the domestically  produced  food staple will generally  benefit those near the
poverty line, but many of the poorest will lose at least in the short term.
Typically,  the highest  incidence  and severity  of poverty  are found in rural areas, especially  if ill-
watered. For many  of the rural poor, their only immediate  route out of poverty  is by migration  to towns,
to face a higher expected income, though often a more uncertain one.  This may or may not reduce
aggregate  poverty. We can be more confident  that growth in agricultural  output - fuelled by investment
in human and physical  infrastructure  - is pro-poor, though not because  the poor own much land.
The policies pursued by most LDCs up to the mid-1980s  - and by many still - have been biased
against the rural sector in various ways.  The same is true - though different policies are involved  - of
the other major sectoral concentration of poor, namely the urban informal sector.  There are clear
prospects for reducing  poverty by removing these biases.  Looking  ahead (far ahead in some cases), it
is less clear how much further gain to the poor can be expected  from introducing  a bias in the opposite
direction. Neutrality  should be the immediate  aim.
However, provided  that the sectoral  composition  of growth is not biased against  the poor -though
political-economy  considerations  suggest that this proviso should not be taken lightly - the overall rate
of economic  growth matters enormously  to their well-being,  more so than some past discussions  of anti-
poverty policy have recognized.  Earlier concerns that growth in a dualistic developing country must
increase inequality  have declined, both as a result of a deeper understanding  of the contingent  nature of
such effects, and due to the belief that, for the poor, absolute  levels of living matter more than relative
positions.  Elasticities  of poverty measures  with respect to distributionally-neutral  growth in aggregate
consumption  of two or more are now common  in LDCs, though there is considerable  variation  according
to initial conditions,  including  wealth inequalities. While the potential  for reducing  consumption  poverty
through a growth process which is not biased against the poor is now undeniable, adverse initial
conditions  can mean that this potential is only realized  painfully slowly.
Two important  roles for public action can be identified. One involves  fostering the conditions
for pro-poor growth, particularly in providing  wide access to the necessary  physical and human assets,
including  public infrastructure. The other entails  helping  those who cannot  participate  fully in the benefits
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role for interventions aiming by various means to  improve the distribution of the benefits of public
expenditures  on social services and safety nets in LDCs.  Those means range from the selection  of key
categories  of public spending, such as primary education  and basic health care, to more finely targeted
transfers (including nutrition and health interventions)  based on poverty indicators, or on some self-
targeting  mechanism. Though disappointing  outcomes  abound, many countries  have demonstrated  what
is possible with timely and well-onceived interventions.
74Notes
1.  The remark  is noteworthy  because  it originates  not  from a warrior  against  poverty  but from an
economic  liberal, writing for an institution  destined  to  become  a think-tank  for Mrs Thatcher's
government.
2.  "Anyone,  before  the middle  of the eighteenth  century,  who  expected  a progressive  improvement
in material  welfare..  .would  have been  thought  eccentric.  There was little variation  in the lot of the
unskilled  [European]  laborer  in the two thousand  years..  .to the France  of Louis  XIV"  [Keynes  (1923:
vii)].
3.  On the 1803  and later editions,  see Himmelfarb  [(1984:114-7)].  On the 1824  article  - which
prefigures  the "substituting  quality  for quantity"  approach  in Becker  and Lewis  (1974)  - see Lipton
(1990).
4.  Yet  the English  poor lost part of this safety  net, as the rules were applied  more  harshly. The
value  of State  support  in old age, about  90%  of working-class  average  incomes  around 1837-8,  fell to
below  30% by 1890-1900  [Thomson  (1984:453)].  However,  from 1911  national  insurance  pensions
restored  the proportion  to around  40%, and "by 1913  outdoor  pauperism  among  the elderly  had fallen
to 5%  of its 1906  level"  [Polak  and  Williamson  (1991:135)1.  Public  relief  was  only  part of the reason;
the growth  of friendly  societies  was massive  [Hanson  (1972:118-27)1.
5.  This is in marked  contrast  to Mandeville's  denial  - so shocking  to his contemporaries  - that, in
a stationary  economy,  charity  schools  could  raise  the income  (or the well-being)  of workers,  rather  than
merely  delaying  their  earnings,  in an epoch  when  there  was  no technical  progress  to complement  the extra
literacy  or numeracy  of, or add  to the wage-bill  for, labor  as a whole. See  Home  (1978).
6.  In political  science,  "modernization  theory"  suggests  that, as developing  countries  progress
economically,  they approach  the forms  of political  organization  of developed  Western  countries. In
anthropology,  "cultural  evolutionism"  is the  view  that  ways  of domestic,  economic  and  social  organization
follow  an evolutionary  sequence  from  lower  to higher  forms.
7.  Though  not  the only  weapon;  Indian  and  other  LDC  governments  did subsidize  and  protect  (via
restrictions  on big firms)  craft, village,  and cottage  industry.
8.  On these  experiences  see  Fei et al. (1979),  Kuo  (1983)  and Wade  (1991).
9.  For example,  India's rate of growth  in national  income  was 1-1.5  percent  per person  yearly
between  1950  and 1973.
10.  See, for instance,  Datt and Ravallion  (1992c)  on the generally  sluggish  reduction  in poverty
measures  in India  since  Independence.
11.  See  Birgegaard  (1987),  Lipton  (1987a). Most  of the spending  of governments  such  as India's,
and of agencies  such as the World Bank, that was labelled "rural development"  went mainly to
smallholder  agriculture,  not to "integrated"  projects. The arguments  against  such projects  in Asia,
however,  have  been  greatly  exaggerated,  especially  for second-generation,  less  top-down  projects  that
invested  in technology  and  institution-building  before  costly  infrastructures  [ibid.;  Limcaoco  and  Hulme
(1990)].
7512.  The fault  may  lie with inappropriate  planning  methods,  not  with  integrated  area  development  as
such. Recent  area  projects  such  as Solidaridad  in Mexico,  which  offer  fiscal  incentives  instead  of dictates
from  area authorities,  appear  to work  better.
13.  Many  of these  estimates  were  almost  certainly  biased  upwards. The main  problem  is that few
of the estimates  of the earnings  gains  from  extra schooling  controlled  for differences  in ability,  family
environment,  and  school  quality.  On  these  and  related  issues  see  the surveys  by Schultz  (1988),  Behrman
(1990),  and also  the chapters  by Jimenez  and  Strauss/Thomas  in this volume.
14.  See, in particular,  Sen (1979, 1985, 1987). For an attempt  to clarify  the issues, and their
implications  for development  policy,  see  Anand  and Ravallion  (1992).
15.  Gulati  (1977)  showed  that  in Trivandrum  (Kerala),  India,  mothers  sold  food  stamps  to purchase
better  health  care - even  though  in Kerala  State  free basic  health  was  widely  avaDlable.  A BN approach
appears  to claim  that  planners  know  better  than  peasants  how  to allocate  income.
16.  Thus  Morris's  PQLI gives  equal  weights  (1/3)  to three  rates - infant  mortality,  life expectancy
at age 1, adult literacy, and the reciprocal  of infant mortality  - and nothing  else.  Of course, the
price-weights  in GNP comparisons  can also be criticized  as arbitrary. But they are, up to a point,
justified  by a theory  according  to which  relative  prices  measure  relative  values  to users  (marginal  utilities)
and  relative  opportunities  foregone  in production  (marginal  costs). No such  revealed  preferences  underlie
the weights  in PQLIs  and the like.
17.  See Jolly and Cornia  (1988),  Pinstrup-Andersen  (1989),  Maasland  and van der Gaag  (1992),
Lenaghan  (1992),  and  Kakwani  et al. (1993).
18.  And  also  with  indicators  of social  and  political  rights  [Dasgupta  (1992)].
19.  However,  when educational  spending  and poverty  incidence  are held constart at the mean,
average  GNP  per person  still  remains  correlated  with  literacy  rate  [Anand  and Ravallion  (1992)].
20.  It is not clear  under  what  circumstances  private  poverty  reduction  and  public  health  activities  are
substitutes,  as opposed  to complements,  in the production  of health. Substitutability  is suggested  by the
fact that health  outcomes  are much  better  in Kerala,  with  widespread  public  health  provision,  than in
many  Indian  States  with far lower  levels  of poverty. Complementarity  is suggested  by a large study  in
the Narangwal  area  of the Indian  Punjab;  there  a given  outlay  had  much  more  impact  on child  health  if
divided  between  (private)  food  supplementation  and  (public)  health  provision  than  if used  exclusively  for
either  [Taylor  et al. (1978)1.
21.  Outliers  also include  countries  with much  worse than expected  outcomes  on BN indicators,
notably  "rich"  oil-producing  nations.
22.  Agarwala's  (1983)  work  stimulated  much  enthusiasm  at the time,  but the robustness  of some  of
the conclusions  is auestionable  [Aghazadeh  and Evans  (1985),  Taylor  and Arida  (1988)]. World  Bank
(1988)  shows  that  countries  receiving  conditional  adjustment  loans  - especially  if repeated  over several
years  - outperformed  comparators  on most indicators,  but with  rather  important  exceptions:  low-income
countries,  heavily  indebted  countries,  and Sub-Saharan  Africal World  Bank  (199lc, ch.4)  argues  that
trade restrictions  reduce  rates  of return  to Bank  projects,  though  Taylor  (1993)  points  to the possibility
of spurious  correlation.  More  rigorous  empirical  work  is needed.
7623.  See Colclough  and Manor (1991), Wade (1991), and the papers in the symposium  on this topic
in the Summer 1990  issue of the Journal of Economic  Perspectives  including  Bardhan (1990).
24.  It is beyond our scope to go into any detail on data sources here. Household surveys are the
single most important  source of data for making poverty assessments; indeed, they are the only data
source which can tell us directly  about  the distribution  of living  standards in a society, such as how many
households  do not attain some consumption  level.  However, a lot of care must go into setting up and
interpreting  such data; see Ravallion  (1992d)  for a survey of the issues that the analyst should be aware
of, and a full set of references.  Discussions  of the generic issues of survey methodology  - such as
sampling, questionnaire  design, survey operations, and the treatment of self-consumed  products and
consumer  durables - can be found in U.N. (1982, 1989), and Delaine et al (1992).
25.  For example, in Morocco, animal husbandry is intensive in child labor.  While a poor farm
household will enjoy higher total consumption  from higher meat prices, the behavioral  responses  may
involve longer-term losses to poor children, taken out of school to tend livestock [de Janvry et al.
(1991)].
26.  These issues are not specific  to poverty measurement;  there are a number of good expositions,
including  Deaton and Muellbauer  (1980) and Deaton (1980). Also see Deaton, in this volume.
27.  This assumes  that the parameters  of the empirical  demand  model satisfy  the theoretical  conditions
of utility  maximization  [see, for example,  Deaton and Muellbauer  (1980)]. The utility function  is derived
from the estimated  demand  model either as an explicit  functional  form [as in, for example,  Rosen (1978)
and King (1983)]  or by more flexible  n'n-erical methods [Vartia (1983)].
28.  For further discussion see Pollak and Wales (1979), Deaton and Muellbauer (1986), Fisher
(1987), Pollak (1991) and Browning  (1992).
29.  The latter are often very important  to poor people's welfare, yet they are typically not valued in
budget surveys. Access to common  property resources appears to have been declining  in India [Jodha
(1986)];  hence market-based  valuations  of consumption  tend to underestimate  the level, but over-estimate
the rate of growth, in poor people's living standards.
30.  Examples include Anand and Harris (1991), Glewwe and van der Gaag (1990), Haddad and
Kanbur (1990), Lanjouw and Stern (1991), and Chaudhuri  and Ravallion  (1993).
31.  The following draws in part on Ravallion (1992d), which elaborates on these issues.  Other
surveys  (though more from a de%  1 'ped  country  perspective)  include Hagenaars  and de Vos (1988), and
Hagenaars  and van Praag (1985).
32.  The basic needs approach to defining poverty lines goes back to Rowntree's (1901) study of
York, England [Atkinson  (1975, Chapter 10)].
33.  After forty years and endless  sterile controversy,  the Dunn team's work on pregnant  and lactating
women [Nestie  (1987-1990)],  and a few good papers on specific work tasks under laboratory  conditions,
comprise almost all the LDC exceptions.
7734.  A Laspeyres index is common,  pne issue is ,where amongst the poor one should anchor the
index.  Some have preferred to use a bundle of goods appropriate to someone at the poverty line
(implying minimization  of the head-count index of poverty; see section 3.3), while others have sought
a bundle of goods more typical of the middle poor or poorest (minimizing  the error in higher-order
poverty measures). While homotheticity  is implausible  in general, there is some evidence  that it is more
common amongst  the poor, in which case this choice will matter little.  See Ravallion  (1992d).
35.  For example, Ravallion and Bidani (1992) show that rank reversals in Indonesia's regional
poverty profile are quite common when comparing  different methods  of setting poverty lines.
36.  This may be revealed by 'thresholds' in behavior, such as at income  levels where the income-
elasticity  of the age- and sex- specific  participation  rate is not significantly  different from zero, where the
food-share  does not fall as income rises, or where the income elasticity of demand for food is unity.
37.  On the arguments  for and against  this property see Blackorby  and Donaldson  (1980).
38.  Sen (1976, 1981)  offers an otherwise  attractive  measure  of the severity of poverty which is not,
however, sub-group  consistent;  this is also true of the measures  that have proposed as generalizations  of
Sen's measure [Thon (1979), Anand (1983), and Kakwani (1980b)].
39.  In particular, PG can be interpreted as ratio of the minimum cost of eliminating  poverty with
perfect targeting  to the maximum  cost with no targeting [Ravallion  (1992d)].
40.  This is actually  a fair characterization  of how a reduction  in the prices of domestically  produced
food-staples  would affect the distribution of welfare in some Asian countries; an example is given in
Ravallion  and van de Walle (1991a).
41.  Ravallion and Chao (1989) show how the optimal allocation can be calculated.  This can be
instructive  in quantifying  the potential  gains from targeted transfers aimed at reducing  poverty, such as
between  regions [as in Ravallion  (1992b)1  or land-ho'ding  classes [Ravallion  (1989a)]; sections  5.3 and
6.2 will give examples. Also see Thorbecke and Berrian (1992).
42.  This is readily proved by differentiating  through (1) w.r.t. z and using the fact that for the FGT
measures  p(y,z) is homogeneous  of degree zero in z and y.
43.  This follows from the fact that, for any given Lorenz curve, the value of F(z) is homogeneous
of degree zero in z and the mean; see Kakwani (1980a).
44.  See Kanbur (1987a), Kakwani (1990a), Kakwani and Subbarao (1990), Jain and Tendulkar
(1990), Datt and Ravallion  (1992a).
45.  We shall give an elementary  exposition  of the approach. For a fuller introduction  see Ravallion
(1992d). On the use of dominance  conditions  in ranking  distributions  in terms of measures  of inequality
see Atkinson (1970); on rankings in terms of poverty see Atkinson (1987), and Foster and Shorrocks
(1988).  Our exposition  will be confined to single dimensions  of welfare, though the approach can be
generalized to multiple dimensions (though, naturally, unambiguous  poverty orderings become more
illusive); on the multi-dimensional  approach see Atkinson  and Bourguignon  (1982, 1987).
46.  More precisely, attention is restricted  to poverty measures which are additive, of the form in
equation  (1), or any measure  which can be written  as a monotonic  transformation  of an additive  measure.
78All the FGT measure5  discussed  in section 3.3 qualify. Atkinson  (1987, 1989, Chapter 2) characterizes
the set of admissible  poverty measures  and gives other examples  from the literature.
47.  This can also be tested (equivalently)  using the generalized  Lorenz curve, obtained  by scaling  up
the ordinary Lorenz curve by the mean. If the generalized  Lorenz curve (ordinary Lorenz curve scaled
up by the mean) of  distribution  A is everywhere above that of B then the area U:Aer  A's cumulative
frequency distribution must be  everywhere lower than B's.  On the generalized Lorenz curve see
Shorrocks  (1983).
48.  The theory is formally identical to the problem of measuring undernutrition when nutrient
requirements  vary in some unknown  way; see Kakwani  (1989) and Ravallion  (1992a).
49.  See World Bank (1990) and Ravallion  et al. (1991); the latter paper describes the assumptions
and data used.  The estimate is based on distributions  of persons ranked by household consunmption  or
income  per person, as derived from household  surveys  for the mid-1980s  covering  76% of the population
of developing countries, and on econometric extrapolations  based on national accounts and social
indicators  for the remainder. Currency  conversions  use the Summers  and Heston (1988)  exchange  rates
adjusted  for differences  in purchasing  pow6.
50.  See World Bank (1990, Chapter 3). Using comparable  estimation  methods,  an earlier study at the
World Bank estimated  that 389%  of the population  of 36 low income countries  in 1975 did not reach the
consumption  per capita of the 46th percentile of the Indian  distribution [Ahluwalia  et al. (1979)]. This
implies a poverty line close to the lower one used by World Bank (1990' and Ravall;on et al (1991).
Note that the earlier study did not include  China.
51.  Almost  all poverty measures  used in practice are homogeneous  of degree zero in the poverty  line
and mean; this is implied  by the property of 'scale independence",  meaning  that if all consumptions  and
the poverty line increase  by the same proportion  than poverty will remain the same.
52.  This is an analytically  convenient  assumption  (Kakwani,  1990a),  but it also accords  very well with
the observed  pattern of shifts over timo in the world  Lorenz curves reported  by Berry et al., (1989). See
Ravallion  et al (1991) for details. Kakwani  (199Oa)  gives formulae  for the elasticities  of various poverty
measures  w.r.t. the Gini index  under this assumption  about  how the Lorenz curve shifts.
53.  Thus low poverty lines indicate higher poverty in SSA, while at sufficiently  higher lines the
ranking reverses; for fiurther  details see Chen et al. (1993).
54.  Though data inadequacies  result in quite a wMde  confidence  interval around estimates  of poverty
in Africa; see Ravallion  et al. (1991)  for estimates  of the 95% confidence  intervals  around point estimates
of poverty levels by region in 1985.
55.  While  the methodology  of bivariate  poverty  profiles  remains  popular,  there are alternatives,  based
on  multi-variate models of the  distribution of the poverty indicator which allow straightforward
dominance  tests; see Ravallion  (1992a).
56.  However, in a sample in 20 urban centers in India in 1984 - while the 819 poor households
averaged 5.9 members, the 1190  non-poor  households  4.7 -the streng negative  size-income  relationship
ceased to hold among the non-poor [National Institute of Urban Affalrs (1989)l.  Similarly, in rural
Bangladesh,  larger family size lowered monthly meals per person, and of kgs. of food staple, mom
subtantally  for poorer villages (and for females and children) [Mahmud  and McIntosh  (1980)1.
7957.  These  data may overstate  the impact  of maternal  education,  because  they do not control  for
ability,  family  background,  etc [Behrman  (1990)].
58.  Mortality  is less of a problem. Each  birth, geteris  2aribus,  itself cuts a household's  average
income,  confounding  the causal  sequence  in any claimed  negative  cross-sectional  association  of it to
fertility.  But each death, being typically  that of a non-working  household  member,  tends to raise
household  mean income;  the effect  therefore  means  that any negative  association  between  income  and
mortality  is mm  likely  to involve  a causal  sequence  from  poverty  to higher  risk  of death.
59.  Exceptions  can arise when higher income  is not associated  with rising opportunity  costs of
mother's  time [Schultz  (1981)1.
60.  First, to achieve  a given  completed  family  size,  the  poor  require  more  births,  due  to higher  child
mortality. Second,  the poor  are likelier  to need  support  from children  in old age than  are the rich, yet
those children  will fa(  lower income,  higher time-rates  of unemployment  (sec. 4.3.2.), and fewer
incentives  to remit  in order  to inherit. Third,  the poor  face  worse  prospects  of education  (which  would
allow  them  to 'substitute  quality  for quantity'  in children  [Becker  and Lewis  (1974)1,  and  especially  of
female  education  (which  raises  the opportunity-cost  of motherhood).
61.  The latter  argument,  however,  depends  on market  transmission  of higher  exptected  demand  for
natural  resources  (due  to higher  population)  to suppliers's  actions  to economize  in, and/or  to discover,
such resources. Where  real long interest-rates  are both exogenous  and high (or rising  sharply),  this
transmission  mechanism  does  not work  weli  [Lipton  (1992a)1.
62.  This  has been  found  for Am  subsets  of girls under  5 in North  India  [Levinson  (1974),  Bardhan
(1982),  Dasgupta  (1987)]  and  in Bangladesh  [Chen  (1981),  Muhuvi  and  Preston  (1991)].
63.  The increase,  with  deepening  poverty,  vanishes  among  the very  poorest  5-10%  of households  in
most samples  [Lipton  1983a:  43-5].
64.  In Peru, the excess  female  burden  was even  more  severe  for single-headed  households,  where
female  heads even  had to work 39% more "market' hours  than male heads; even in multiple-earner
households,  market  plus domestic  work  occupied  female  heads  for 76 hours  per month  more  than  male
heads  [Rosenhouse  19891.
65.  See H. Standing  (1985),  Anker  and  Hein (1985),  Guhan  and  Bharathan  (1984)  on silk-weaving
work  in South  India;  von  E-aun, Puetz  and  Webb  (1989)  on irrigated  rice-farming  in the Gambia;  Telles
(1993)  on urban  labor  markets  in Brazil.
66.  For sociological  ' planations  see Alam  and  Martin  (1984),  and Schiegel  (1976).
67.  See, for example,  Visaria  (1977),  Lipton  (1983a)  and  van de Walle  and  Ravailion  (1992).
68.  Since  child/adult  ratios  rise sharply  with  falling  living  standards,  this  probably  explains  why  the
associated  increase  of female  ASPRs  is so modest.
69.  For theories  and evidence  on unemployment  in LDCs  see Rosenzweig's  (1988)  survey. Recent
contributions  include  the work  on tacit collusion  on the supply  side in rural labor markets  [tDrfze  and
Mukherjee  (1989),  Osmani  (1991)],  and the general  equilibrium  theory of unemployment  under the
efficiency  wage  hypothesis  [Dasgupta  and Ray (1986, Dasgupta  (1992)]. The latter explains  higher
80unemployment  amongst  those with fewest  assets  as the competitive  equilibrium  of a labor market in which
the cost of labor per efficiency  hour is high for those with few assets, who are thus priced out of the
market.
70.  Though rural poverty clearly fell in Indonesia, Egypt, and Kenya in 1950-75  or so, real farm
wage-rates  showed  no clear uptrend [Lipton  (1983: 86-7)]. Real wage rates showed  little gain - and by
some accounts  fell -during the 1980s  in Java, while  poverty  measures  fell markedly [Ravallion  and Huppi
(1991), World Bank (1991b)1.
71.  Schooling  is associated  with higher  productivity  even  for farm laborers  [Chaudhri  (1979),  Jamison
and Lau (1982), Otsuka et al. (1992)], and can help people to escape from low real wage-rates i
unskilled agriculture  by shifting or diversifying  sector, or place, of work.  In Malaysia, Thailand and
Korea, this process eventually  "turned  round" the rising trend of farm labor supply; female  education  also
helps this process in the long run by inducing  lower fertility.
72.  For a stark example  of how the poor can lose from statutory  minimum wage rates imposed  on
public works employment  see Ravallion  et al (1993).
73.  Iu a sample of Philippine farm households, Bouis (1991) finds that the incidence of certain
micronutrient  deficiencies  (iron, calcium, thiamin)  tends to be greatest amongst  the poor.
74.  See Schiff and  Valdes (1990); on  Ivory Coast evidence, such  capacity depends on  loat
endowments  of quite precisely specifiable  health inputs [Thomas  et al. (1992: 32)].
75.  See Payne and Lipton (1993); for more enthusiasm  about  RMR-adaptation,  see Sukhatme  (1981);
for less, see Dasgupta and Ray (1990).
76.  Despite the controversies about calorie-income  elasticities  we have not seen, and would not
readily believe, data showing  high incidences  of severe undernutrition  well abo  an ultra-poverty  line.
77.  See Schofield  (1974),  Bardhan  and Rudra (1981), Platteau  (1988), Ravallion  and Dearden  (1989),
Rosenzweig  and Stark (1989), Walker and Ryan (1990), Townsend (1991), Ravallion  and Chaudhuri
(1992),  Fafchamps  (1992), Coate and Ravallion  (1993),  Saha (1993), and Besley's  chapter in this volume.
78.  See, for example,  Anderson  and Hazell (1989), Chambers  et al.(1981), Sahn, (1989), Ravallion
(1988), World Bank (1990, chapter 2), Walker and Ryan (1990), and Morduch (1990, 1991).
79.  4.7% in Cameroon, 7.1% in Peru, 0.3% in Bangladesh,  3.0% in India, 4.8% in Sri Lanka and
2.2% in Thailand. They were slightly  more significant  in Turkey (9.7%), Syria (14.7%) and Paraguay
(16.0%).  Only in two of the ten countries with substantial  populations and available data (Ecuador,
Nepal) did over  30% of people live in  "intermediate" settlements. See  UN  (1983:896-907) and
'1988:711-718).
80.  Exceptions  do exist. In parts of Kerala (India)  and SW Sri Lanka, rural areas are not much less
densely  seled  than are small towns.
81.  National definitions of "rural" and "urban" do not refer to comparable (or sometimes  to any)
population sizes of setdements.  In Africa, five of the available (1980s) national data sets give no
definition;  ten give political definitions (e.g. "municipalities");  for five, the main criterion is " > 5000";
for one, " > 3000"; andi  for three, ' > 2000".  In Asia, the respective  numbers are 4 (including  China),15, 2 (including  India),  zero  and 1. In South  America,  they  are 1, 6, 0, 0 and 2, plus  one country  each
using  ">2500"  and "> 100  dwellings".  In Asia  a further  two  countries  use "> 10,000",  and  one each
">9000" and (Japan)  ">50,000". See  UN (1988:  205-6).
82.  For example,  an RUPIR  of 3 means  that  a randomly  selected  person  living  in rural  areas  is  three
times  more  likely  to be poor  than  one living  in urban  areas.
83.  The Bank  estimate  is 1.1. However,  the 1.3  figure  makes  use of a subsequent  reworking  of the
Indian data, which developed  alternative  (income-group-  and State-specific)  rural and urban price
deflators. This new  series  gives  somewhat  higher  estimates  of rural  poverty  incidence,  and  of RUPIRs:
respectively  59 per cent  and 1.27  for 1970-71,  51 per cent  and 1.28  for 1983,  and 49 per cent  and 1.29
for 1987-8  [Minhas  et al. (1991:1670)].
84.  Large excess  rural mortality  exists  in India  for both sexes  at all ages; for under-fives,  the gap
appears  to have widened  since 1961  [Mitra (1978:  223), Ruzicka  (1982:  tables 5-6)].  Rural infant
mortality  typically  exceeds  urban  [World  Bank  (1990:  31)1.
85.  However,  even the urban poor, especially  female  casual workers, depend  significantly  on
agricultural  and allied  employment  and  income.
86.  Such  as banning  street vending,  or low-cost  transport  from the streets,  or favored  treatment  to
large firms  in access  to institutional  credit.
87.  Spearman's  rank correlation  coefficient  is not significant  even  at 10 per cent; but, of the five
States  (out  of 15) with  highest  urban  poverty  incidence,  three  are among  the half-dozen  with  the lowest
proportions  of urban  population  living  in slums.
88.  Notice  that the function P is homogeneous  of degree  zero in the poverty  line and the mean.
Poverty  measures  with  this property  are 'invariant  to scale*.  In some  of the literature,  these  are  referred
to as "relative  poverty  measures",  as distinct  from  "absolute  poverty  measures",  which  are invariant  to
adding  the same absolute  amount  to all incomes  and the poverty  line; see Blackorby  and Donaldson
(1980)  and Foster  and Shorrocks  (1991). A:most  all poverty  measures  currendy  used in practice  are
"relative  poverty  measures"  in the above  sense.
89.  The  Lorenz  curve  can  be written  as L(pz)  - F-r(t,)dWi/ where  F-I is  the inverse  of the CDF
0
i.e., a proportion  p of the population  have  a standard  of living  less than  F-(p,n)  [Gastwirth  (1971)].
90.  This assumes  that  z is constant,  though  this can be readily  relaxed  to the assumption  that  z has
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following  intensification  in the early 1970s [Cohen  (1975)].
99.  The new institutional  economics  emphasizes  the choices  made  by farmers in adopting  innovations,
those choices being seen as dependent on (inter alia) evolving  relative factor scarcities. On the agro-
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highly volatile  in the 1970s  and 1980s.  Increases  in the prices of these goods  often led to public spending
sprees, which led to large budget deficits when  primary commodity  prices fell.
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110.  Household  survey instruments  funded  this way have included  a number  of the surveys  done under
the World Bank's Living Standards  Measurement  Study; see Glewwe  (1990).
111.  We shall continue  to focus on consumption  poverty. Impacts  of adjustment  on a range of social
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Panwalkar  (1988),  Echeverri-Gent  (1988), Dreze (1990a), Dreze and Sen (1989), and von Braun, Teklu
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Longhurst (1989), Singh (1990)].
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127.  The same is true of the view that "excessive" indebtedness  arises from the "extravagance"  of
myopic peasants  when exposed to new opportnities  for credit; see Ravallion  (1990c).
128.  See Theil and Finke (1985), Schieber  and Poullier (1989), and Gertler and van der Gaag (1990).
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131.  These  are often  termed  'benefit  incidence'  studies. 'his  is somewhat  misleading,  since  one is
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